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Abstract

THE DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE CONRTIBUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT
GRANTS TO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
By
AMANDA LORI WILSKER
AUGUST 2011

Committee Chair: Dr. Dennis R. Young
Major Department: Economics
The nonprofit sector is becoming increasingly important to the U.S. economy both as an
employer and service provider. Although most of the sector‟s revenues are earned, the ability of the
nonprofit sector to generate significant levels of unearned income in the form of grants and
contributions reinforces the sector‟s uniqueness. This dissertation uses the NCCS-Guidestar data to
address questions pertaining to the determinants of nonprofits‟ contributions and government grants.
Each of the essays‟ findings is discussed briefly below.
The first chapter examines the relationship between an organization‟s finances and the level
of government grants received. Because organizations choose to apply for government grants, a
Heckman procedure is coupled with fixed effects to produce unbiased, within organization estimates.
When controlling for the probability an organization receives grant funding, the average level of
grants an organization receives generally increases with improvements in efficiency measures. In
testing Brooks‟ (2004) adjusted performance measure, the author finds that for many categories of
nonprofit organizations, improvements in performance relative to community expectations increase
grants for recipients, but better performance reduces the probability an organization receives any
government grants.

x

xi
The second essay examines the determinants of direct support to organizations in four of the
major categories, namely Arts, Education, Health, and Human Services, using instrumental and panel
techniques. Unlike government grants, changes in price do not affect organizations‟ expected
contributions. When significant, government grants generally crowd out private donations while the
effects of program service revenue vary by category and specification.
The final essay examines the effects of nonprofit expenses and revenues on direct support for
organizations in four small subcategories, Disaster Preparedness, International Aid, Environmental
Conservation, and Performing Arts. The essay tests whether the impact of various revenue and
expense variables on direct support changes around an unexpected event such as 9/11. Results
suggest that the events of 9/11 had a greater moderating effect for categories losing funding compared
to categories that received a windfall of contributions.

xi

1

Introduction
For two consecutive weeks in April, 60 Minutes featured both the best and worst of
the nonprofit sector. On April 17th, 2011, the CBS news show aired a story about Greg
Mortenson, best-selling author and executive director of the Central Asia Institute. The story
raised concerns over excessive benefits for Mortenson and the intentional misleading of
donors. Since airing, the Montana Attorney General announced he is investigating
Mortenson and his charity. One week later, on April 24th, the same news program featured
Eli Broad, a philanthropist intent on giving away the majority of his multi-billion dollar
fortune. Supportive of the arts, medical and scientific research, and public education, the
worst Broad‟s critics can say is that he micromanages each of his contributions to ensure that
they are used properly by the recipient organization. He considers his contributions as
investments and expects tangible returns.
These two stories demonstrate America‟s love/hate relationship with the nonprofit
sector. We look to the nonprofit sector as a savior at times, able to solve problems created or
exacerbated by public and private sector failures. At other times, we criticize the nonprofit
sector as inefficient and assume that without the profit-maximizing objective of for-profit
firms, the nonprofit sector maximizes directors‟ or board members‟ objectives that may not
align with the organizations‟ stated missions.
Whether we believe in the nonprofit sector‟s ability to fill a void in society or are
simply acting on our need to “do good,” many American‟s contribute to nonprofit
organizations. Our government, too, provides grants and extends contracts to organizations
that are constrained in their ability to redistribute profits. Current economic conditions and
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changing political tides threaten government support to many nonprofits including staples in
public media such as National Public Radio (NPR) and Public Broadcasting Station (PBS).
Few nonprofits, philanthropists, and directors receive the media attention recently
given to the examples above, and yet a significant proportion of nonprofit organizations are
dependent on contributions and government grants. At the organizational level, little
research examines the determinants of government grants received by a nonprofit. More
research exists on determinants of private contributions, but research is generally divided into
two camps. In the three essays that follow, each of these issues is addressed.
In the first chapter, the author analyzes organizational factors that affect the level of
government grants received by a nonprofit organization. Recognizing that organizations
choose to apply for government grants, the author applies a Heckman methodology that
accounts for self-selection. While the results suggest that government grants are dependent
on previous year‟s allocation of expenses, the most interesting finding may come from an
adaptation of Brooks‟ Adjusted Performance Measure. Organizations spending more on
program expenses are less likely to receive grants, but conditional on receiving grants, more
efficient organizations receive more money from the government. These results suggest that
governments are selecting the most efficient organizations from a pool that does not
represent the best of the nonprofit sector.
The second essay merges empirical advances in the estimation of crowding out of
private contributions by government grants with research on the effects of financial proxies
for efficiency on direct support. In addition to efficiency measures and government grants,
the effect of program service revenues on contributions is also considered. Analysis was
restricted to four of the five major categories, and relationships were estimated using a
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variety of panel and instrumental techniques. When government grants significantly affected
contributions, the relationship was negative, supporting crowding-out hypotheses. The sign
and significance of program service revenues varied considerably across categories, and
interestingly, the financial proxy for efficiency lacked significance.
Further disaggregation of categories occurs in the third essay in which Disaster
Preparedness and Relief organizations are compared with Performing Arts, Environmental
Conservation, and International Aid. Although still interested in the effects of government
grants, efficiency, and program service revenues on direct support, this essay seeks to
determine whether the effects are moderated as people respond to tragedies such as 9/11.
Surprisingly, greater moderation occurs for organizations that are losing funding such as the
Performing Arts than for industries receiving large influxes of money.
While governments respond to improvements in an organization‟s efficiency, private
donors are less concerned with efficiency and more concerned with other revenue streams,
including government grants and program service revenue. In all three essays, we find
evidence of significant differences between categories and groups of nonprofits, suggesting
that further research may benefit from closer examination of more homogeneous groups of
nonprofit organizations.
Each essay offers new insight into specific revenue streams for nonprofit
organizations, but with each answer, new questions arise. Addressing some questions
requires the collection of new data. Existing data provide information on grant recipients but
not applicants, for example. Other issues may be addressed with different empirical
techniques. For example, it might be interesting to compare the results in the second essay to
those generated by a generalized method of moments technique. Finally, changing the unit
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of analysis from the organization to the sector may offer even more information on the
determinants of direct support and government grants.
Additional research in these areas is both encouraged and expected, but further
improvements do not diminish the importance of the research within this dissertation. From
a researcher‟s perspective, developments in this dissertation highlight the need for
understanding changes over time and including several revenue and expenses categories in
the prediction of government grants and direct support. For nonprofits, findings promote the
importance of understanding the differential impacts of determinants across categories and
over time. While the goal of a nonprofit should not be to maximize grants or contributions,
for many nonprofits, their work never ends. The need for greater revenues to meet growing
service demands underlines the importance of understanding the determinants of both private
contributions and government grants. Finally, for current and prospective donors, the
research says a lot about those factors that affect aggregated contributions at the
organizational level. Perhaps we should all take our cues from Eli Broad, the Californian
philanthropist, and expect returns or outcomes from our charitable contributions.
Understanding current behavior is necessary before we can change behavior, and both may
be necessary to build a more efficient and effective nonprofit sector.
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Why Government Gives: The Effects of Efficiency Proxies on Government Grants to
NPOs
The public sector provides a nontrivial source of financing to nonprofit organizations
directly in the form of grants, contracts, and fees for services and indirectly as tax deductions,
credits, and payments to individuals that ultimately flow to nonprofits (Bowman & FremontSmith, 2006). Prior to 1960, public support of nonprofit organizations constituted a small
share of nonprofit revenues and was largely confined to select nonprofits (Smith, 2006). The
last five decades, however, produced radical changes in the relationship between the
nonprofit and public sectors, with 29% of nonprofit revenues now coming directly from the
government (Blackwood, Wing, & Pollak, 2008). Considering that the nonprofit sector
accounts for a minimum of 5% of GDP (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009), government support of
nonprofits accounts for more than 1.4 percent of the United States‟ economy.
Despite the importance of the government-nonprofit relationship, relatively little
research examines the determinants of government funding, specifically government grants
that constitute approximately one third of direct public support. Instead, economists
traditionally focus on crowding out-the displacement of private contributions following
government funding (Andreoni & Payne, 2003; R. Steinberg, 1991)-and the determinants of
private contributions including financial proxies for efficiency (Tinkelman, 1999; Tinkelman
& Mankaney, 2007; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). While understanding the response of
donors to government funding and efficiency proxies is important, multiple parties have a
vested interest in understanding those factors that affect the receipt of government grants.
There are reasons to believe that the public sector reacts differently to changes in
nonprofit organizations‟ behaviors than private donors. Nonprofit organizations control their
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expense allocations, and to the extent that expenses affect revenues (Fischer, Wilsker, &
Young, 2010), the organizations also have considerable control over their revenue streams.
In estimating private contributions, researchers and watchdog agencies often use expense
allocations to calculate measures intended to capture a nonprofit organization‟s efficiency.
Theoretically, private donors are expected to increase contributions as organizations become
more efficient. Empirically, however, the relationship is ambiguous. Results vary in both the
magnitude and direction (Bowman, 2006; Khanna, Posnett, & Sandler, 1995; Okten &
Weisbrod, 2000; Parsons, 2003; Tinkelman, 2004; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986), perhaps a
result of donors‟ lack of information on nonprofit financing (Horne, Johnson, & Van Slyke,
2005). Presumably, the government has a greater stake in ensuring efficient use of
taxpayers‟ money, with more resources to research an organization before awarding funding
and monitor organizations after.
It is conceivable that the government is more responsive to changes in financial
proxies for efficiency than private donors, but before we can make such an argument,
empirical testing is necessary. This essay estimates the relationship between financial
proxies for efficiency and government grants while controlling for organizational fixed
effects and selection into the pool of grant applicants/recipients. The author begins with a
review of the relevant literature, discussing first the relationship between the public and
private sectors and then financial proxies for efficiency. Then, hypotheses and a description
of the data used in the subsequent analysis are presented. Results from a series of regressions
are presented and analyzed. Finally, the author concludes with a brief summary of the
findings and implications for public policy.
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Before we begin with the crux of this paper, however, let us first define government
grants. Government grants are reported on line 1e of the Form 990 filed by nonprofit
organizations. According to directions for filing Form 990, a grant is a payment from a
governmental unit and is reported “if its primary purpose is to enable the organization to
provide a service to, or maintain a facility for, the direct benefit of the public rather than to
serve the direct and immediate needs of the governmental unit.” Generally speaking, grants
are defined as payments that further the grantees‟ missions, while contracts primarily benefit
the payee.
The distinction between government grants and contracts is often blurry because of
the striking similarities. For each, the government must issue some type of request for
proposals, and responses are evaluated on a competitive basis. Grants, however, are
generally not provided to private, for-profit agencies, and are “designed to accomplish a
public purpose, … address a public problem, or stimulate a particular activity,” (Flood,
2002). Contracts are more specific in their terms and conditions, more heavily regulated, and
most importantly, designed to acquire goods and services with a premium placed on delivery
of the good or acceptable performance (Flood, 2002).
The remainder of this paper focuses on government grants, thus relying on accurate
reporting by the nonprofit organization and appropriate classification of funding by the
government as grants as opposed to contracts.
Bureaucratic Theory and Nonprofit Grants
Prior to examining the documented relationship between the public and nonprofit
sectors, let us first establish a brief model for the government agencies making the grants.
There are two parts of government, the politicians–likely determining the size of budgets
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and/or the amount of budgets allocated to grants–and the bureaucrats responsible for
awarding grants, selecting grantees, and monitoring usage of the grants by recipients.
With respect to politicians, two sets of literature offer potentially valuable insight.
First, the median voter theorem postulates that in order to win an election, a politician must
express views consistent with the median voter. In theory, the model works in a two
candidate race when voters‟ preferences can be represented along a single dimension.
According to such a theory, politicians‟ positions, and later government expenditures on
public goods, are viewed as an expression of the preferences of the median voter. Nonprofits
enter the scene because, like the government, the sector provides goods often collective in
nature or ones that the private sector cannot produce profitably. For this reason, Weisbrod
(1964) argues, social welfare is increased by subsidizing the nonprofit sector (Weisbrod,
1964), providing justification for contributions and perhaps making the first theoretical
argument for government grants to nonprofits.
The problem, however, is that many studies fail to find expenditure decisions that are
consistent with the median voter theorem (Romer & Rosenthal, 1979). As Romer and
Rosenthal (1979) suggest, expenditures are often in excess of those desired by the median
voter, suggesting either a multiplier between median voter preferences and actual
expenditures or the possession of significant bargaining power by agency bureaucrats. Other
problems reside with the representatives we elect to represent us. Politicians may engage in
log-rolling, or the trading of their votes on current issues for supporting votes on policy they
and their constituents desire. Particularly in the case of expenditures, one can see that parties
tend to support one another in cases when their own constituents may not benefit in exchange
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for their party‟s support on bills where their own regions benefit economically (Buchanan &
Tullock, 1965).
Temporarily ignoring the ability of the median voter theorem to connect political
preferences to overall expenditures, we can still draw general conclusions between the
theorem and grants to nonprofit organizations. In deciding what types of nonprofits to award
money and the level of funding earmarked for specific industries, politicians are likely to
consider the values and preferences of their constituents. For example, in view of their
constituents‟ preferences, politicians determine the level of services publically provided
relative to those funded by the government but provided by nonprofit organizations. The
median voter may also determine how much funding, if any, is awarded in grants to the Arts,
Environment, or Human Services, to name a few nonprofit industries. Finally, politicians are
likely to award grants to the most deserving nonprofits if the median voter is concerned with
organizational efficiency. Of course, the last part of this hypothesis fails to hold if voters
base preferences on organization reputation rather than efficiency, as the two may not be
correlated.
Also relevant to the discussion are the determinants of intergovernmental grants,
the closest public expenditures to government grants of nonprofits. While little if any
research exists on public funding of nonprofits, a substantial body of research on
intergovernmental grants may provide additional insight. Factors such as the similarity in
political party between officials in the sending and receiving government units positively
affects grants per capita (Grossman, 1994). States with a higher proportion of Democrats in
the state legislature also receive more federal funding. Other studies have documented that
greater per capita grants flow to areas with more swing voters (Johansson, 2003). In this
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sense, intergovernmental grants become political tools. Grants to nonprofits may fill a
similar purpose. Government officials may make grants to nonprofit organizations that
appeal to voters with particular preferences, hoping that the inflow of funds or designations
for specific purposes will increase support for the politicians‟ candidacy.
Although a handful of grants to nonprofit organizations may come directly from
political proceedings, often times, money is allotted generally to specific causes or purposes,
and it is the duty of the bureaucrats to divide the pool of funds, award specific grants, and
monitor recipients. Niskanen (1968) provided a cornerstone of public choice literature,
describing the ways in which a bureaucracy desiring to maximize its budget can produce at a
level and grow at a rate significantly higher than that expected of a competitive market facing
the same conditions. This result arises when the bureaucracy is assumed to be an agent with
monopoly power both over the buyer of services (government) and service provision
(Niskanen, 1968). Contrary to Niskanen‟s view of a perpetually increasing bureaucracy,
Breton and Wintrobe (1975) conclude that the budget maximizing preference is constrained
by the fact that increases in size – particularly in the number of employees- diminishes a
managers control over the agency. Thus, there is some point at which an increase in budget
is no longer optimal (Breton & Wintrobe, 1975).
The above theories were established to explain bureaucratic behavior, but extension
to the government‟s grant making behavior is not unreasonable. Through grants, an agency
can increase the provision of services indirectly, thus reducing the trade-off between budget
increases and managers‟ control over the agency. In other words, the optimal size of a
bureaucracy, while still subject to the criticism of Breton and Wintrobe (1975), increases
beyond that anticipated if all service provision is provided directly by a public agency.
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Discussion and development of the bureaucratic literature is important but may be
outside the scope of this particular paper. For example, how politicians and bureaucrats
decide the proportion of the budget earmarked for grants is left for future research. Here, we
assume that the granting agency or bureaucrat is a rational actor, and whether motivated by
self or public interests, has reasons to allocate designated grant funds to the more efficient
nonprofit applicants. From a public interest perspective, such allocations increase social
welfare more than the awarding of grants to less efficient organizations. For bureaucrats
motivated by pure self-interest and the desire to advance professionally, the need to
demonstrate a clean, positive track record may include the awarding of grants to exceptional
nonprofit organizations. Although constrained by the availability of grant funds, the number
of grants they can award, the applicant pool, and the time they can spend reviewing each
application and monitoring each recipient, it remains in the bureaucrats‟ best interest to
objectively award funding. Again, formal development of the theory is beyond the scope of
this dissertation, but such theory does suggest that we should observe a positive relationship
between grants awarded and nonprofit efficiency.
If we accept the notion that bureaucratic agents are rational and are interested in
funding the most efficient nonprofit organizations, then we may incorporate our knowledge
of individual donors and how they value efficiency. The next section describes the
relationship between the public and nonprofit sectors and then provides reasons why the
determinants of government grants may be similar and different to the determinants of
private contributions.
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Government and Nonprofit Sector Interactions
As a public expenditure, grants to nonprofit organizations represent a unique
relationship between the public and nonprofit sectors. Theories on the origins of the
nonprofit sector suggest it developed (at least in part) as a result of the public sector‟s failure
to provide adequate services, suggesting a supplemental relationship. Grants, however, are
more like outsourcing; the public sector pays for services provided by the nonprofits. This
source of funding, therefore, implies a complementary relationship between the public sector
and grant recipients (Young, 2000, 2006).
The relationship between the nonprofit and public sectors is occasionally explored
(Smith & Gronbjerg, 2006; Young, 2000, 2006), but economists displayed greater interest in
understanding how the actions of the government affected private contributions, both in
regards to crowding out and changes in marginal tax rates (Andreoni & Payne, 2003; Dokko,
2008; Handy & Webb, 2003; Harrison & Laincz, 2010; Kingma, 1989; Marudas & Jacobs,
2004; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Payne, 1998; Smith, 2006; R. Steinberg, 1991; Weisbrod &
Dominguez, 1986). Estimates of crowding-out, for example, vary considerably across
studies (Tinkelman, 2010), possibly explained by asymmetric information between
nonprofits and donors (Horne, et al., 2005).
Information asymmetry between private donors and nonprofit organizations is not
surprising given the costs of researching an organization (i.e. time) (Buchheit & Parsons,
2006) and the relatively small dollar amount of most households‟ donations (The Center on
Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2010). The average donation is approximately $172, but
the median is only $50. Roughly two-thirds of all donations are less than or equal to $100
(The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2007). This stands in stark contrast to
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government grants to the nonprofit sector. Conditional on having received (and properly
reported) government grants, the median and average values between 1998 and 2003 were
$138,000 and more than one million dollars, respectively. Although the data do not allow us
to determine the number of separate grants an organization receives or whether some grants
are multi-year awards, we can assume that the typical grant is much larger than the average
donation.
With large sums of money at stake, government agencies should engage in more
thorough background checks than most donors. It can even be argued that their search costs
are lower. Nonprofit organizations must apply for government grants, providing financial
statements and clear descriptions of how the organization intends to use the resources.
Bureaucrats do not make decisions on a case-by-case basis but more likely select the best
candidates from a pool of applicants. After a grant is awarded, most government agencies
continue to monitor recipient organizations to ensure proper usage of funds (Smith, 2006).
We expect more thorough oversight from the government since public officials have more to
lose than a head of household following a poor allocation of resources.
If government agencies more thoroughly investigate grant recipients, then we might
expect more systematic relationships between efficiency proxies and the level of grants
awarded. Marudas and Jacobs (2009) provide what may be the only existing study of the
determinants of government funding at the organizational level. Their sole measure of
efficiency was price (or the necessary contribution to increase program expenses by one
dollar), and the authors used only two years of data from the Statistics of Income dataset. By
including the necessary lagged values for certain variables, the authors are left with only one
observation for each organization, unable to account for organizational fixed effects.
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Marudas and Jacobs (2009) find that a one percent increase in the price reduces expected
government grants by 1.1 percent but acknowledge empirical and theoretical flaws with their
model. Their work nonetheless provides a starting point for what should be an important line
of research.
Financial Proxies for Efficiency
While public sector contributions and their relationship to financial proxies for
efficiency are understudied, a considerable amount of research explores the relationship
between these proxies and private contributions. Popular measures include shares of
expenses allocated to programs, administration, or fundraising (Bowman, 2006; Jacobs &
Marudas, 2009; Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007), the price of increasing program expenses by
one dollar (Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Tinkelman, 2004), and financial information such as
revenue diversification and net assets (Chang & Tuckman, 1991). Untested measures of
nonprofit efficiency include those used by watchdog and rating agencies such as fundraising
effectiveness (Charity Navigator, 2010), Steinberg‟s (1986) marginal donative product (R.
Steinberg, 1986a), and Brooks‟ (2004) Adjusted Performance Measures (Brooks, 2004).
Parsons (2003) provides one of the more recent reviews of this literature. After
presenting arguments for and against a uniform standard of accounting for nonprofit
organizations, she cites the lack of output measures (or success at accomplishing mission) as
the primary reason why scholars cannot decisively assess nonprofit efficiency. As a result,
we are forced to look at inputs when evaluating the effects of efficiency for large numbers of
organizations (Parsons, 2003). In a small field experiment, for example, Khumawala and
Gordon (1997) conclude that donors are more interested in the expense allocations of
organizations than complex figures reported on the financial statements, although these are
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second to information organizations provide on their missions, activities, and
accomplishments (Khumawala & Gordon, 1997). A more recent experimental approach
concluded that potential donors viewed organizations that provided financial information
more favorably than organizations that did not, but this view did not result in increased
donations. In the second part of the same study, donors that selected to view financial
information rewarded organizations that allocated a greater share of resources towards
program expenses with larger donations (Buchheit & Parsons, 2006).
In another field experiment, Bowman (2006) tracks employee contributions to
workplace giving campaigns, where potential contributors are provided with information on
an organization‟s expenditures. Stemming from (R. Steinberg, 1986b)‟s and Brooks‟ (2004;
2006) arguments that expense shares fail to capture the efficiency with which an additional
donation will be used, Bowman (2006) tests the sensitivity of donations to changes in
overhead ratios. While increases in overhead expenses are associated with declines in
contributions, Bowman determines that other factors are more important in determining the
level of contributions.
Although not explicitly provided, donors are occasionally presented with information
that they could use to deduct price – equal to the amount needed to increase program
expenses by one dollar. Okten and Weisbrod (2000), for example, conclude that increases in
the price of giving consistently reduce contributions, thereby reducing the positive, direct
effect of fundraising on total contributions. Panel data techniques, however, sometimes
reveal the insignificance of price once we account for unobservable, time-invariant
characteristics (Khanna, et al., 1995).
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The financial health of an organization may be of interest to donors, but as a recent
study by Hope Consultants (2010) and research by (Buchheit & Parsons, 2006) concluded,
donors are not as responsive to changes in (or levels of) financial health indicators as theory
predicts. Lack of significance may indicate multiple actions that cancel out one other. For
example, some donors reward financial prudence while others question the usefulness of
their donation if the organization appears to save rather than spend significant portions of
revenues (Handy & Webb, 2003). When one of these two actions prevails, it appears to be
the latter with increases in assets negatively affecting contributions, ceteris paribus (Marudas,
2004). A more likely possibility is that donors lack sufficient knowledge about nonprofit
finances (Horne, et al., 2005) for changes in financial health to have any discernable impact
on contributions. As mentioned earlier, the government may be more inclined to review
financial information, but as is the case with private contributors, their response to
organizations that maintain sufficient reserves may not be favorable. In fact, Marudas and
Jacobs (2009) find a negative relationship between wealth (defined as net assets divided by
non-fundraising expenses) and government support, although their empirical techniques may
have biased results.
Brooks (2004) suggests that donors may be less responsive to the actual values of
efficiency proxies than they are to nonprofits‟ relative performance. Governments,
particularly those at local levels, should be familiar with the success of individual
organizations – giving credibility to those scholars suggesting that government grants signal
quality to potential donors (Khanna & Sandler, 2000). Applicable to this paper, however, is
the idea that governments have an idea of what is expected from nonprofits and reward those
that perform better than other nonprofits in the community.
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The next part of the paper begins to build an empirical model explaining the
relationship between nonprofit financial characteristics and the level of government grants
received.
Empirical Model and Data
Marudas and Jacobs (2009) propose the first such model using organizational
characteristics to predict levels of government grant funding. Despite recognizing the need
for panel techniques in prior publications (Marudas & Jacobs, 2004), the scholars only have
two years worth of data, and the need for lagged variables eliminates the possibility of
controlling for organizational fixed effects. The authors also exclude observations reporting
zero government grants. The problem is that organizations receiving grants are not a random
sample. First, organizations determine whether applying for grants is in their best interest.
Then, government agencies select among the applicants, further complicating the analysis.
The removal of organizations failing to receive government grants creates a selectivity bias
that may affect estimated parameters (Heckman, 1976). Therefore, two problems need to be
corrected. First, a panel dataset is necessary given the differences in cross-sectional and
panel estimates found in previous research (Khanna, et al., 1995; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000).
Second, an attempt to account for the selection is necessary to avoid (or at least minimize)
potential bias in the coefficients.
The NCCS-Guidestar National Nonprofit Research Database (also known as
Digitized Data) is the best available data to explain variation in government grants. It spans
from 1998-2003 and includes the population of nonprofit organizations filing Form 990 with
the IRS. More recent datasets do not include the population of nonprofits or fail to
distinguish government grants from other sources of contributions. Digitized Data provide
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information on the population of 501c(3) nonprofits filing Form 990 with the IRS, required
of all non-religious nonprofits earning more than $25,000 in any given year. As mentioned,
it is one of the few datasets that disaggregates total contributions into government grants,
donations from private individuals and corporations (direct support), and revenues from
foundations (indirect support).
Six years of data are available and records are matched according to a unique
organization identifier, the EIN. Due to entry and exit as well as smaller organizations with
revenues fluctuating around $25,000, information is not available for all organizations across
all years. While the data is taken from forms filed with the IRS, some scholars question the
reliability of the data (Froelich, Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000; Gordon, Khumawala, Kraut, &
Meade, 2007). Following Tinkelman (1999) and Marudas and Jacobs (2009), among others,
observations for which the data are implausible are removed. This includes observations
with negative values in accounting lines that should not be negative and instances where
individual parts are greater than the whole. Also excluded from analysis are organizations
whose primary missions are to collect funds for other organizations and do not provide
services directly to the community. Table 1 provides more detail on the organizations
excluded from analysis.
Unfortunately, we lose observations for which there are two or fewer years of data.
The model, discussed in detail below, includes lagged variables and fixed effects, thus
requiring a minimum of three years of usable data. A total of 177,329 organizations with
580,344 observations remain in the sample following the data cleaning outlined in the table.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 present summary data on the remaining organizations. In the case
of the financial data in Tables 2 and 3, all monetary values are real, with 1998 serving as the
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base year (CPIs taken from [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010]). The first of these two tables
presents descriptive statistics while the second table compares variables‟ means by grant
recipient status. Table 4 documents the representation of the 23 NTEE categories in the
usable sample. (There are actually 26 categories according to the taxonomy, but two are
dropped for having no usable observations – Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Grant-making
Foundations (T) and Mutual and Membership Benefit (Y), while Unknown (Z) contains an
assortment of 273 unrelated organizations.) In addition to the frequency with which each
category occurs, two additional columns present the categories‟ average reliance on
government grants. A ratio of government grants to total revenues is calculated for each
organization, and then the average of this figure is presented for the category and grant
recipients within the category. (This number differs from that where total government grants
are compared to total revenue within a category.)
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Table 1
Observations Omitted from Analysis
Number of Observations
dropped
10,495
93
100
69
46
143
528
247
202
326
79
11544
5205
3636
170656
143951
15,906
1887
262,384
449
55,263
77,764
179,922

Reason for Removal
Negative Total Revenues (drop if not using)
Negative contributions
Negative direct Support
Negative Indirect Support
Negative Government Grants
Negative Fundraising Expenses
Negative Managerial / Administration Expenses
Negative Total Expenses
Negative Program Expenses
Program Expenses Exceeding Total Expense
Administrative Expenses Exceed total Expense
Private Foundations
Government Grants in Excess of Total Revenues
Mutual Benefit Public Charities
Supporting Public Charity (“Friends of, Booster Clubs,
Foundations”)
Single Organization /NTEE Category level fundraising,
Grant making foundation, and general fundraisers
Working Capital Ratio greater than 20
Price greater than 20
Zero Program Expenses
Category Z
One year of Data for Organization
Two years of Data
Observations in 1998*

21

Table 2
Select Summary Statistics (real values)
Variables

Mean

Median

Government Grants
Program Expenses
Administrative Expenses
Total Expenses
State Funding to Others
Net Assets - BOY
Government Grants (when > 0)
Price
Working Capital Ratio
Administrative Share of Total
Expenses

392292.5
3465091
519485.1
4859615
2.76e+08
3719394
962599.2
1.345653
1.181206
16.4229

0
207287.6
33448.98
262184.6
7.33e+07
140982.4
101632.5
1.167342
.5453086
11.89598

Standard
Deviation
5930750
3.27e+07
4324717
6.52e+09
4.95e+08
7.79e+07
9260695
.9109127
136.4165
18.08668

Maximum
1.36e+09
5.14e+09
4.09e+08
2.75e+12
3.60e+09
1.83e+10
1.36e+09
19.99971
19.99989
100

Table 3
Comparison of Means by Receipt of Government Grants
Variables

Government Grants
Program Expenses
Administrative Expenses
Total Expenses
State Funding to Others
Net Assets - BOY
Price
Working Capital Ratio
Administrative Share of Total
Expenses
Observations

Mean for
observations with
Grants=0
0
3,178,847
489,730.5
3,746,424
2.67x10^8
2,735,588
1.375353
1.196279
16.69622

Mean for
observations
with Grants>0
1,209,540
5795394
834137.2
6726497
3.09x10^8
7,210,778
1.297652
1.155944
15.9648

363,474

216,860
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The second and third columns in Table 4 illustrate interesting patterns of public
support to the nonprofit sector. First, there is considerable variation in public support across
categories. Form 990 filers classified as Religion-Related, for example, receive, on average,
less than 2% of all revenues from the government. Of the less than six percent that receive
any government grants, the average reliance is almost one-third. Other sectors rely more
heavily on government grants. Thirty-six percent of organizations classified as Crime and
Legal-Related, for example, report receiving government grants. For these recipients, the
government contributes more than 60% of each organization‟s revenue, on average.
The most important observation to take from Table 4 is that conditional on receiving
government grants, average reliance on this revenue source is fairly consistent (and high)
across all categories. It is the proportion of organizations within a category that receive
government grants that differs, but once an organization receives government funding, it
tends to rely heavily on this source.
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Table 4
Representation of NTEE Categories
Category

Frequency

Avg. Reliance
on
Government

ARTS, CULTURE & HUMANITIES
EDUCATION
ENVIRONMENT
ANIMAL-RELATED
HEALTH CARE
MENTAL DISEASE & CRISIS
INTERVENTION
DISEASES, DISORDERS, &
MEDICAL DISCIPLINES
MEDICAL RESEARCH
CRIME & LEGAL RELATED
EMPLOYMENT
FOOD, AGRICULTURE &
NUTRITION
HOUSING & SHELTER
PUBLIC SAFETY AND DISASTER
PREPAREDNESS AND RELIEF
RECREATION & SPORTS
YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS & NATIONAL SECURITY
CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL ACTION &
ADVOCACY
COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT &
CAPACITY BUILDING
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
SOCIAL SCIENCE
PUBLIC AND SOCIETAL BENEFIT
RELIGION RELATED
TOTAL

19,043
24,343
3,839
2,827
15,796
7,007

.106
.112
.171
.061
.102
.291

Avg. Reliance
on
Government
for Recipients
.226
.394
.400
.280
.310
.552

4,508

.155

.477

1,346
3,821
3,465
1,909

.105
.347
.253
.181

.472
.617
.532
.338

12,636
2,979

.178
.258

.463
.445

11,337
5,016
30,181
3,202

.032
.115
.241
.074

.242
.294
.488
.420

1,415

.194

.515

8,907

.258

.560

1,332
544
1,908
9,968
177,329

.130
.093
.120
.019
.157

.430
.427
.493
.320
.420

Finally, it is imperative to remember that the numbers above represent government
grants and not government funding generally, which may also include government contracts.
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Without information on government contracts, it is difficult to determine whether
government funding across NTEE categories would converge or whether the difference
would actually increase.
Although understanding the determinants of organizations‟ reliance on government
grants as a share of total revenues is important, this topic is left for future research. Instead,
this paper examines determinants of the level of grants reported by nonprofit organizations.
Right Hand Side Variables
We expect efficiency to affect the level of government grants, and therefore, two
measures of efficiency are tested as determinants. First, PRICE represents the necessary
increase in government grants to increase program expenses by $1. It is calculated as the
inverse of the share of expenses spent on programs for organization i in time t:
Pricei,t = (Real Program Expensesi,t/Real Total Expensesi.t)-1

(EQ 1)

The above equation is one of two definitions of price, where the alternative compares
donations to fundraising. Because of the focus on government grants, the alternative
definition is less relevant than the one presented in EQ 1.
Despite the frequent use of price, criticisms of the measure are justified. The measure
is based on average expenses rather than marginal changes (Brooks, 2006). If administrative
and fundraising expenses for the year are fixed and already covered by current revenues, a
greater percentage of a contribution goes to programs, producing a price lower than that
estimated in EQ1. Using a price based on average rather than marginal may misrepresent the
“efficiency” of an increase in contributions. Unfortunately, marginal values are not
available, and readers should remain mindful of the shortfalls of this measure in particular.
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The effect of price on private donations, as already discussed, is ambiguous, perhaps
the result of information costs. If the government is more aware of finances and changes in
resource allocation, then we expect that the government will reduce grants to organizations
spending a decreasing share of expenses on programs. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H1: Price is inversely related to the level of government grants, ceteris paribus.
The use of price as opposed to its inverse, program expenses as a share of total
expenses, is also important. The obvious reason to use price is its frequent use in previous
studies and classic economic interpretation. More importantly, however, is understanding the
origins of the price measure. In a different formulation, price incorporated marginal tax rates
faced by donors, therefore producing slightly different results than the measure used in this
paper. Decomposing the initial measure, one can remove the tax rate, and assume that on
average, the rate facing donors is constant across donors and years for a particular
organization, thus moving the tax rate into an organization‟s fixed effects. A second reason
for using price is that it symbolizes the indirect relationship between fundraising and
contributions, or in this case, government grants. Fundraising is generally thought to
increase contributions. Price, however, provides a functional form that is equal to the inverse
of fundraising expense share plus administrative expense share. The inclusion of both allows
us to measure the direct, positive effect of fundraising while allowing for the indirect and
negative effect that increases in fundraising relative to other expenses can have on donors.
The second measure, MSHARE, represents administrative and managerial expenses as
a percentage of total expenses. Bowman (2006) suggests that organizations that spend less
on administration are more efficient than similar organizations. For almost 12% of the
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sample, administrative expenses are reported as zero. Unlike program expenses,
organizations reporting no administrative expenses are not removed. Although organizations
could be counting the entire salary of program directors as program expenses, it is also
possible that organizations operate with volunteers, avoiding managerial expenses.
Based on previous research, the author hypothesizes:
H2: Increases in administrative and managerial share of total expenses decrease
government grants, ceteris paribus.
There are plausible reasons, however, why we might not find evidence in support of
H2. For example, a nonprofit may invest in personnel more capable of submitting requests
for government funding, thus increasing administrative expenses as a share of total expenses.
Results supporting or refuting the above hypothesis could provide important insight into this
relationship.
The two measures represent different aspects of efficiency, supported by a correlation
of 0.48. Through the third major expense category, fundraising, it is possible that one of the
above measures changes while the other does not. For example, if price is constant, this
could indicate that program expenses and total expenses are constant. (It could also indicate
that program and total expenses changed proportionally, which could produce a different set
of implications.) With fixed program and total expenses, a change in fundraising as a share
of total expenses implies a change in administrative expenses as a share of total,
demonstrating how one proxy for efficiency remains constant while another changes. A
second example would be the case in which administrative as a share of total expenses is held
constant. A change in fundraising would suggest a change in price. Including both measures
is important because one captures the relationship between fundraising and program
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expenses while the other represents the dynamic between administrative and fundraising
expenses, ceteris paribus.
Although the two measures are correlated as already mentioned, correlation does not
bias results. Instead, analysis focuses on those parts of the two variables that are
uncorrelated to predict parameters. Removing one from the model would probably increase
the importance of the remaining variable but simultaneously bias results.
Both measures, however, have been criticized as failing to appropriately depict the
efficiency of an organization. Brooks (2004), therefore, offers his own measure, the
Adjusted Performance Measure. Calculation of this alternative measure is discussed in
greater detail below, but generally speaking, it is a comparison of a nonprofit‟s actual
performance to its expected performance, where expectations are calculated on factors
assumed exogenous to the nonprofit. Organizations that perform better than expected receive
a positive score, and those that underperform receive negative values. The greater the
over/under performance, the larger the deviation from what is expected. Governments,
particularly local and to some extent state governments, may compare organizations to
similar nonprofits and form opinions based on these comparisons and expectations.
Therefore, we expect the following:
H3: Increases in the Adjusted Performance Measures are positively related to
government grants at the organizational level, ceteris paribus.
Because previous studies document variation in the significance and magnitudes of
coefficients on these proxies (for example, see [Jacobs & Marudas, 2009; R. Steinberg,
1986a; Tinkelman, 2004]) based on nonprofit mission/category, the above measures are
interacted with each of the NTEE categories.
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In addition to the financial proxies for efficiency, a number of other organizational
variables are likely to affect the level of government funding. Larger organizations, for
example, may be better known in the community or able to make the argument that they meet
a larger proportion of the demand. Thus, program expenses are included in the model
(Marudas & Jacobs, 2008b).
Government funding at the organizational level may also be a function of the
available resources by respective state agencies. The state was chosen as the appropriate
level for defining the market since many of the government grants awarded to nonprofits
appear to originate (or be administered through) the state agencies (Bowman, 2006; Smith,
2006). Previous research trying to proxy government interest in other contexts have used
measures such as library expenditures or federal grants per capita to a county (including
grants allocated to agencies other than nonprofits) (Gronbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001) or
state/local tax revenues (Matsunga & Yamauchi, 2004).
Two sets of variables were considered for inclusion as a measure of a state‟s interest
in a particular nonprofit industry. The first measure created from the dataset equaled the sum
of grants awarded to an NTEE category within a state less what was awarded to organization
i. The second measure – actually a set of measures – is data from the U.S. Census of
Governments for 1998-2003 on expenditure categories for each of the 50 states. Specifically,
information on state spending in the areas of education, public welfare, health, hospitals,
parks and recreation, corrections, and natural resources is assembled for the purpose of
representing the budgets of potential grant-making institutions. Because each agency is more
likely to award grants to specific categories of nonprofits, these measures are also interacted
with the NTEE categories.
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The correlations between the measures above and government grants are low
(absolute value consistently below 0.1), but the correlations between the sum of grants to
others and state agency budgets are high (ranging between 0.61 and 0.88), suggesting that
there is a significant relationship between agencies‟ budgets and the amount of grants
awarded. Due to the high correlation, and the fact that inclusion of grants to others
introduces additional statistical complications not a factor with the state budget variables1,
only variables of the state-level expenditures are included in the following empirical analysis.
Working Capital Ratio (WCR), equal to the ratio of net assets to non-fundraising
expenses, is the final time-variant control in the model. It represents the number of years an
organization can sustain its operations if total revenues fall to zero (and all fundraising
ceases). A measure of financial health and used by Charity Navigator as an indicator of
organizational capacity in their rating system, this measure estimates the ability of an
organization to survive during an economic downturn assuming program and administrative
expenses remain constant. For organizations in our sample, ten percent have no (or negative)
net assets. Two thirds of organizations with positive net assets could support themselves for
less than a year and a half. The top ten percent of organizations could sustain operations for
5 years or more.
In the case of private contributions, accumulation of net assets is associated with a
decrease in donations (Marudas, 2004) . Donors may be deterred by the thought that their
contributions are not being put to immediate use or the donors‟ preferences are to give to
1

The sum of grants to others, as a variable in estimating G i, would include the grants awarded to Gj. The
predicted value for Gj, therefore, would also include the grant to G i. Theoretically, this makes sense since
grants are often awarded simultaneously. An additional instrument uncorrelated with G i but correlated with
the sum of grants to others would be difficult to identify. Nonetheless, models were estimated with this
variable, and the coefficient on the sum of grants to others, while significant, was economically unimportant.
(It suggested a $100,000 increase in grants to others increased Gi by approximately $40.) These results are
available but will not be provided or discussed in the remainder of this paper.
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organizations in immediate need (Handy & Webb, 2003). Despite private donors‟ response,
greater working capital ratio is considered a positive signal of financial health (Chang &
Tuckman, 1991).
Other characteristics are likely to explain changes in government grants, such as the
organization‟s mission, location, and NTEE category. These factors are time-invariant, and
along with other time-invariant unobserved characteristics, are included as fixed effects in
the model. Unobserved organizational characteristics may also include the effort to obtain
grants, the skill level of administration, and reputation. To the extent that these are
independent of the efficiency measures and/or time invariant, these factors do not bias
results. If, however, these factors are correlated with the variables and are time variant, they
may account for a portion of the unexplained variation in government grants and/or bias
results.
Many of the variables described above are lagged in the empirical specification to
avoid simultaneity problems in estimation. For example, does an organization receive more
government grants because it changed its administrative expenses, or did it change these
expenses because it received government grants? The inclusion of the lagged term avoids
this dilemma. Monetary variables are also transformed by taking the natural logarithm. In
the cases of program expenses, state expenditures, and the dependent variable, government
grants, one is added to all values. With controls included for year, the author proposes the
following model to explain the level of government grants for nonprofit organizations.
Equation 2 presents the model for analysis. As is always the case in fixed effects regression,
coefficients for the time invariant variables are not estimated.
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log(Gi,t,c.m)= 0+ 1*logPEi,t-1 + FY‟θt+ 2*log(Pricei,t-1) + (log(Pricei,t-1)*NTEEi)‟λ1
+ 3*WCR,I,t-1 + (WCRi,t-1*NTEEi)‟ λ2 +4*MSHAREEi,t-1 + (MSHAREi,t-1*NTEEi)‟ λ3 +
(BUDGETSt,m*NTEEi)‟ λ4 +γm + νc + ηi + εi,t,c,m

(EQ 2)

Where:
Gi,t,c.m is government grants awarded to organization i in time t, community (in this case
state) c, and market (or NTEE category), m;
PEi,t-1 is program expenses for organization i in time t-1;
FY is a vector of time indicators;
Pricei,t-1 is the inverse of program expense share defined in EQ 1 for organization i in time t1;
NTEE is a vector of NTEE categories (excluding Arts), where each variable is a 0,1 indicator
for organization I;
WCR,I,t-1, is the working capital ratio for organization i in time t-1;
MSHAREEi,t-1 represents administrative and managerial expenses as a share of total expenses
for organization i in time t-1;
BUDGETSt,m is a vector of the agency budgets for market m in time t;
And γm, νc, and ηi are time invariant components representing fixed market (m), community
(c), and individual (i) effects.
A problem arises, however, when we consider the distribution and nature of the
dependent variable, government grants. Sixty three percent of observations record zero
grants, and there is a distinct element of self-selection in the receipt of government grants.
(Presumably, an organization must choose to apply before a grant is awarded.) Conditional
on receiving grants, the median total government funding for an organization exceeds
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$150,000, while the average is more than one million. Unfortunately, there is no data on the
application for government grants or the number of grants awarded, but we can assume that a
positive value of government grants indicates that an organization applied and was selected
for at least one award. Analysis that includes zero-grant observations or excludes all zerogrant observations (such as that in [Marudas & Jacobs, 2009]) without adjustments for the
self-selection component are likely to produce biased results.
Heckman (1976) proposed a two-step procedure, frequently used in labor economics
to estimate wages (selection occurs with entrance into the labor market) but also used to
estimate consumer expenditures on items such as durable goods or health care (see [Greene,
2002]). The first step involves a probit equation to estimate selection, followed by an OLS
regression on positive values that includes the inverse mills ratio (a ratio of the probability
density function to the cumulative density function of the predicted probabilities from step
one). The process also includes a transformation of the variance covariance matrix used to
estimate standard errors in the second step (Heckman, 1976).
Unfortunately, a fixed effects probit model poses statistical problems in estimation.
Unlike coefficients in linear models, coefficients in probit models are sensitive to which
category is omitted as the control – thus producing biased estimates. Heckman (1981)
initially suggests that the bias is reduced as T increases, with the magnitude approaching
10% when T=8 (Heckman, 1981). More recent studies using Monte Carlo methods question
the original findings and suggest that the bias may be large even with considerably large Ts,
[see (Greene, 2004) for discussion]. With a large N but a T limited to 6 (5 with lagged
variables), the inclusion of a series of dichotomous indicators for tens of thousands of
organizations is not a feasible solution and would likely produce biased results. Greene
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(2001, 2004) suggests that the estimates of a probit regression that ignores individual
heterogeneity (fixed effects) may not be any worse than estimates obtained with individual
controls (Greene, 2001, 2004) 2.
Based on Greene‟s (2001, 2004) conclusion, the author estimates a probit model
without individual organizations‟ fixed effects. The author does, however, include time
invariant variables such as the NTEE category. Controls for fiscal year are also included.
(Interactions between categories and year were found to add little to the model‟s explanatory
power). All of variables used in the fixed effects equation (EQ 2) – including the efficiency
measures and interactions – are included. Additional variables are included in the probability
of receiving government grants equation, specifically, the number of competitors in the
market (excluding organization i), the number of these organizations receiving funding from
the government, and the average award size to these recipients. Equation 3 models the first
step, probit regression.
Pr(GRi=1|Xi)=Φ( α1*(C,MNP-i,t)+α2*((C,MGR-i,t)+ α3*((C,MG-i,t)/C,MGR-i,t))+NTEE‟δ +
1*logPEi,t-1 + FY‟θt+ 2*log(Pricei,t-1) + (log(Pricei,t-1)*NTEEi)‟λ1 + 3*WCRi,t-1 + (WCRi,t1*NTEEi)‟

λ2 + 4*MSHAREEi,t-1 + (MSHAREi,t-1*NTEEi)‟ λ3 + (BUDGETSt,m*NTEEi)‟ λ4)
(EQ 3)

Where C,MNP-i,t equals the sum of nonprofit organizations in community c, market m, in
time t, excluding organization i;
C,MGR-i,t is the number of organizations in community c, market m that received grants in
time t, excluding organization i; and

2

(Greene, 2004)) also suggests that random effects estimates are worse than fixed effects and no effects
estimates when the assumptions necessary for consistency are not met.
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C,MG-i,t equals the sum of government grants awarded to organizations in community c,
market m, excluding awards to i.
Following the estimation of the probit regression, values for the predicted
probabilities are used to calculate the inverse mills ratio. These are used in the second step.
The inverse mills ratio, along with the sample size, the coefficient for the inverse mills ratio,
and error terms are all used to transform the variance covariance matrix and develop weights
for each observation. These weights are then used in a Weighted Least Squares approach
(with fixed effects), and the standard errors from this regression are used to evaluate the
significance of coefficients from the second step (Smits, 2003).
Results
Partial estimates from three regressions are presented in Table 5 for comparison. The
first column presents estimates from an OLS model that does not include organizational fixed
effects. It does, however, include time-invariant indicators for NTEE category. The second
column includes estimates from a fixed effects regression on the full dataset. Finally, results
from the second step of the Heckman are presented in the last column. Organizations from
all 23 usable categories are included in the analysis below, but the results in Table 5 are
limited to Arts and Culture (A) organizations.
Significant differences exist between the regressions, demonstrating the importance
of finding a model that produces unbiased estimates. For example, the OLS estimates in the
first column suggest a strong relationship between organizational size and the level of grants,
with a one percent increase in size expected to increase the average of government grants by
approximately 0.72 percent. Larger organizations are expected to receive larger grants,
ceteris paribus. This finding is not surprising, but notice that this figure is reduced by close
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to 90% to less than 0.08 percent when we include organizational fixed effects. And once we
control for the selection of grant recipients, we again find a significant reduction in this
coefficient to less than 0.02 percent, suggesting that increases in organizational size by
recipient organizations is not an important factor in estimating government grants for the
following year.
The opposite trend emerges in the coefficient for price. Insignificant and small in
magnitude in the first two regressions, results in the third column suggest that for
organizations receiving government funding, a ten percent increase in price (a reduction in
efficiency) is expected to decrease the average of government grants by 1.8 percent for arts
organizations. Inclusion of non-recipients, in this case, diminishes the effect that changes in
price could have on government grants for organizations currently receiving government
funding.
Also of interest are the changes in coefficients for the state budget expenditure
categories. Generally speaking, for the Arts, controlling for selection reduces the magnitude
(absolute value) and significance of changes in government expenditures for all but two
expenditure categories, education and natural resources. Different patterns emerge for other
NTEE categories. Further investigation of these results is warranted but beyond the scope of
this essay.
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Table 5
Select Coefficients from Estimation
OLS with
Category
Controls

FE with
clustered
errors

FE, clustered
errors, &
Heckman
Correction
0.71926***
0.07385***
0.01861**
Real program expenses (ln,t-1)
(0.00431)
(0.00859)
(0.00803)
-0.04561*
-0.13275***
-0.07675***
FY99
(0.02411)
(0.01845)
(0.0064)
-0.00195
-0.08974***
-0.04564***
FY00
(0.02339)
(0.01622)
(0.00582)
0.02559
-0.03892***
-0.00937*
FY01
(0.02295)
(0.01339)
(0.00527)
0.04032*
-0.00409
0.01105**
FY02
(0.02269)
(0.01032)
(0.00459)
0.0497
-0.02981
-0.18190***
Price (log, t-1)
(0.08857)
(0.06509)
(0.02718)
0.03543***
0.00313**
0.00062
Administrative Expenses Ratio
(0.00173)
(0.00156)
(0.0007)
-0.08265***
-0.0149
0.01645***
Working capital ratio (beginning of
year)
(0.00618)
(0.01291)
(0.00419)
-0.05437
-0.23702
-0.14267*
Education Expenditures (log, t)
(0.1425)
(0.17969)
(0.08497)
0.35744***
0.17163
-0.02841
Public Welfare Expenditures (log, t)
(0.08832)
(0.14069)
(0.04674)
-0.12298***
-0.09717**
-0.01323
Hospital Expenditures (log, t)
(0.03644)
(0.04459)
(0.01341)
-0.52289***
0.31064***
0.04078
Health Expenditures (log, t)
(0.06946)
(0.0849)
(0.0343)
0.03909
-0.28986*
-0.01641
Corrections Expenditures (log, t)
(0.09251)
(0.16274)
(0.05761)
-0.11037**
-0.00799
0.10194**
Natural Resource Expenditures
(log, t)
(0.05488)
(0.09248)
(0.04234)
0.35397***
0.07538
0.01057
Parks-Recreation Expenditures
(log,t)
(0.04297)
(0.07387)
(0.0229)
552028
550256
211098
Observations
0.15
0
0.02
R-squared
166807
70304
Number of ein
Standard Errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant
at 1%
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Given the variation in estimated coefficients, the author selects those from the probit /
fixed effects two-step procedure as those most likely to describe the variation in government
grants. Table 6 presents estimates from the two steps for each of the measures highlighted in
this paper. Note that both measures are included in each of the two estimations (the first step
(Probit) and the second step (Fixed Effects). The numbers below are not the coefficients but
the actual expected effect (in percent change) on government grants for each category (equal
to the sum of the coefficient on the omitted interaction (Arts) and the estimated coefficient).
For variables not transformed with a log, the number below is equal to one less the
exponential of the coefficient times one hundred.
With respect to price, the author finds that changes significantly affect the level of
government grants in 15 of 23 categories. In all but two of the categories (Public Safety and
Disaster Preparedness/Relief (M) and Civil Rights, Social Action, and Advocacy (R), price is
negatively related to government grants, with the largest effect for organizations classified as
Environmental (C). The coefficients must be interpreted with caution, however, given the
additional controls in the model. With administration‟s share of expenses and program
expenses included as additional controls, changes in price are directly related to changes in
fundraising as a share of total expenses. The lower the price – the lower total expenses in
year t-1, and thus the greater the share of program expenses as a percentage of total expenses.
More specifically, administrative expenses must fall but in proportion to the decline in total
expenses so that the ratio of administrative to total expenses remains constant. The bulk of
the drop in total expenses, therefore, is attributed to less fundraising expenses in the previous
year.
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Table 6
Marginal Effects on the probability and level of Government Grants
Category

Price
MSHARE
Probit Effect Fixed Effects Effect Probit Effect Fixed Effects Effect
0.009
-0.182 ***
0.003 ***
0.062
Arts, Culture & Humanities
-0.159***
-0.152 *
0.003 ***
-0.263**
Education
-0.098***
-0.797 ***
0.002 ***
0.389**
Environment
-0.159***
0.001
0.003 ***
-0.162
Animal-Related
-0.051***
-0.373 ***
0.003 ***
0.239
Health Care
0.211***
-0.147
0.002 ***
-0.455***
Mental Disease & Crisis Intervention
-0.216 ***
-0.143
0.002 ***
-0.272
Diseases, Disorders, & Medical
-0.197
***
-0.151
0.004
***
-0.490
Medical Research
-0.246 ***
-0.230 *
0.002 ***
-0.319*
Crime & Legal Related
-0.110 ***
-0.366 ***
0.001 ***
-0.094
Employment
-0.157 ***
-0.155
0.002 ***
0.045
Food, Agriculture & Nutrition
-0.001
-0.473 ***
0.004 ***
-0.119
Housing & Shelter
0.236 ***
0.001 ***
0.210
Public Safety And Disaster Preparedness And Relief -0.156 ***
-0.031 **
-0.323 ***
0.004 ***
-0.352*
Recreation & Sports
-0.139 ***
-0.191
0.004 ***
-0.410**
Youth Development
-0.147 ***
-0.092 *
0.001 ***
-0.096
Human Services
-0.113 ***
-0.517 **
0.011 ***
-0.093
International, Foreign Affairs & National Security
-0.402 ***
0.599 **
0.005 ***
-0.754***
Civil Rights, Social Action & Advocacy
-0.175 ***
-0.115 *
0.003 ***
0.011
Community Improvement & Capacity Building
-0.139 ***
-0.515 *
0.003 ***
-0.670*
Science & Technology
-0.238 ***
-0.269
0.003 ***
-1.414**
Social Science
-0.226 ***
-0.249
0.003 ***
-0.405
Public And Societal Benefit
-0.070 ***
-0.707 **
0.001 ***
0.632**
Religion Related
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%
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With administrative expenses as a share of total, we find a statistically significant
relationship between the measure and expected government grants in ten categories. For
most of these categories, increases in administration‟s share of total expenses reduces the
expected level of government grants, but in two categories, Environment (C) and Religion
(X), the opposite is true. Recall, however, that we are holding program expenses and
program expenses as a share of total expenses (via price) constant. Therefore, changes in
administrative share are likely the result of changes in fundraising levels. With this
interpretation, the results are more surprising.
It would be remiss not to emphasize the significance of the same proxies in the first
step (probit) analysis. The financial proxies for efficiency of price and administrative
expenses have significant effects on the probability of receiving government grants in 21 and
all 23 of the categories, respectively. While administrative expenses as a share of total
expenses is always statistically significant, the magnitude of each coefficient is small. Price
appears to have the most consistent effect on the probability of receiving government grants.
A ten percent increase in price is expected to affect the probability of receiving a grant
between one and four percentage points, ceteris paribus.
A second way to analyze the data is to consider the categories and the financial
proxies (or combination of proxies) that significantly affect expected government grants.
Table 7 presents a classification of NTEE categories by the combination of significant
measures. From this table, we can easily identify those categories that appear less responsive
(on average) to changes in the proxies for efficiency. Even for the five categories in the
“None” column, it is still the case that changes in the efficiency measures significantly affect
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the probability of receiving government funding. Unfortunately, a clear pattern explaining
the grouping of organizations into the four groups below does not emerge.

Table 7
Comparison of Statistically Significant Efficiency Measures
None
Food
Diseases, Disorders
Animal-Related
Medical Research
Public Benefit

Price Only
Employment
Community
Housing
Public Safety
International
Arts
Health
Human Services

Admin. Only
Mental Health
Social Science
Youth

Price & Admin
Education
Civil rights
Science & Technology
Environment
Crime
Recreation
Religion

Adjusted Performance Measures

Brooks (2004) suggests nonprofits may not be assessed on the absolute levels of the
financial proxies for efficiency but rather on their performance relative to other similar
organizations. He develops the idea of Adjusted Performance Measures (APMs), measures
that control for exogenous factors beyond the organizations‟ control. Using census variables
from the American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample: 2000-2003, the author
regresses program expense share on a set of controls including demographic and economic
variables, similar to the model suggested by Brooks (2004). The necessary variables were
only available for 2000-2003 for 367 MSA‟s ranging from Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY to
Youngstown-Warren, OH, further limiting the sample to 325,987 observations for 144,483
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organizations. (This measure is excluded from the previous analysis because of its effect on
sample size.) Results from this regression are presented in Table 8.
Interestingly, the initial regression included total population, but the coefficient was
insignificant. Thinking of gender differences that emerged in experimental literature on
public goods and dictator games (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Croson & Gneezy, 2009),
the author includes male and female populations as separate controls and found convincing
evidence that the gender composition of a city affects nonprofit resource allocation.
Education, age, diversity, and economic/ labor market variables are also significant in
predicting expected levels of program revenue share.
Following the estimation, predicted values are calculated and then subtracted from the
actual value to calculate the residual. In the original article, Brooks argues that
organizations should be ranked according to their performance (measured by the residual),
but more information may be available in the residuals, and this is confirmed with a
comparison of models using residual and rank (not presented). Interaction terms between the
APM‟s and the NTEE categories are created, and then the two-step process from above is
replicated with the new set of variables. Again, the lag of the APM is used in the analysis.
Although the first two measures and interactions are still included, estimates are presented
only from the new set of variables. The full sets of results are available upon request.
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Table 8
Predicting Expected Program Expense Shares
Variable
Total Revenue (log)

Non-Fundraising Share
0.108***
(311.35)
-0.151***
Males (log)
(4.83)
0.145***
Females (log)
(4.63)
-0.001*
Percent with at least Bachelor’s degree
(1.84)
-0.001***
Percent with High School but no Bachelor’s
(4.09)
0.000***
Percent Minority (race)
(3.44)
-0.001
Unemployment Rate
(1.62)
0.001
Number of families in poverty (log)
(0.87)
-0.001*
Percent of population over 65
(1.95)
0.012***
Percent of population under 5
(6.78)
-0.040***
Average household income (log)
(5.06)
-0.001**
Percent of non-citizens
(2.34)
0.003***
Percent of Foreign-born citizens
(5.05)
-0.000***
Percent Hispanic
(3.53)
0.002***
Share of Labor Force in Management
(3.38)
0.000
Share of Labor Force in Service
(0.16)
0.004***
Median Age
(4.72)
-0.290***
Constant
(3.29)
YES
Time & Category Controls
325987
Observations
0.28
R-squared
Absolute value of t statistics in parenthesis; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and
*** significant at 1%
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Table 9 presents the effects of changes in over/under performance relative to similar
nonprofits in the organization‟s community on the level of government grants. The first
column estimates the effect of a one unit change, but for this variable, a one unit change is
equivalent to three standard deviations. The use of the exponential form in interpreting the
coefficient complicates matters further given the nonlinear nature of the function. The
second column, therefore, includes an estimate of the percent change of government grants
given a one standard deviation change in the residual, equal to 0.33. Estimates in bold are
significant at the 10% level.

Eleven of the twenty three categories are significant, with all but one (Health)
positive, as expected in Hypothesis 3. The magnitude of these coefficients, however, was
largely unexpected. A one standard deviation increase in over performance, for example,
increases expected funding to the Arts by approximately two-thirds. For international
organizations, a similar increase more than doubles the expected level of government grants.
In the first step, however, we find that increases in performance are actually associated with a
decrease in the probability of receiving funding, a puzzling result. This suggests overperformance is negatively associated with receiving grants, but when grants are awarded, the
government rewards performance. Results from the first step are presented in Table 10.
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Table 9
Effects of Changes in Performance on Government Grants
Category

Arts, Culture & Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related
Health Care
Mental Disease & Crisis
Intervention
Diseases, Disorders, &
Medical Disciplines
Medical Research
Crime & Legal Related
Employment
Food, Agriculture & Nutrition
Housing & Shelter
Public Safety And Disaster
Preparedness And Relief
Recreation & Sports
Youth Development
Human Services
International, Foreign Affairs
& National Security
Civil Rights, Social Action &
Advocacy
Community Improvement &
Capacity Building
Science & Technology
Social Science
Public And Societal Benefit
Religion Related
Significant effects in bold

Expected Percent Change
in Government Grants
with 1 Unit change in APM

369.19
41.66
563.07
-17.42
-51.12
225.35

Expected Percent
Change in
Government
Grants with 1
Standard Dev.
change in APM
66.55
12.18
86.69
-6.12
-21.04
47.60

30.86

9.28

249.60
19.85
329.71
-59.86
150.49
-5.51

51.14
6.16
61.79
-26.01
35.39
-1.85

367.27
286.95
21.25
828.14

66.32
56.29
6.57
108.60

192.80

42.55

92.51

24.13

900.91
-99.05
227.41
-38.04

113.86
-78.52
47.90
-14.61
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Table 10
First Stage Heckman Results for Adjusted Performance Measures
Category
Arts, Culture & Humanities
Education
Environment
Animal-Related
Health Care
Mental Disease & Crisis Intervention
Diseases, Disorders, & Medical Disciplines
Medical Research
Crime & Legal Related
Employment
Food, Agriculture & Nutrition
Housing & Shelter
Public Safety And Disaster Preparedness
And Relief
Recreation & Sports
Youth Development
Human Services
International, Foreign Affairs & National
Security
Civil Rights, Social Action & Advocacy
Community Improvement & Capacity
Building
Science & Technology
Social Science
Public And Societal Benefit
Religion Related
*** Significance at the 0.01 level

Effect of APM on the Pr. Of
Receiving Grant
-0.570 ***
-0.435 ***
-0.101
-0.345 ***
0.306 ***
-0.308 ***
-0.405 ***
-0.800 ***
-0.286 ***
-0.266 ***
-0.546 ***
-0.086
0.289 ***
-0.227 ***
-0.203 ***
-0.099
-0.665 ***
-0.023
-0.261 ***
-0.590 ***
-0.487 ***
-0.039
-0.320 ***

Discussion and Conclusion
Although previous studies questioned the responsiveness of private contributions to
changes in financial proxies for efficiency (see [Khanna, et al., 1995], for example), the
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government appears to be more sensitive to changes in the three measures used above with
considerable support for each of the earlier mentioned hypotheses. Price, for example, is
negative for twenty categories. Thirteen of the fifteen significant categories are negative,
with estimates suggesting that a ten percent change in price reduces government grants
anywhere from 1 to 8 percent. The positive and significant coefficients on Public Safety and
Civil Rights organizations are a bit of an anomaly. Given the other controls in the model,
this suggests that the government rewards increased fundraising efforts by these
organizations, whereas it generally punishes increases in fundraising expenses by other types
of organizations.
The second measure, administrative expenses, is negative for the majority of
categories, suggesting that when controlling for program expenses and total expenses, the
government prefers to see resources allocated to fundraising rather than administration. We
must be careful, however, in making recommendations based on this finding. The first step
of the Heckman procedure estimating the probability of receiving government funds suggests
a small but consistently positive relationship between administrative expenses and the
probability of receiving funds. Perhaps this result indicates that organizations seeking
government funds allocate more resources towards administration to help prepare higherquality applications for government funding.
Adjusted Performance Measures, when added into the analysis, produce what may be
the most interesting set of results. Results from the second step support the third hypothesis.
Organizations that spend a greater share of their resources on programs than what is expected
increase their level of government grants received. Perplexing, however, are the results from
the first step. An increase in performance relative to others decreases the probability of
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receiving government grants. These two findings together suggest that from the pool of
recipients, larger grants are awarded to more efficient organization, but it is unclear whether
the best performing organizations are failing to apply or are simply not selected. Future
research into why organizations apply for government funding and the process government
agencies use to select recipients is necessary to understand the observed phenomenon.
Significant differences exist across categories, both in the significance and signs of
each measure and the set of measures that have a significant effect on government grants for
each category
Although the results suggest a statistically significant relationship between efficiency
measures and government grants, there remain additional issues that are not easily solved
with the data available. First, the lack of variation in government funding within an
organization suggests that grantors operate on a largely incremental basis. In a budgeting
context, incrementalism postulates that government agencies alter their budgets on a yearly
basis by copying the budget of the previous year with minimal changes. In the case of
grants, government agencies may determine the level of funding using the previous years‟
funding as a guide. (Similar budgeting philosophy by nonprofits may also explain the
relatively small changes in the financial proxies from one year to the next.) An incremental
approach to grant making (or the even spread of a multi-year grant across time) could
produce a lower bound estimate of the association between grants and efficiency measures.
Efficiency measures may change, but government grants remain stable in this instance, thus
reducing the ability of efficiency measures to explain variation in grants. Additional
information on government grants and a longer time span are necessary for addressing this
problem.
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The second possibility is that the efficiency measures, while statistically significant,
fail to capture the worthiness of organizations (Brooks, 2004, 2006). While there is merit to
the objections raised, the ease at which we can dismiss financial proxies for efficiency as
determinants of grants decreases as we move away from local governments. Higher levels of
government may be less familiar with specific organizations and instead rely on financial
information when nonprofits apply for grants or report on their progress.
Another possibility is that this model fails to fully capture the dynamic between
government grants and nonprofit efficiency. A study on board composition, for example,
found that major donors participating on the finance committee reduces administrative
expenses as a share of total expenses (Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003). In this case, the
monitoring may be responsible for changes in behavior. The same could be true of
government grants. Funding is awarded, and then because of increased oversight or a
decreased dependency on private contributions, the nonprofit alters its expense allocation
(Andreoni & Payne, 2003). This suggests a causal relationship between efficiency and grants
that works in the opposite direction than that assumed in this paper. This paper uses lagged
variables to control for this possibility, but further research is still necessary to determine the
extent to which government grants may alter organizations‟ expense decisions.
While a number of questions pertaining to efficiency measures and government
grants have been addressed in this analysis, the research generates even more questions. For
example, is there a relationship between the effect of each efficiency measure and the
organization‟s dependence on government grants as a share of total revenues? What explains
the set of measures that are significant for each category, and why do the effects of the
efficiency measures vary across categories? Aside from the efficiency measures, what other
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factors contribute to the level of government grants? Controls for state expenditures and
working capital ratios were included in the models but not analyzed and discussed. Like the
efficiency measures, coefficients on these measures (available upon request) varied in
significance and were occasionally counter to what we would expect. These patterns are also
worth further exploration.
Although a number of anomalies emerge, this paper presents a unique analytical
approach to understanding the determinants of government grants on a diverse set of
nonprofit organizations. This paper improves on the empirical technique used in the only
similar analysis, and despite the lack of research on this topic, it should be of interest to the
nonprofit and public sectors. For nonprofits, these figures suggest what they might expect in
terms of government grants given changes in their financial positions and resource allocation,
factors organizations can control. For governments awarding grants, this research allows
them to look at a broader spectrum of organizations and how the government is allocating
resources. Are they rewarding organizations that perform well? Why are organizations that
“over-perform” less likely to receive grants? If they are not applying, perhaps the
government should ask why. Are there changes needed to the application and award process
that would better reflect the goals of the government and the constituents? The nonprofit
sector is undoubtedly an important part of the U.S. economy, and the relationship between it
and the public sector is worthy of continued exploration both on theoretical and empirical
grounds.
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Determinants of Contributions to Nonprofit Organization: Revisiting the Old and
Exploring the New
In an effort to reconcile Adam Smith‟s Theory of Moral Sentiments with recent
findings from experimental economics, Ashraf, Camerer, and Loewenstein (2005) note
Smith‟s understanding of the roles altruism, fairness, and trust in the establishment of a wellfunctioning market economy (Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein, 2005). The set of values
emerges as a primary explanation for contributions to public goods–including donations to
the nonprofit sector-along with several other notable concepts such as warm-glow (Andreoni,
1990) or prestige (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998). Summarizing Smith‟s original
ideas, Ashraf et. al. (2005) write, “[People] display erratic patterns of sympathy, but are
consistently concerned about fairness and justice. They are motivated more by ego than by
any kind of direct pleasure from consumption…” (p. 142).
The quotation above suggests that individuals will contribute to nonprofit
organizations for reasons that are both altruistic and selfish, but regardless of why individuals
give, it is likely that charitable contributions will remain a significant source of revenues for
nonprofit organizations. Despite a growing body of literature on the subject, we still have a
limited understanding as to the determinants of charitable contributions at the organizational
level. To some extent, our failure to assemble a theory of private contributions that
withstands empirical testing may result from the dichotomy that exists in current research.
One group of scholars examines the relationship between functional forms of resource
allocation (otherwise referred to as financial proxies for efficiency) and aggregate
contributions to the nonprofit organization (see for example (Okten & Weisbrod, 2000;
Parsons, 2003; Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007). A second group of scholars focuses on the
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relationship between alternative funding streams, namely government grants, and private
contributions, with debate as to whether government funding crowds out private
contributions or signals organizational quality (Andreoni & Payne, 2003; Payne, 1998; R.
Steinberg, 1991; Tinkelman, 2010). Relatively little research exists on a third possible
determinant, program service revenues. A recent article by Kerlin and Pollack (2010)
challenges the anecdotal theories that nonprofits turn to program service revenues to
compensate for declining contributions and government grants (Kerlin & Pollak, 2010), but
research has largely failed to address the possibility that donors respond to earned revenue
streams in a similar manner as they do government grants. Complicating the issue is that the
relationship between funding sources and resource allocations is likely endogenous, a
problem addressed in relatively few empirical analyses (see for example [Andreoni & Payne,
2003; Harrison & Laincz, 2010]).
The purpose of this essay is to better answer the frequently asked question, what
affects private contributions at the organizational level? To accomplish this task, the
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the importance of private contributions
to the nonprofit sector is discussed and existing literature on the determinants of charitable
contributions at the organizational level is summarized. Then, a theoretical model and
empirical techniques to produce unbiased estimates are presented. Data, primarily from the
NCCS Digitized Data, are described and summarized in the fourth section. Results,
robustness checks, and discussion of the results immediately follow.
Contributions to the Nonprofit Sector
During 2009, GivingUSA estimated that private charitable contributions exceeded
$300 billion, including donations to public charities and religious congregations. A 3.2%
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decline in real contributions from the previous year was one of the largest losses for the
sector in more than 5 decades (Giving USA 2010: The annual report on philanthropy for the
year 2009, 2010). Focusing only on public charities filing Form 990 with the IRS, private
contributions constituted 12.3% of reporting agencies‟ revenues (Blackwood, et al., 2008),
but the average reliance on contributions as a share of total revenues, weighting all
organizations equally, approaches 25% (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2003).
New organizations, in particular, rely more heavily on contributions during their first year of
operations, and reliance on contributions by new organizations has increased at a
significantly faster rate than existing organizations (Harrison & Wilsker, 2011). Although
not the largest source of income for the sector as a whole, its uniqueness to the nonprofit
sector and importance to many organizations in maintaining service provision warrants
additional research on the determinants of contributions.
Theories and Research on Contributions at the Organizational Level
Dependence on private support varies considerably across nonprofit subsectors.
Fisher, Wilsker, and Young (2010) and Wilsker and Young (2010) theorize that dependence
on contributions depends on the nature (or mix) of the services provided. Specifically, the
more a service resembles a public good, the greater the nonprofit‟s reliance on contributions
(Fischer, et al., 2010; Wilsker & Young, 2010). Wilsker, Young, and Grinsfelder (2010)
further clarify the theory by stating that organizations with redistributive missions, regardless
of the nature of service, similarly depend more on private contributions (Young, Wilsker, &
Grinsfelder, 2010). This theory claims a stronger causal link between funding sources and
the nature of services provided, whereas existing theory of “donative nonprofits” simply
stated that the percentage of donated revenues proxies for the public-ness of services
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provided (Hansmann, 1987). The benefits theory, as (Young, 2007) originally described,
details the expected relationship between contributed and earned revenue sources.
Government Grants
A second theory can also be used to explain variation in subsector dependence on
contributions, but this one focuses on the relationship between contributions and government
grants. Theoretically, if nonprofits provide pure public goods, and donors care only about
the level of services provided, then once the optimal level of output is reached, increases in
government contributions should be offset by declining contributions (Roberts, 1984; Warr,
1982). Research in this area, however, has generally found incomplete crowding out – that
is, a dollar increase in government funding reduces contributions by some amount less than a
dollar (see R. Steinberg [1991] or Tinkelman [2010] for reviews of the literature).
The failure of empirical results to match the theory has spawned numerous
explanations. Perhaps the best known explanation is that from Andreoni and Payne (2003)
who hypothesize that unobserved factors increase grants, fundraising, and contributions
simultaneously. Once the authors attempt to correct for endogeneity, they find that increases
in government grants reduce the fundraising efforts of organizations. Reduced fundraising
may then explain some of the observed crowding out. Harrison and Laincz (2010) suggest
that the frequency of grant receipts may also explain observed patterns between fundraising
and government grants. If nonprofit organizations are expenditure smoothing and money is
assumed fungible, then a windfall grant in one year may be passed along to future years by
investing in (future) fundraising. If the organization expects to receive the grant for multiple
years, then the organization may reduce fundraising (Harrison & Laincz, 2010).
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Crowd-out may also be partially offset by crowding-in (Heutel, 2009) or an increase
in the number of donors (Brooks, 2003) if grants signal organizational quality. And if
individuals feel warm-glow, that is, a utility-increasing feeling independent of the level of
services provided, then this, too, mitigates the crowd-out effect. Finally, the lack of
knowledge by potential donors may explain the variation in findings across studies (Horne, et
al., 2005).
Tinkelman (2010) provides the most recent review of the literature. Based on an
analysis of previous findings and historical trends in the sector, he concludes that crowding
out, as traditionally described, is unlikely. Increases in government funding over the last
several decades would have driven contributions down dramatically. That did not occur, and
instead, contributions to the sector as a whole have remained stable. Instead, it appears
individuals may reallocate their funding from one subsector to another, and it is changes in
what private donors contribute that may spur significant changes in government grants
(Tinkelman, 2010).
Steinberg (1991) states that estimates that fail to account for the level of government
making the grant to the nonprofit are also subject to bias. Specifically, changes in federal
funding may cause changes in state (or local) funding in addition to changes in private
contributions. Aggregated measures of government funding cannot account for this change,
and thus coefficients are biased. If Steinberg is correct, however, in that state and local
governments respond to changes in federal grants, than the coefficients predicted in OLS (or
similar models) likely underestimate the effect that changes in federal funding of nonprofits
has on other revenue streams.
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Studies focusing on the relationship between government grants and contributions are
distinct from other research on organizational determinants of contributions in that most of
the more recent research recognizes the problems of endogeneity and attempts to correct for
this problem (see for example Andreoni and Payne (2003) and Harrison and Laincz (2010)).
Studies more interested in fundraising and efficiency, as discussed in the next section, do not
give as much attention to this issue. Several papers such as Okten and Weisbrod (2000),
(Marudas & Jacobs, 2004), and (Tinkelman, 2004) control for government grants by
including a lagged variable, but little discussion is given to this variable, perhaps due to its
lack of significance or economic importance in the final regressions.
Fundraising and Efficiency Measures
The relationship between government and contributions is complex, so one would
hope for more straightforward relationships between contributions, fundraising, and
efficiency measures. Unfortunately, such is not the case. First, it is important to distinguish
between fundraising and efficiency, and then present reasons why these topics are discussed
jointly in this section.
On the surface, fundraising and efficiency are distinct topics. Fundraising refers to
monetary outlays intended to generate greater revenues for the nonprofit organization.
Efficiency refers to the ability of the nonprofit organization to provide the greatest services
with the least amount of program expenses. The two concepts could be mutually exclusive,
but the lack of good efficiency measures resulted in numerous scholars generating financial
proxies for efficiency, often based upon organizations‟ expenditures, including fundraising
(Baber, Roberts, & Visvanathan, 2001; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986) or managerial
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expenses (Bowman, 2006; Frumkin & Kim, 2001). For this reason, these two are often
linked in the literature and will likely remain so until better measures for efficiency emerge.
Steinberg (1986), for example, attempts to identify the objective functions of
nonprofit organizations by calculating their marginal returns to fundraising. The most tested
financial proxy of efficiency, price, involves using the inverse of fundraising as a share of
total expenses (Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). The next section first prevents previous
estimates of the effects of fundraising and efficiency on contributions, and then discusses
reasons for ambiguity in these results.
Perhaps the first attempt to assess the determinants of contributions to a nonprofit
organization was that by Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986), in which the authors regressed
donations (logged) on what they referred to as advertising (fundraising) and price, the
necessary donation to increase program expenses by one dollar. Analogous to the private
sector, Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) determine that donors respond positively to
fundraising and negatively to price. After original findings were challenged by scholars
using fixed effects methods and controlling for time-invariant characteristics (Khanna, et al.,
1995), Okten and Weisbrod (2000) replicated much of the original work, this time using
panel techniques and two-stage least square approaches. Although the authors only
instrument for price and fundraising using lagged versions of these variables as instruments
(along with the change in age, program service revenue, and grants), they conclude that
nonprofit subsectors vary in their level of over- and under- fundraising, and price
unambiguously decreases contributions. Studies on price continue to find results suggesting
insignificant or negative relationships between price and contributions, often varying across
nonprofit categories and model specifications (see Parsons [2003] for a review). Tinkelman
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and Mankaney (2007) recently replicated earlier research, claiming that many of the
insignificant results are in fact the result of unreliable data.
Other financial proxies for efficiency appear in the literature, most notably those
using administrative expenses (as opposed to fundraising) as an indicator of efficiency. For
example, Bowman (2006) determines that donors, when presented information on the
overhead costs of organizations in a workplace giving campaign, decrease contributions to
organizations with rising expenses.
Outside of an organized field experiment, it is unclear how much information donors
receive and the extent to which donors are aware of a nonprofit organization's expense
decisions or internal efficiency. Horne et. al. (2005), for example, demonstrate the lack of
information donors report knowing about the organizations to which they donate. The source
of poor information is not clear. Are nonprofits failing to provide quality information, or are
the search costs greater than the typical donor wishes to incur (Buchheit & Parsons, 2006;
HopeConsulting, 2010)?
Even when information is available, another set of scholars question the validity of
such efficiency proxies (Brooks, 2004, 2006; R. Steinberg, 1986b). To reiterate, the
measures fail to assess actual efficiency. Consider two nonprofits with equal total
expenditures, one spending 80% on programs, and the other spending 85%. The former
assists 100 beneficiaries, while the later helps 90. If the quality of services is the same,
which organization is more efficient? Most would agree the first organization, despite lower
expenses allocated to programs, but such is not the case when expenditures are used to proxy
for efficiency. Steinberg (1986) raises additional objectives, that measures are based on
averages rather than marginal values. Consider an organization that currently spends 30% of
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its revenues on fundraising and administration. If you donate a dollar today, can we say that
only 70% of your donation is used to programs? Not so, if fundraising and administration
are fixed expenses that are already covered by existing revenue sources. It could be that one
hundred percent of your donation goes to programs, again raising doubts about the validity of
financial proxies for efficiency.
Earned Revenues
The last major determinant of contributions in my model is program service revenue.
The ability to generate earned revenue may send one of several signals to potential donors
and researchers alike. First, the ability to charge for services suggests the service is not a
pure public good and instead is a rival good or exhibits some dimension of excludability.
Second, earned revenues indicate that beneficiaries are not only willing but also able to pay
(at least in part) for services rendered. These ideas again reflect upon the foundation of the
benefits theory (Young, 2007).
Program service revenue appears as a control in several studies estimating
contributions at the organizational level but is generally not the variable of interest.
Tinkelman (2004), for example, lists program service revenue as a control, but fails to
present estimated results for his full regression. In their two-stage estimation (instrumenting
for other variables), Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find statistically significant but small
coefficients for program service revenues, with elasticities between zero and 0.03. They use
this as evidence that crowding out by earned revenues does not occur. Marudas and Jacobs
(2004) also control for program service revenues, and like Okten and Weisbrod (2000), find
weak evidence that program service revenues crowd out contributions. There was one
statistically significant, negative coefficient (-0.01) across all of the categories tested, and
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even this coefficient loses significance in other model specifications for the same category of
nonprofits.
Again, the direction of the relationship between earned revenues and contributions is
unclear. Are nonprofits unable to earn revenue more dependent on contributions, as Fischer
et. al. (2010) propose? Or, are donors less willing to support organizations which can (and
do) charge service recipients directly? The determinants of earned revenue, aside from the
nature of service (Fischer, et al., 2010) , are largely unexplored in the literature. Some
sources of earned revenues, particularly unrelated business activities, are suspected of
resulting in mission drift (R. Steinberg & Weisbrod, 1998; Weisbrod, 1998), although more
recent research has cast doubts upon the extent of mission drift due to this particular revenue
stream (Jones, 2007). Overall, earned revenues constitute a considerable portion of
nonprofit revenues, primarily the result of large Health, Education, and Arts subsectors.
Although the determinants of program service revenue are not identified in existing
literature, it is possible that fundraising affects earned revenues in addition to contributions.
Fundraising may alert community members to the nonprofit‟s services, for which these
individuals may later pay. It is also possible that organizations incorrectly report advertising
as fundraising, thus creating an empirical link between the two even if a theoretical link is
unfounded. Finally, it can also be argued that earned revenues may be a function of
efficiency, but again, the direction of the relationship is uncertain. Given a fixed level of
services, increases in efficiency may indicate lower costs, and savings are passed on to
service recipients. It is also feasible that increased efficiency allows for greater services
rendered, and hence greater earned revenues.
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Assembling a formal theory
Combining the ideas from above, the author begins with the theory proposed by
Harrison and Laincz (2010) and make minor revisions that create interesting implications,
not all of which will be addressed in the empirical part of this chapter. Nonprofit
organizations are assumed to maximize a function V. Although V may encompass different
factors for each organization, it is always assumed to be a function of S, service delivery.
Organizations are interested in providing increasing levels of S, constrained by the level of
revenues it can collect. In this case, money available for services equals contributions (C),
earned revenues (R), and government grants (G) less fundraising expenditures (f). Given the
interdependence of these factors, contributions are thought to be a function earned revenues,
government grants, fundraising expenditures, and efficiency (e). Fundraising is a function of
government grants, which is a function of efficiency, and earned revenues are a function of
government, efficiency, and fundraising. Mathematically, we have:
V(S) = V(C(f,G,e,R) – f(G,e)+G(e)+R(G,e,f)

(EQ 4)

First order conditions are as follows:
FOC1: V/G = V‟*(C/G - f/G + 1 + R/G)

(EQ 5)

FOC2: V/f = V‟*(C/f - 1 + R/f)

(EQ 6)

FOC3: V/e = V‟*(C/e – f /e + G/e + R/e)

(EQ 7)

FOC4: V/R = V‟*(C/R + 1)

(EQ 8)

The first order conditions provide interesting and new insights into problems
identified in previous research. For example, FOC 1 suggests that the crowding out from
government is not strictly a function of changes in contributions. More specifically, setting
FOC 1 equal to zero, and assuming an interior solution, we find:
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C/G - f/G + R/G = -1

(EQ 9)

The effect of government grants on contributions ultimately depends on the effect of
the same grants on fundraising efforts and earned revenues. In instances where government
grants replace earned income, implying a negative value for R/G, it is possible that we
observe crowding in, or a positive value for C/G. Consider, for example, a nonprofit that
receives a matching grant for contributions conditional on providing services at a reduced
fare. Such a grant could reduce earned revenues at a level greater than dollar-for-dollar,
while simultaneously increasing contributions given donors‟ reduced price of increasing
services.
Even if earned revenues decline with government grants, the effect of government
grants on contributions is still uncertain. Suppose the change in earned revenues is bound
between 0 and -1. Following Andreoni and Payne‟s (2003) theory, fundraising decreases
with changes in government grants, and a negative sign on f/G offsets some (or all) of the
decline in earned revenues. Therefore, under these conditions, C/G must be negative, with
the exact value depending on the values of the other two terms.
Harrison and Laincz (2010) suggest that organizations receiving grants in time t but
not expecting the continuation of grants, could even attempt to smooth services by shifting
more resources to fundraising in time t than they would have had they not received the grant,
thus collecting more contributions and increasing service provision in time t+1. In this case,
f/G is positive, and the sum of the remaining terms must be equal to the absolute value of
(f/G – 1).
FOC 2 also provides new insight into old findings. (R. Steinberg, 1986a) classified
entire segments of the nonprofit sector as either service or revenue maximizers, depending
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whether changes in fundraising increased contributions positively (ideally by 1) or whether
the marginal donative product was driven to zero. Omitted from the discussion was whether
fundraising could affect earned revenues. It is feasible, however, that fundraising serves dual
purposes. Suppose an organization sends out fundraising material that details the services it
provides. As information about the organization spreads, the nonprofits‟ paying clientele
may increase, hence creating a positive relationship between fundraising and earned
revenues. If R/f is positive, C/f could be less than one, but the organization is still
maximizing services.
Reviewing Steinberg‟s (1986) results, nonprofits classified as Arts, Education, and
Welfare were service maximizers, while Health organizations were, on average, budget
maximizers. Comparing information on these organizations, however, the author finds that
in 2003, Health organizations were more reliant on earned income than were Arts or
Education (73% compared to less than 55%). Organizations such as those classified as
Health with zero marginal donative products from additional fundraising expenditures may
actually recoup all benefits through earned revenues, and therefore could still be viewed as
service maximizers.
The third FOC considers the effect of efficiency on other functions in the model.
Optimal selection of efficiency occurs when the sum of the effects of efficiency on
contributions, government grants, and earned revenues less the effect on fundraising equals
zero. The first term, the effect of efficiency on contributions, is often calculated as
insignificantly different from zero, suggesting either no effect of efficiency on contributions
or that nonprofits are selecting levels of efficiency that maximize contributions only, such
that increases in efficiency are not expected to further increase contributions. Whether the
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selection of e is actually optimal depends on the values of the remaining terms. A previous
essay in this dissertation suggests that for organizations receiving government grants, the
value of this term may be positive. This suggests that increases in efficiency are either
decreasing earned revenues or increasing fundraising expenses.
The final FOC is perhaps the most controversial. It implies that in order to maximize
services, nonprofit organizations should collect program service revenues from beneficiaries
until the level that an additional dollar in program service revenue decreases contributions by
one dollar. Organizations for this value is positive are not depending enough on earned
revenues, and when the value is less than negative one, the organization should decrease the
revenues collected from beneficiaries. This theory, however, does not say whether the latter
should be accomplished by reducing fees or the number of beneficiaries served.
Each of the first order conditions above presents the opportunity to re-evaluate
existing theory and findings. This dissertation, however, focuses only on one piece of the
model – contributions. Given the endogeneity of factors involved, attempts are made to
estimate the least biased parameters, but future research is necessary to complete the
assessments. The following section begins to document the process necessary for unbiased
estimation of the determinants of contributions.
Empirical Strategy
Based on the theoretical model described above, private contributions – or direct
support – are thought be a function of efficiency, fundraising efforts, government grants, and
earned program service revenue. Fundraising during time t is expected to have a direct effect
on fundraising. Potential donors are solicited and respond in the same time period. The time
frames for the other variables are more complex, but as is often assumed in the existing
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research, the response to government funding, earned revenues, and efficiency may be
lagged. Potential donors may not know revenue levels and expense allocations during time t,
but what occurs in time t could affect subsequent donations in time t+1.
When nonprofits post information on their expense allocations, for example, or
organizations like the BBB Wise or Charity Navigator assign ratings, these are typically
based on the previous years‟ reports. Granted, many donors are unknowledgeable about the
finances of an organization (Horne, et al., 2005), but for those donors who do obtain
information, it is likely based on information from time t-1. For this reason, contributions are
assumed a function of the previous year‟s earned revenues, government grants, and
efficiency measure.
Additional factors may also affect the level of contributions received. Size, for
example, may proxy the public‟s awareness of an organization. There is variation in the
literature on the appropriate measure of size, and the choice does have implications for
results (Marudas & Jacobs, 2008a). Because we are interested in capturing a measure of an
organization‟s activity, this study includes program expenses as the measure of size.
A parsimonious model, therefore, might take the following form:
DirSuppi,t = B0 + B1 FRi,t + B2Gi,t-1 + B3PSRevi,t-1 + B4Pricei,t-1 + B5Pexpi,t-1 + B6Yrt +
ei,t

(EQ 10)

Where DirSuppi,t represents the direct support, or contributions, to organization i in time t,
FRi,t is fundraising expenditures during time t, Gi,t-1 is government grants during time t-1,
PSRevi,t-1 is the previous time period‟s program service revenues, Pexp i,t-1 measures the
organizations program expenses in the previous time period, and Yrt represents controls for
the time period.
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The above model is improved by controlling for time-invariant factors such as
mission and location. The adding of a term, ui, allows us to extract organizational level
effects that are correlated with the error terms and time-variant variables included models,
generating results less subject to bias. The model then becomes:

DirSuppi,t = B0 + B1 FRi,t + B2Gi,t-1 + B3PSRevi,t-1 + B4Pricei,t-1 + B5Pexpi,t-1 + B6Yrt +
ui + ei,t

(EQ 11)

The final step in generating the least biased estimates of our parameters of interest is
considering exogenous, “unobserved” factors that may affect both the dependent and righthand side variables, thus biasing results. The usage of lagged variables is intended to resolve
some problems of simultaneity, but one could easily develop scenarios in which this
substitution is not a perfect solution. Consider an event like 9/11, where there was a change
in demand for particular services that lasted multiple years. Government grants and
contributions increase in the current time period, and both remain at elevated levels for
several years thereafter. The correlation between government funding in one year and the
next is high (0.95), and both may be affected by the same exogenous event. The coefficient
for program service revenues may similarly be biased by an exogenous increase in demand.
Fundraising is also endogenous if determined in part by government grants and the inflow of
contributions.
Instruments for three of the variables, fundraising, program service revenues, and
government grants may help to resolve this issue. For example, instrumenting for

66

government grants allows us to estimate that part of government grants not related to an
exogenous increase in demand for services and helps us to better understand the crowding
out phenomenon, for example. We further amend the model by including the instrumental
variables into the following equation:
DirSuppi,t = B0 + B1 FR*i,t + B2G*i,t-1 + B3PSRev*i,t-1 + B4Pricei,t-1 + B5Pexpi,t-1 + B6Yrt
+ ui + ei,t

(EQ 12)

The remainder of this paper describes the data used to predict contributions and
provides estimates from the models described above, starting with results from the most
parsimonious regression (EQ 10), progressing to the inclusion of organizational effects (EQ
11), and lastly, fixed effects instruments (EQ 12) models.
Data
Between the years of 1998 and 2003, the National Center of Charitable Statistics and
the Urban Institute in conjunction with Guidestar assembled a detailed dataset on all
nonprofits Filing Form 990s with the IRS (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2003).
Unlike the more recent and commonly used Core Files, data during these years includes
disaggregated measures of contributions. Financial data distinguishes between private
contributions, indirect support (from federations and parent/umbrella organizations), and
government grants. (These three measures are also separated in Statistics of Income data, but
this dataset is not representative of the population of nonprofits.) Nonprofit organizations
with revenues in excess of $25,000 are required to file Form 990, but extrapolation of results
to organizations with revenues below this threshold is not recommended. Across all years in
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this data set, more than 335,000 organizations filed Form 990 at least once, for a total of
more than 1.3 million observations.

Table 11
Distribution of observations across years
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total

Number of Organizations
179,922
206,628
217,000
229,953
230,165
238,276
1,301,944

Percent of total
13.82
15.87
16.67
17.66
17.68
18.30

Despite the requirement to submit the Form 990, the lack of taxes, accountability, and
a single standard of accounting by nonprofits decreases the likelihood of accurate reporting
(Parsons, 2003). For example, although it is possible for organizations to have negative
revenues, the frequency with which this occurs suggests that some instances are errors. A
series of steps are taken to improve the quality of data used in this analysis.
Observations with negative total expenses, program expenses, or administrative
expenses are excluded from the sample. Negative revenues, including government grants,
direct support (private contributions), and program service revenue, are also grounds for
removal. Further restrictions are imposed on the data, with requirements that the sums of
revenue streams and sums of expense streams cannot exceed the respective values of total
revenues and total expenses. Table 12 provides greater detail on the number of observations
excluded from analysis for these reasons.
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Table 12
Excluded Observations
Reason for Exclusion
Negative Total Revenues
Negative Total Expenses
Negative Direct Support
Negative Gov. Grants
Negative Prog. Serv. Rev.
Negative Administrative Exp.
Negative program Expenses
Negative Fundraising Exp.
Sum of Program and Managerial
Expenses > Total Expenses
Program Expenses >Total
Expenses
Grants >Total Revenue
Direct Support > Total Revenue

Number of
Observations
10495
247
100
46
520
528
202
143
519

As a percentage of the
Population (1.3 million)
.008
.000
.000
0.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

521

.000

12181
26127

.009
.020

A number of observations are double counted above. For example, organizations
reporting negative total revenues are likely to also appear in those rows with government
grants exceeding total revenues and direct support greater than total revenues. In total, the
above process removes 29,232, or 2.25 percent, of the more than 1.3 million observations.
Because most of these are removed for reasons on the revenues side, a comparison of these
organizations to those remaining in the sample must be done using expenses. Both total
expenses and program expenses suggest that organizations in the above table, on average, are
less than half the size of the average nonprofit organization remaining in the sample.
The sample is further refined by removing those organizations not directly involved
in service provision. This includes organizations whose primary purpose is listed as fundraising, grant-making, or philanthropy. The sample is further narrowed by including only
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those organizations classified into one of the following major NTEE categories: Arts,
Education, Health, and Human Services. Table 13 provides more detail on these excluded
organizations.

Table 13
Additional Narrowing of Sample
Reason for Exclusion
Public Foundations
Level2 = M or S ?
Level 3 include Z
NTMAJ5= “OT”

Number of Observations
11,544
174,292
143,951
301,871

As a percentage of the
Population (1.3 million)
.89
13.39
11.06
23.19

Again, there is considerable overlap amongst these reasons, with 402,665
observations falling into one of the above rows. Combined with observations removed
because of questionable data quality, a total of 416,433 observations are excluded from the
sample. The remaining data includes information on 224,798 organizations with 885,511
data points.
The following tables provide information on those organizations remaining the
sample. The first table provides information on the four major categories included in this
study, the NTEE (National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities) categories classified into each one
of these 4, and the number of observations and organizations in each group. The second
table provides summary statistics on the financial variables for those
organizations/observations, by major category.
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Table 14
Description of categories used in the sample
Major 5 Category
Arts
Education
Health

Human Services

Primary Categories
Arts, Culture &
Humanities
Education
Health Care; Mental
Health & Crisis
Intervention;
Diseases, Disorders
& Medical Disc;
Medical Research
Crime and Legal;
Employment; Food,
Ag. & Nutrition;
Housing & Shelter;
Public safety,
Disaster
Preparedness &
Relief; Recreation &
Sports; Youth
Development;
Human Services

Organizations
32,461

Observations
123,444

48,594
36,104

179,120
153,020

107,630

429,546

Most organizations are in the study for more than one year, but in the summary
statistics that follow, each observation in the usable sample is included. All monetary values
have been converted to real values, with 1982-1984 serving as the base (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2010).
On average, health organizations are the largest, but due to their reliance on earned
revenues, average fundraising expenditures are close to the nonprofit sector‟s average.
Interestingly, Arts organizations, which are smaller than organizations in the other major
categories on average, spend a larger percentage on administration than Health, Education, or
Human Services.
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The four sectors also demonstrate significant variation on the revenues side. Average
reliance on private contributions, for example, varies from 2% for Health nonprofits to 39%
for the Arts. Despite the huge range, Health organizations, on average, actually receive a
little more direct support in absolute terms than do Arts nonprofits. Human Service
nonprofits depend more on government grants than other nonprofit categories, and the three
categories besides Arts each depend on program service revenues for more than half of their
total revenues.
It is important to note, however, that the data below can be misleading. The
percentages represent reliance on each source for the subsector, but individual organizations
are unlikely to be as diversified as these numbers suggest. Despite growing emphasis on
revenue diversification (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chang & Tuckman, 1991; Hager, 2001),
most organizations still rely heavily on one source of revenue. Table 16 provides the 25 th
and 75th percentiles for the shares of revenue from contributions and program service
revenues. Most organizations receive no government grants, and thus the percentiles used
are the 75th and the 95th, still with the intention of demonstrating how organizations tend to
receive very little from this source or depend almost entirely upon it.
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Table 15
Summary Statistics by Major Category
Variable

Arts
Mean

% of
Total

Education
Mean

% of
Total

Health
Mean

% of
Total

Human Services
Mean

% of
Total

Revenues:
Total Revenues
Direct Support
Government Grants
Program Service Revenues

$852,349
$330,417
$98,483
$241,564

39%
12%
28%

$3,920,434
$555,333
$430,430
$2,249,008

14%
11%
57%

$15,100,000.00
$357,012.00
$475,146.60
$13,300,000.00

2%
3%
88%

$1,327,283
$189,525
$312,046
$667,052

14%
24%
50%

Expenses
Total Expenses

$722,950

Program Expenses

$546,264

76%

$2,865,589

85%

$12,600,000.00

86%

$1,092,811

84%

Fundraising
Administrative Expenses

$38,873
$122,318

5%
17%

$60,925
$421,793

2%
13%

$43,128.43
$1,939,159.00

0%
13%

$19,593
$141,433

2%
11%

Number of Obs.

123,444

$3,365,361

179,120

$14,700,000.00

153,020

$1,293,391

429546
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Table 16
Dependence on revenue streams evaluated at specified percentiles
Direct Support

Arts
Education
Health
Human
Services

25th
.16
.01
.00
.02

75th
.79
.69
.83
.91

Program Service
Revenue
25th
75th
.00
.55
.00
.77
.00
.95
.00
.79

Government Grants
75th
.05
.00
.07
.15

95th
.50
.74
.86
.91

From the above table, we see that one quarter of all Human Service organizations rely
on direct support for more than 90% of their total revenues. For Health nonprofits, one
quarter receive virtually no program service revenues, while another quarter rely on earned
revenues for 95% of their total revenues. While there is some evidence that diversification
offers in the Arts and Education based on values for the 75th percentile, Health and Human
Service organizations appear much less diversified at the organizational level.
This may have important implications for results both in this paper and previous
research. It raises questions of whether the proper divisions for analysis are at the major (or
minor) category levels, grouping nonprofits by mission, or whether nonprofits have more in
common with organizations with similar revenue compositions, regardless of mission area.
This issue is reconsidered later in the paper.
It is from the above data that financial proxies for efficiency, such as price, are
generated. Again, price measures the necessary contribution to increase program expenses
by $1 and is typically calculated on average rather than marginal data. Simply stated:
Price = total expenses / program expenses

(EQ 13)
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or the inverse of program expenses as a share of total expenses. If an organization spends
80% of all expenditures on programs, then the price of donating to that organization is $1.25.
Statistically speaking, there is relatively little variation in price. This may be due in part to
the data cleaning process, where organizations that do not directly spend on program service
delivery are removed. It is also likely that there is pooling of nonprofits at thresholds used by
watchdog and rating agencies. Whether organizations are truly maintaining relatively stable
program expenses as a percentage of total expenses, or whether accounting data is
manipulated to his targets as anecdotal evidence suggests, is unknown.
To complete the description of data, tables 17-20 provide correlations between the
financial variables used in analysis. As expected, even the correlations differ significantly
from one major category to the next.

Table 17
Correlation Matrix (Arts)
ARTS

Direct
Fundraising Government
Support Expenditures Grants (lag)

Fundraising
Expenditure
Government
Grants (lag)
Program
Expenses (lag)
Program Service
Revenue (lag)
Price (lag)

0.58

Program
Expenses
(lag)

0.14

0.14

0.71

0.46

0.54

0.52

0.44

0.12

0.72

0.00

0.02

-0.00

-0.00

Program
Service
Revenues

-0.00
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Table 18
Correlation Matrix (Education)
EDUCATION

Direct
Fundraising Government
Support Expenditures Grants (lag)

Fundraising
Expenditure
Government
Grants (lag)
Program
Expenses (lag)
Program Service
Revenue (lag)
Price (lag)

0.85

Program
Expenses
(lag)

Program
Service
Revenues

0.77

0.72

0.80

0.83

0.84

0.65

0.73

0.68

0.95

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

Program
Expenses
(lag)

Program
Service
Revenues

Table 19
Correlation Matrix (Health)
HEALTH

Direct
Fundraising Government
Support Expenditures Grants (lag)

Fundraising
Expenditure
Government
Grants (lag)
Program
Expenses (lag)
Program Service
Revenue (lag)
Price (lag)

0.77
0.17

0.05

0.13

0.09

0.18

0.08

0.04

0.13

0.99

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

0.00

0.00
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Table 20
Correlation Matrix (Human Services)
Human Services

Direct
Fundraising Government
Support Expenditures Grants (lag)

Fundraising
Expenditure
Government
Grants (lag)
Program
Expenses (lag)
Program Service
Revenue (lag)
Price (lag)

0.78

Program
Expenses
(lag)

0.12

0.14

0.69

0.84

0.33

0.58

0.77

0.12

0.94

-0.00

0.00

-0.00

-0.00

Program
Service
Revenues

-0.00

To reiterate, although the dataset contains numerous financial measures, it lacks
proper efficiency measures. Ideally, in constructing the model that follows, we would
include some indicator of organizational efficiency. To do so means we need more
information on an organization‟s inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Unfortunately, uniform
measures in a dataset of this size are unlikely in the near future.
Results
Having initially estimated models on the full sample (not shown), and comparing
these results to more specific subsets of the sample, it was determined that significant
differences exist between nonprofit types (NTEE major 5 categories) and years. For that
reason, separate models are estimated for four if the five major five NTEE categories, Arts,
Education, Health, and Human Services, as well as for specific years in the sample. The fifth
category, Other, is excluded from this analysis. Due to the number of results presented in
this essay, this section is organized in the following manner. First, OLS estimates are
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analyzed. Each of the major NTEE categories are presented separately, and comparisons are
made across years. Then, comparisons are made between categories. To test the robustness
of these results, the next approach follows a similar order but presents results from a fixed
effects regression. Finally, instrumental variables as a means for reducing bias caused by
potential endogeneity are considered.
OLS results
Table 21 presents OLS results for organizations classified as Arts, Culture, and
Humanities nonprofits. As previous mentioned, the yearly estimation demonstrates the
variation in the expected effects of each control variable. For example, an increase in
fundraising expenses in the current year is expected to increase donations by an amount
ranging from just over 2 to just under 4 during the 5 year period for which data was
available. The lack of significance on price, the efficiency measure, suggests that
contributions during the current year may not be as highly (and negatively)related to prior
year‟s fundraising as expected. The combination of these two factors, therefore, suggests
that present fundraising has the most significant effect on current year contributions, and that
if there are diminishing marginal returns to fundraising, Arts organizations, on average, are
fundraising below a level that is optimal.
The effect of government grants on contributions is also interesting. The
results above continue to offer support for the incomplete crowding out hypothesis, although
this notion will be further tested later in this paper when we consider government grants as an
endogenous variable in the model.
As expected, larger organizations (measured by last year‟s program expenses) attract
greater donations in the current year. More interesting, however, is the negative relationship
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between the previous year‟s earned revenues and this year‟s contributions. Given the
correlation between one year‟s earned revenue and the next, it is difficult to determine
whether individuals are less willing to contribute to nonprofits capable of collecting
increasing amounts of earned revenues, or whether nonprofits themselves are turning to
earned revenues to compensate for falling contributions.
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Table 21
OLS Results (ARTS)
ARTS

(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS - full sample OLS - 1999
OLS - 2000
3.027***
3.953***
3.352***
Fundraising
(0.027)
(0.048)
(0.044)
Expenses
-0.545***
-0.570***
-0.390***
Government
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Grants (lag)
0.608***
0.574***
0.591***
Program
(0.005)
(0.005)
Expenses (lag) (0.003)
-0.507***
-0.554***
-0.473***
Prog. Service
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.012)
Rev (lag)
-145.463
-127.161
41.447
Price (lag)
(133.439)
(632.197)
(373.946)
-26,089.631***
Fiscal Year
(6,852.776)
52288149.52***
104,149.78*** 78,541.85***
Constant
(13713160.692)
(16,435.614)
(15,272.615)
59719
10269
11498
Observations
0.68
0.79
0.82
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

(4)
OLS - 2001
3.924***
(0.093)
-0.860***
(0.015)
0.882***
(0.010)
-0.949***
(0.026)
83.622
(1,740.864)

(5)
OLS - 2002
2.122***
(0.046)
-0.443***
(0.008)
0.521***
(0.006)
-0.318***
(0.016)
-94.820
(171.115)

(6)
OLS - 2003
2.697***
(0.040)
-0.474***
(0.006)
0.499***
(0.004)
-0.396***
(0.010)
30.861
(149.006)

36,213.972
(32,176.40)
12322
0.62

98,293.25***
(20,449.09)
12634
0.66

81,183.18***
(13,598.94)
12996
0.78
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As was the case with organizations in the Arts, we find considerable variation in the
effect of fundraising on private contributions across the years for Education nonprofits. In
2001, education nonprofits expected almost $8.00 in direct support for each additional dollar
spent on fundraising. This may be due to an influx of donations following 9/11. To test this
possibility, the same regression as above for organizations in New York State during 2001 is
estimated. Contrary to what I expected (that Education organizations in New York might
receive significant, unsolicited contributions, education organizations in this state may over
fundraise (coefficient = 0.87 for Education organizations in NY in 2001). Although larger
Education organizations are expected to receive more contributions, the effect of size
(measured by prior year‟s fundraising) is not as large in magnitude as it is for Arts
Organizations. It is possible that donors contribute to well known Arts nonprofits, but are
more likely to give to smaller, local Education organizations.
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Table 22
OLS Results (Education)
Education

(1)
(2)
OLS - full sample OLS - 1999
5.706***
5.920***
Fundraising Expenses
(0.035)
(0.083)
-0.120***
Government Grants (lag) 0.023***
(0.004)
(0.008)
0.242***
0.288***
Program Expenses (lag)
(0.002)
(0.005)
-0.231***
Program Service Rev (lag) -0.237***
(0.002)
(0.005)
-41.221
428.334
Price (lag)
(387.837)
(1,949.825)
-71,405.378***
Fiscal Year
(10,394.613)
1.429e+08***
-18,016.494
Constant
(20800984.991)
(34,296.561)
82080
13847
Observations
0.81
0.84
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

(3)
OLS - 2000
6.180***
(0.077)
0.176***
(0.010)
0.251***
(0.006)
-0.261***
(0.006)
233.930
(2,477.116)

(4)
OLS - 2001
7.778***
(0.089)
-0.110***
(0.012)
0.202***
(0.007)
-0.208***
(0.007)
-4,436.049
(3,261.490)

(5)
OLS - 2002
4.374***
(0.059)
0.241***
(0.006)
0.209***
(0.003)
-0.209***
(0.003)
-35.609
(792.412)

(6)
OLS - 2003
4.447***
(0.062)
-0.110***
(0.005)
0.327***
(0.003)
-0.344***
(0.003)
4.835
(338.380)

74,115.615**
(33,059.050)
15646
0.86

42,981.353
(38,638.673)
16821
0.76

36,519.077
(25,388.980)
17457
0.87

111,456.227***
(23,809.628)
18309
0.86
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The effect of Earned Revenues on contributions to Education organizations is also
negative but smaller in magnitude. While people donate less as the nonprofit collects more
program service revenue, the smaller coefficient suggests that private donors may be more
accepting of this revenue source for Education than Arts organizations.
Finally, the previous year‟s government grants have an interesting effect on charitable
contributions. In some years, there is a moderate, incomplete crowding out. In other years,
government grants are associated with an increase in contributions. Again, the varying fiscal
years used by nonprofit organizations makes it difficult to determine whether 9/11 had some
impact on this coefficient, where some exogenous factor increased both government grants
and contributions. Using location in New York to test this possibility (assuming New York
received a disproportionate amount of federal funding following 9/11), the author finds an
insignificant difference in the coefficient between organizations inside and outside of New
York.
Health nonprofits also demonstrate unique patterns. While statistically significant,
program service revenues, for example, have a small effect on contributions relative to their
impact on contributions for organizations classified as Arts. Size, as measured by program
expenses, also appears a less important determinant of private contributions for these
organizations than those classified in the previous categories. The effect of present year
fundraising is fairly consistent across years, and as was the case in other models, the
efficiency measure it insignificant. Most interesting in this set of regressions, however, is the
consistent crowding in of private donations by previous year‟s government grants.
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Table 23
OLS Results (Health)
Health

(1)
(2)
OLS - full sample OLS - 1999
4.372***
3.481***
Fundraising Expenses
(0.013)
(0.040)
0.191***
Government Grants (lag) 0.184***
(0.004)
(0.007)
0.044***
0.032***
Program Expenses (lag)
(0.001)
(0.002)
-0.027***
Program Service Rev (lag) -0.038***
(0.001)
(0.001)
-1.367
1.406
Price (lag)
(9.942)
(968.269)
-4,065.313
Fiscal Year
(8,900.008)
8175767.179
56,136.647***
Constant
(17809233.213)
(20,494.010)
96591
18087
Observations
0.61
0.36
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

(3)
OLS - 2000
4.144***
(0.025)
0.189***
(0.006)
0.039***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.002)
-0.373
(44.464)

(4)
OLS - 2001
4.580***
(0.045)
0.177***
(0.015)
0.071***
(0.006)
-0.061***
(0.005)
-34.046
(2,020.178)

(5)
OLS - 2002
4.373***
(0.016)
0.232***
(0.005)
0.031***
(0.002)
-0.026***
(0.002)
-0.946
(6.379)

(6)
OLS - 2003
4.328***
(0.018)
0.113***
(0.006)
0.064***
(0.002)
-0.057***
(0.002)
-473.746
(6,300.439)

73,613.274***
(19,149.708)
19207
0.65

42,804.847
(49,606.042)
19790
0.42

-9,205.287
(18,054.756)
19673
0.85

68,719.571***
(22,650.458)
19834
0.80
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Table 24
OLS Results (Human Services)
Human Services

Fundraising Expenses
Government Grants
(lag)
Program Expenses
(lag)
Program Service Rev
(lag)
Price (lag)
Fiscal Year
Constant

(1)
OLS - full
sample
4.236***
(0.019)
-0.337***
(0.003)
0.361***
(0.002)
-0.360***
(0.002)
-0.939
(12.935)
-4,151.201
(3,508.860)
8382658.646

(2)
OLS - 1999

(3)
OLS - 2000

(4)
OLS - 2001

(5)
OLS - 2002

(6)
OLS - 2003

3.464***
(0.023)
-0.294***
(0.003)
0.318***
(0.003)
-0.284***
(0.003)
-0.422
(6.599)

2.623***
(0.022)
-0.289***
(0.004)
0.315***
(0.003)
-0.295***
(0.003)
-419.574
(372.752)

3.095***
(0.038)
-0.259***
(0.006)
0.314***
(0.005)
-0.320***
(0.005)
-29.765
(161.296)

4.752***
(0.027)
-0.834***
(0.004)
0.879***
(0.003)
-0.697***
(0.003)
3.831
(14.335)

-1.371***
(0.039)
-0.579***
(0.004)
0.639***
(0.003)
-0.647***
(0.003)
613.708
(668.185)

79,247.385*** 113,060.235*** 104,469.590*** 174,123.726***
(4,601.814)
(5,562.387)
(9,540.036)
(7,833.783)
42178
46643
49427
50833
0.88
0.79
0.57
0.94

(7021567.729)
240988
Observations
0.65
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

156,904.719***
(7,918.875)
51907
0.69
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Results from Human Service organizations are interesting in that they most closely
resemble those from Arts, Culture, and Humanities nonprofits. Government grants generate
moderate to high crowding out, and larger organizations, defined as those that spend more on
programs, receive greater private contributions. It also appears to be the case that
organizations collecting more earned revenues in the previous time period receive lower
contributions in the present time. It may be tempting to assume that organizations collecting
fees are not soliciting private contributions, but this relationship persists while controlling for
total fundraising.
The results above are interesting, but a variety of factors call the results into question.
Several terms may be endogenous, and the possibility that omitted factors are correlated with
included variables causes further bias in the estimated coefficients. To test these possibilities,
the following sections estimate similar models as presented above, but use fixed effects and
later instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity.
Panel Estimation
Although fixed effects models control for both observed and unobserved fixed
effects, the differences in the models above suggest that separate estimation for the major
categories remains necessary. It could also be argued that each variable in the model should
be interacted with individual fiscal years, but direct comparison between major NTEE
categories is simplified with a more straightforward empirical model. Results are presented
in the table below.
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Table 25
Fixed Effects Results - A comparison across categories

Fundraising
Expenses
Government
Grants (lag)

(1)
AR
1.628***

(2)
ED
5.315***

(3)
HE
1.776***

(4)
HU
17.316***

(0.094)
-0.020

(0.077)
-0.122***

(0.075)
0.072***

(0.060)
-0.097***

(0.020)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.006)
0.065***
-0.016***
0.011***
-0.027***
Program
Expenses (lag)
(0.015)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.213***
-0.013***
-0.006***
-0.136***
Program
Service Rev
(lag)
(0.027)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.004)
-121.517
11.102
-0.046
0.427
Price (lag)
(197.019)
(396.800)
(8.349)
(12.739)
-15,088.075*
-52,901.604***
-2,754.250
-4,380.296
Fiscal Year
(7,768.678)
(9,777.470)
(7,487.365)
(3,387.342)
30473867.294** 1.064e+08***
5729190.922
8749839.618
Constant
(15544792.440)
(19565247.337)
(14981495.486)
(6778125.885)
81304
95876
239241
Observations 59127
25976
27579
72048
Number of ein 18496
0.01
0.09
0.01
0.34
R-squared
(within)
0.65
0.42
0.75
0.69
R-squared
(between)
0.53
0.46
0.60
0.60
R-squared
(overall)
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

As was the case with the OLS estimates, controlling for organizational fixed effects
reveals significant differences between four of the major NTEE categories. Assuming
fundraising exhibits diminishing marginal returns, Arts and Health organizations are much
closer to achieving levels of fundraising that maximize private (and hence total)
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contributions. Human Service organizations and to a lesser extent Education nonprofits can
expect to receive significantly greater returns to increases in fundraising, suggesting lessthan-optimal fundraising expenses on average for these organizations.
Of the other variables, the only one displaying a consistent pattern across all
categories is price, the most commonly tested financial proxy for efficiency. And like the
OLS models, the fixed effects models confirm findings from other panel research (Khanna &
Sandler, 2000) that suggests private contributions are nonresponsive to changes in this
particular measure of efficiency.
Other variables in the model highlight differences between categories and the need
for organization-level effects. Consider the variable for size, program expenses. In the OLS
models, while the magnitude changes across years and major NTEE categories, the
significance and sign remained constant. The panel estimates paint a different picture.
While still significant, the magnitude of the coefficients in Table X are smaller than those in
previous models, and some of the estimates even suggest a negative relationship between
program expenses in the previous year and private contributions in the current year. An Arts
organization can expect to attract $65 more dollars for every thousand it increases program
expenses. The same increase for Human Service Organizations is expected to decrease
contributions by $27.
This last result is puzzling, and the extent to which this may have been skewed by
organizations such as the American Red Cross whose contributions and expenses may be
cyclical, Human Services is re-estimated for all Human Service Organizations except those
classified as P21–American Red Cross. Results are presented in Table 26. The expected
effect of prior year‟s program expenses is now not only positive but far exceeds the
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magnitude of the other categories. Specifically, an additional one thousand dollars spent on
program expenses in the previous year by Human Service nonprofits excluding the Red
Cross is expected to increase current year‟s contributions by $539. The differences between
the results in Table 25 and 26 suggest the need for further disaggregation, an area for future
research.

Table 26
Fixed Effects on Human Service Organizations (excluding Red Cross)
HU
2.297***
Fundraising Expenses
(0.044)
-0.509***
Government Grants (lag)
(0.003)
0.539***
Program Expenses (lag)
(0.002)
-0.555***
Program Service Rev (lag)
(0.002)
0.954
Price (lag)
(6.384)
-2,949.038*
Fiscal Year
(1,700.370)
6012739.532*
Constant
(3402392.361)
239231
Observations
72043
Number of ein
0.36
R-squared (within)
0.61
R-squared (between)
0.55
R-squared (overall)
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

Comparing the effects of government grants in the above tables also demonstrates the
diversity of contribution determinants within the nonprofit sector. Arts organizations, as a
group, seem unaffected by the receipt of government grants. The same grant, however, is
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expected to attract additional private contributions to Health organizations. A real $1000
increase in government grants is expected to increase reported private contributions by $72.
Education and Human Service organizations, however, demonstrate incomplete crowding-out
in a magnitude similar to the average found in other studies (Tinkelman, 2010). By
removing five Red Cross organizations from the sample, however, Table 26 suggests that for
every two dollars received in government grants, private contributions to the remaining
Human Service organizations fall by more than $1.
Finally, we find that while controlling for other factors, increasing prior year‟s earned
revenues decreases current year‟s contributions for all major categories of nonprofits
presented in this paper with the exception of Arts. As Arts organizations increase their
earned revenues, contributions also increase. This may result from the nature of services
provided by Arts organizations, where patrons paying for services are also enticed to donate
additional funding. For the other categories, actual beneficiaries and donors may be two
distinct groups, and therefore, the more that the beneficiaries can self-finance, the less the
donors are willing to give. Again, it is difficult to separate out the extent to which earned
revenues fill gaps created by declining contributions or contributions decline as a result of
organizations seeking the more stable earned revenues (Kerlin & Pollak, 2010). This is
another area worthy of continued research.
Originally, scholars speculated that nonprofits resorted to earned and commercial
revenues as a means of replacing lost government and private contributions. This suggests a
decline in contributions precedes changes in commercial revenues. Empirically, this idea
remained largely untested until recently. Kerlin and Pollack (2010) find increasing reliance
on commercial revenues, regardless of prior changes in contributions. Results in this paper
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suggest contributions for some types of organizations are expected to decline following
increases in earned revenues. Together, these two papers present implications counter to the
scholars‟ earlier hypothesis. It could be the case that nonprofits fear a drop in contributions
and thus place greater emphasis on earned revenues, but the drop in contributions (or grants)
fails to materialize. Greater emphasis on earned revenues, even when controlling for
fundraising, discourages private contributors, and thus the subsequent fall in contributions
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy for such nonprofit organizations.
To test this idea, Table 25 is replicated, but this time an interaction term between
fundraising and lagged real program service revenues is included. If this idea is correct, that
donors may be turned off by increasing earned revenues, we should find a negative sign on
the interaction variable. It suggests that the return to an additional dollar on fundraising is
lower for organizations generating more in earned revenues. This also implies that earned
revenues have a larger (in terms of magnitude) effect on private contributions when a
nonprofit engages in larger fundraising, ceteris paribus. Results are presented in Table 27.
Interestingly, the interaction term is positive in all 4 major NTEE categories, although the
magnitude suggests any true interaction effect is close to zero. (Note that the HU column
now excludes 5 American Red Cross organizations.)
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Table 27
Fixed Effects Results with Fundraising and Program Service Rev. Interaction

Fundraising
Expenses
Government
Grants (lag)
Program
Expenses (lag)
Program Service
Rev (lag)
Price (lag)
Fiscal Year
Fundraising (lag)
* Prog. Serv. Rev
(lag)
Constant

(1)
AR
1.310***

(2)
ED
4.159***

(3)
HE
1.590***

(4)
HU
2.101***

(0.095)
-0.002

(0.108)
-0.138***

(0.078)
0.056***

(0.046)
-0.511***

(0.020)
0.012

(0.009)
-0.014***

(0.010)
0.010***

(0.003)
0.541***

(0.015)
0.043

(0.003)
-0.035***

(0.002)
-0.007***

(0.002)
-0.560***

(0.029)
-0.417
(196.094)
-11,367.397
(7,730.818)
0.000***
(0.000)

(0.004)
10.033
(395.976)
-44,991.679***
(9,771.002)
0.000***
(0.000)

(0.002)
-0.045
(8.344)
-1,302.135
(7,484.755)
0.000***
(0.000)

(0.002)
0.954
(6.381)
-2,751.350
(1,699.448)
0.000***
(0.000)

23129933.097
90752918.412*** 2859911.196
5620537.659*
(15468923.012) (19551741.986)
(14976185.089) (3400545.116)
59127
81304
95876
239231
Observations
18496
25976
27579
72043
Number of ein
0.02
0.10
0.01
0.36
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

Instruments
Up to this point, the results are interesting to interpret, but to begin to draw causal
arguments, it is necessary to distinguish correlation from causation. Accounting for fixed
effects begins this process in the above models, but some endogeneity may remain. Consider
the variable, program service (earned) revenues. Although lagged in the model, the theory
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presented earlier suggests that it may also be a function of government grants, fundraising,
and efficiency, also from the lagged year. Although lagged fundraising is not included in the
model, current and lagged fundraising are significantly correlated (0.976), and the other two
variables are also considered as determinants of contributions (although the efficiency
measure fails to prove significant in any specification). Fundraising may also be
endogenous, as its value may depend upon the level of revenues received from sources such
as the government. Andreoni and Payne (2003) suggest that incomplete crowding out may
result from a change in fundraising strategies by nonprofit organizations. As organizations
increase their receipts of government funds, they decrease their level of fundraising, and
hence collect less money. If nonprofits financial resources are fungible, however, it could be
the case that nonprofits receiving government funding are able to increase their fundraising
endeavors, hence masking crowding out that may have occurred had fundraising remained at
pre-government funding levels. Finally, government funding may be responsive to changes
in an organization's efficiency. The previous chapter in this dissertation asserts that the level
of government funding received by an organization generally increases as organizations
become more efficient, although this effect varies considerable across efficiency measure and
the mission of the nonprofit.
The following methods are used to predict less biased estimates and test the
robustness of previous results. First, we consider using instruments comparable to those used
by Andreoni and Payne (2003). While these authors used NIH funding in a model estimating
the impact of government grants on fundraising, I instead instrument with new (as opposed to
continuation) NSF funding to higher education in an organization‟s metropolitan area, as
determined by zip code. Additional instruments unique to individual organizations are then
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tested. I instrument for lagged government grants using a twice lagged measure of
fundraising expenses and lagged earned program revenues by the twice-lagged managerial
expenses. Changes in fundraising during previous years may signal efficiency to the
government, and changes in managerial expenses may indicate a shift towards more
business-savvy administration, thus foreshadowing an increase in earned program revenues
exogenous from any increase in demand for services that would increase government, earned
revenues, and contributions simultaneously.
Table 28 includes estimates for the first and second steps when NSF funding is used
as an instrument. While Andreoni and Payne (2003) used a longer sample and aggregated
NSF funding at the state level, the author attempts to calculate a more accurate measure by
aggregating NSF funding at the MSA level. Unfortunately, this measure is a poor instrument
in each of the four major categories considered. In all 4 cases, new NSF grants to an area
fails to prove a significant determinant of government grants when controlling for individual
fixed effects. Additional measures were then tested, including continuing grants, total grants,
average grant size, and state level departmental budgets (not shown). Unfortunately, each of
these yielded results similar to the NSF data presented. They were poor predictors of
government grants, and results in the second stage are therefore unreliable.
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Table 28
Fixed Effects and Instrumenting with NSF Funding

Government
Grants (lag)
Fundraising
Expenses
Program
Expenses (lag)
Program Service
Rev (lag)

(1)
AR
0.561

(2)
ED
-4.648

(3)
HE
-0.254

(4)
HU
-1.071

(7.183)
1.904

(2.916)
9.242***

(1.215)
0.944***

(1.541)
0.863

(2.024)
-0.147

(2.948)
-0.565

(0.287)
0.042

(1.169)
0.283

(1.170)
0.478

(0.384)
0.723

(0.081)
-0.020

(0.315)
-0.441

(1.408)
(0.530)
(0.055)
(0.288)
-1,636.693
-51.870
-0.050
1.044
Price (lag)
(1,586.152)
(1,037.897)
(12.952)
(9.061)
-57,443.833
112,916.531
-25,558.282
31,254.202
Fiscal Year
(45,045.998)
(135,181.295)
(60,657.698)
(28,650.267)
1.153e+08
-2.231e+08
51423777.090
-6.192e+07
Constant
(89753564.114) (2.692e+08)
(1.211e+08)
(56894657.264)
35033
49244
54677
139196
Observations
16172
22848
23994
62799
Number of ein
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
First Step
AR
ED
HE
HU
-0.000
0.001
0.002***
0.000
New Grants ($,
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
lag)
0.281***
1.006***
-0.204***
-0.758***
Fundraising
(0.028)
(0.059)
(0.036)
(0.042)
Expenses
0.163***
-0.132***
0.066***
0.204***
Program
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.002)
Expenses (lag)
-0.196***
0.182***
-0.045***
-0.187***
Program Service
(0.009)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.002)
Rev (lag)
30.190
-11.144
-0.020
0.510
Price (lag)
(260.763)
(222.146)
(3.192)
(7.056)
6,640.770
37,844.645*** 39,723.446*** 17,732.730***
Fiscal Year
(4,043.170)
(10,286.495)
(6,249.113)
(2,766.285)
-1.322e+07
-7.529e+07*** -7.925e+07*** -3.520e+07***
Constant
(8091477.713) (20586420.590) (12506846.089) (5536520.824)
35033
49244
54677
139196
Observations
16172
22848
23994
62799
Number of ein
0.05
0.17
0.11
0.16
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
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The organization-specific instruments in the second analysis prove more beneficial
for assessing causality. We begin by instrumenting for government grants and program
service revenue. Results are presented in Table 29. In each of the four categories, the
proposed instruments meet the requirements for good instruments. Theoretically, they are
not directly related to the variable of interest, in this case, private contributions and are
significant predictors of lagged government grants and program service revenues. Both
instruments are usually significant, but when only one of the instruments is significant in the
first step regression, it is the one proposed as the instrument for that particular endogenous
variable.
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Table 29
Fixed Effects and Instruments for Government Grants and Program Service Revenues

Government Grants (lag)
Program Service Rev (lag)
Fundraising Expenses
Program Expenses (lag)
Price (lag)
Fiscal Year
Constant
Observations
Number of ein
First Stage
Fundraising Expenses
Program Expenses (lag)
Price (lag)
Fiscal Year

AR

ED

HE

HU

-5.551***
(1.096)
0.129
(0.665)
5.686***
(0.499)
0.936***
(0.356)
95.474
(436.069)
-27,473.0
(22963.8)

-0.460***
(0.092)
0.135***
(0.022)
3.180***
(0.215)
-0.152***
(0.021)
-2.716
(455.344)
-56,018.140***
(16319.7)
1.133e+08***

1.354
(1.166)
-0.043
(0.036)
2.107***
(0.264)
0.029
(0.039)
0.045
(10.841)
-57,059.0
(50455.4)
1.14E+08

-1.051***
(0.243)
-0.399***
(0.032)
2.694***
(0.181)
0.460***
(0.042)
1.862
(13.803)
8,809.9*
(5313.0)
-1.7E+07
-10576215

55162,163
-45964618

-32663414

-1.01E+08

41191
15557

55691
21522

67237
24002

(1)
AR_gov

(2)
AR_psr

(3)
ED_gov

(4)
ED_psr

(5)
HE_gov

(6)
HE_psr

166769
61454
(7)
(8)
HU_gov HU_psr

0.619***
(0.030)
0.155***
(0.004)
42.261
(62.750)
-1,130.76

-0.930***
(0.021)
0.307***
(0.003)
-59.057
(43.145)
1,474.988

1.774***
(0.057)
0.081***
(0.001)
5.779
(228.227)
3,348.336

-2.397***
(0.108)
0.857***
(0.002)
54.366
(431.762)
-16,594.34

-0.234***
(0.034)
0.013***
(0.000)
-0.110
(2.612)
40,332***

0.849***
(0.218)
0.942***
(0.002)
-2.337
(16.790)
223,727***

-0.159***
(0.043)
0.108***
(0.001)
0.628
(9.268)
18,701***

-4.293***
(0.071)
0.547***
(0.002)
2.124
(15.354)
-3,376.5
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Fundraising Expenses
(Twice lagged)
Administrative Expenses
(Twice lagged)
Constant

(3,319.6)
0.283***

(2,282.5)
-0.791***

(8,164.144)
1.296***

(15,445.0)
-1.577***

(3,514.57)
-0.087***

(22,592.6)
-0.565***

(2,066.53)
-0.281***

(3,423.4)
-0.099

(0.048)
0.130***

(0.033)
-0.053***

(0.061)
-0.056***

(0.116)
-0.289***

(0.025)
-0.001

(0.163)
0.167***

(0.048)
-0.145***

(0.079)
1.278***

(0.017)
2203303.4
(6643789.
675)
41191
15557
0.07

(0.012)
-2721394
(4568105.
382)
41191
15557
0.58

(0.004)
-6704685.7
(16340316.
946)
55691
21522
0.17

(0.008)
33480667
(30912793.
544)
55691
21522
0.88

(0.001)
-8e+07***
(7034128.
156)
67237
24002
0.06

(0.009)

(0.013)

-4.5e+08***

-3.7e+7***

(45217187.
899)
67237
24002
0.89

(4136043.
240)
166769
61454
0.07

(0.021)
6733727
(6851818.
058)
166769
61454
0.48

Observations
Number of ein
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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In the case of Arts nonprofits, we find that crowding out occurs with a much larger
magnitude than previously estimated. The results suggest that an additional dollar of
government grants may decrease contributions by more than $5.55, a figure that far exceeds
that in most research. Earned program revenues loses significance after instrumentation,
suggesting that controlling for other factors, including unobservables that do vary with time
such as a demand for a nonprofit‟s services, this revenue source does not significantly affect
private contributions.
Results from the first step are also worthy of discussion. The instruments are
statistically significant, but not necessarily in the directions predicted. Government grants
are positively impacted by managerial expenses, a result anticipated following earlier
research (previous chapter). Previous fundraising, however, is a positive predictor of
government grants. Given the often inverse relationship of fundraising and efficiency
measures, one might be more inclined to think an increase in a previous year‟s fundraising
would lower efficiency, and hence decrease government grants. The key to understanding
this finding, however, may lay with the exogenous variables in the model. Specifically, we
are controlling for future fundraising expenses, relative to the lagged government grants.
While direct interpretation of this coefficient is not important, the inclusion of this variable
suggests that the greater the twice lagged fundraising, the less the increase from past to future
– with the difference even being a decline in fundraising. It may not be the level of
fundraising that is theoretically important, but the change in fundraising from one year to the
next that concerns the government. Therefore, controlling for future fundraising, the greater
the past fundraising, the greater the possibility of a decrease in fundraising expenses, and
thus the increase in government grants.
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Interpreting managerial expenses is also interesting. Simple correlations between
lagged managerial expenses and program service revenues in the Arts are positive (0.68), but
the results from the fixed effects model suggest a negative statistical relationship.
Contradictory to my original hypothesis with this variable, Arts organizations are not
investing in managerial expertise to increase their ability to generate earned revenues, but
such investment does appear significantly related to government grants.
The results from Education organizations also suggest that crowding out may be more
significant for nonprofit organizations than suggested by the first panel estimates, although
for these organizations, crowd out is still incomplete. The instrumentation of program
service revenues also generated interesting results. Despite explaining the vast majority of
earned revenues for Education organizations (R-squared within of .88), the effect of program
service revenues changes from slightly negative in the first estimation to positive and
moderate in magnitude in the latest estimation. A $1000 increase in earned revenues is now
expected to increase private contributions by $135. Given the significance of higher
education in the education category, this finding is not surprising, and further research is
necessary to determine the robustness of these findings across different types of education
nonprofits.
In the first step, we again find that lagged fundraising positively affects government
grants, but in this case, managerial expenses decrease both government grants and program
service revenues. Given the control for size (program expenses), increases in administration
as a share of total expenses increases government grants for Arts but decreases the
government grants for Education. This highlights the differences in expectations between
revenue sources for different types of nonprofit organizations.
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Health nonprofits exhibit a different pattern than Arts or Education in that after
instrumentation, neither government grants nor program service revenues are expected to
significantly affect private contributions. For these organizations, the only significant
determinant of contributions is fundraising expenditures. The first step regressions, however,
provide another unique insight into our instruments. In predicting lagged earned service
revenues, this is the first instance in which managerial expenses are associated with increases
in earned revenues. Health care organizations may be investing in administration with the
intent of increasing earned revenues.
The Human Service category, the final of the four major categories analyzed in this
paper, presents interesting results that differ from the previous categories. (Again, this
estimation excludes 5 organizations classified as P21 – American Red Cross). Crowding out
by government grants is estimated at 1.05, giving the closest estimate to perfect crowding out
in the paper thus far. Specifically, by removing the variation in government grants that may
fluctuate simultaneously with private contributions from an unobserved factor, we now find
that an increase in government grants of $1 is expected to decrease private contributions by
$1.05.
The estimation of government grants in the first step suggests the expected
relationship between lagged fundraising and government grants. While not the only category
to exhibit this pattern (also negative and significant for Health), the magnitude in this case is
significantly larger than in the other instance.
Nonprofits in this category are also the only group to display a negative relationship
between earned program service revenues and private contributions, ceteris paribus. A
$1000 increase in earned revenues decreases contributions by close to $400. In the
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prediction of earned revenues, we find that managerial expenses has a significantly larger
effect than it did in the other categories, where a $1000 increase in the previous year‟s
managerial expenses is expected to increase program service revenues by $1278.
Having already instrumented for government grants and program service revenue,
there is one more possibly endogenous variable in the model – fundraising expenditures. If
fundraising expenditures are decided at the beginning of a fiscal year based upon last year‟s
revenues, expenses, and projections for the coming year, then the variable as a determinant of
private support is exogenous. Endogeneity, however, may be likely if nonprofit
organizations adjust their fundraising expenses during the year due to some unanticipated
increase in demand for services, or in response to higher or lower than expected
contributions. For example, suppose an organization tends to collect $1 million dollars
during the first half of the fiscal year. Due to economic conditions, the organization collects
only $700,000. The organization may re-evaluate their fundraising strategies, even
increasing their fundraising expenditures hoping to make up the difference.
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Table 30
Instruments for Government Grants, Program Service Revenue and Fundraising (2nd
stage results only)

Government
Grants (lag)
Program
Service Rev
(lag)
Fundraising
Expenses
Program
Expenses (lag)

(1)
AR
-3.435***

(2)
ED
-1.213***

(3)
HE
1.905

(4)
HU
-1.196***

(0.849)
4.031***

(0.177)
0.038

(1.976)
-0.037

(0.258)
-0.409***

(0.728)
13.852***

(0.030)
10.244***

(0.036)
2.023***

(0.034)
3.199***

(1.778)
-0.251

(1.048)
0.012

(0.610)
0.017

(0.426)
0.480***

(0.282)
(0.037)
(0.045)
(0.045)
-398.037
13.037
0.118
1.977
(416.097)
(532.719)
(11.323)
(14.418)
-52,453.813**
-101,278.321*** -79,887.031
10,589.077*
Fiscal Year
(21,912.688)
(19,852.915)
(80,002.313)
(5,534.724)
1.038e+08**
2.032e+08***
1.595e+08
-2.086e+07*
Constant
(43810708.713)
(39711106.045)
(1.594e+08)
(11017850.119)
41191
55691
67237
166769
Observations
21522
24002
61454
Number of ein 15557
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
Price (lag)

With the third instrument included, there is evidence of significant crowding out in
three of the major categories, Arts, Education, and Human Services. In the cases of
Education and Human Services, the crowding out is close to the one-to-one crowding out
theory predicted but most empirical studies failed to find. Controlling for fundraising
expenses (and assuming expenses reflect efforts), nonprofit organizations in these categories
may expect a decline in contributions as government grants to the organization increase.
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Results for Arts organizations suggest a crowding out significantly larger than dollar for
dollar. In this case, an additional dollar in government grants, ceteris paribus, is expected to
decrease private contributions by more than $3. Awareness of growing government support
to these organizations may decrease private contributors‟ desires to privately fund these
organizations.
Program Service Revenue, in this model, significantly affects expected contributions
for Arts and Human Service organizations, but less so for Education and Health. Arts
organizations can expect an increase in contributions as program service revenues increase,
ceteris paribus. One could develop a plausible story about the nature of service provided by
Arts organizations, the dual role of individuals as donors and recipients, externalities, and
significant differences between private value and admissions prices. As a museum or the
popularity of a performing arts group increases, more individuals patron these nonprofits, and
these same individuals then make private contributions to these organizations above the
required admissions price.
Of the four categories, donors and beneficiaries in Human Services may be the most
mutually exclusive group and services can largely be considered redistributive in nature.
This may explain the negative relationship between program service revenues and private
contributions in this category. A one thousand dollar increase in program service revenues is
expected to decrease private contributions by $409, ceteris paribus.
Finally, returns to fundraising may be much larger than expected, once we control for
organizational effects and the variable‟s possible endogeneity. For Arts organizations, for
example, an additional dollar in fundraising is now expected to increase private contributions
by more than $13. This relationship, while still statistically significant, is much smaller in
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magnitude for the categories of Human Services and Health, where additional fundraising
may only generate $2-$4 per additional dollar spent.
The following table compares magnitudes and significance across several of the
models and categories. It includes statistically significant coefficients from the OLS models,
the fixed effects models, the case in which we instrumented for government grants and
program service revenues (Instrument 2), and finally, when fundraising is included as a third
endogenous relationship (Instrument 3).

Table 31
Comparison of Significant Results across Categories and Specifications

ARTS

Education

Health

Human
Services (ex
P21 in cols 24)

government
Program Serv.
Rev.
Fundraising
government
Program Serv.
Rev.
Fundraising
government
Program Serv.
Rev.
Fundraising
government
Program Serv.
Rev.
Fundraising

OLS
(pooled)
-.545
-0.507

Fixed
Effects
.213

Instrument
(2)
-5.551
-

Instrument
(3)
-3.435
4.031

3.027
.023
-0.237

1.628
-.122
-.013

5.686
-0.460
0.135

13.852
-1.213
-

5.706
.184
-0.038

5.315
.072
-.006

3.180
-

10.244
-

4.372
-0.337
-0.360

1.776
-.509
-.555

2.107
-1.051
-0.399

2.023
-1.196
-0.409

4.236

2.297

2.694

3.199

Comparing the various empirical techniques provides us the opportunity to better see
patterns in the data. For example, we find that instrumentation increases the magnitude of
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crowding out, or in the case of Health, earlier estimates of crowding-in are no longer present.
Depending on the classification of an organization, crowd-out from an increase in
government grants may decrease private contributions from zero to over $3, an estimate that
exceeds most previous research (Tinkelman, 2010).
Focusing on Arts organizations, estimates of crowding out vary from just over 50
cents on the dollar to $3.43 per dollar increase of government grants. Program Service
Revenues were initially correlated with a decline in direct support, but once organizational
fixed effects were included in the model, increases in earned revenues are generally assumed
to increase private contributions (in 2 of the three estimations). Fundraising, assuming
subject to diminishing returns, falls significantly short of its revenue maximizing level in
each of the models.
The change in parameters for Education is also interesting. Without fixed effects, the
pooled OLS model suggested that increases in government grants may have attracted
increased contributions. Again, once we include fixed effects, crowding out is expected at
levels between -0.12 to -1.2. Again, these results suggest that partial crowd out is likely, but
complete crowding may also be occurring once we correct for factors potentially biasing
results. The effect of earned program service revenues on contributions to Education
organizations is a bit more ambiguous. Further research on this issue is warranted,
specifically the separation of organizations such as nonprofit higher education that may be
skewing results.
Health organizations are unique in that, as a whole, they do not appear subject to
crowding-out or crowding-in. When significant, the magnitude of this coefficient is
relatively low, and once fixed effects and instruments are included, the estimated parameter
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is statistically insignificant from zero. Again, it is difficult to determine whether these results
are biased by large, nonprofit hospitals, whether donors are unaware of government funding
to nonprofit organizations in this category (i.e. [Horne, et al., 2005; Van Slyke & Roch,
2004]), or whether crowd-in and crowd-out effects perfectly cancel one another out. Program
Service Revenues follow a similar pattern, small in magnitude when significant, but
insignificant all together in the last two estimation techniques. Nonprofits falling into this
category are also expected to have the lowest return to changes in fundraising, with estimated
effects as low as $1.78 per each additional dollar allocated to fundraising expenses.
Finally, Human Service organizations (still excluding P21 – American Red Cross),
exhibit the tightest estimates of crowding out, with parameters ranging from -0.34 to -1.2.
Overall, increasing public support of a nonprofit Human Service organization decreases
contributions by private donors in subsequent time periods, evidence that these organizations
may be considered more of the pure public good and subject to traditional theories of crowdout in the sector. It is also possible that Human Service nonprofits, although covering a
wider range of industries than some of the other major 5 categories, may consist of
organizations that are in many respects, more similar in missions to assist those less
fortunate. This is further exhibited by estimates on the effect earned program revenues,
which suggest that a one dollar increase in this revenue source causes an expected decline in
private contributions between 0.36 and 0.56 cents.
What may explain these findings? The missions and services offered by each
category likely accounts for much of the cross-category variation. Consider the relationship
between beneficiaries and prospective donors. Young et. al. (2010), for example, use these
two variables in combination to determine the extent to which organizations are public or
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private. In the case of Arts organizations, one could argue, as already mentioned, that donors
comprise a significant portion of service beneficiaries. The exact opposite is true for Human
Services, where many of the services are redistributive in nature. Education and Health fall
somewhere in the middle. Alumni donating to a nonprofit college, for example, are previous
recipients of services, but their support is now more redistributive in nature. A parent
donating to her child‟s school, however, is more likely a direct beneficiary of her donation.
First consider the Arts, where donors may also be patrons. Although certain art forms
may resemble public goods, an individual is ultimately concerned with his own consumption.
He wants to enjoy a holiday classic like the Nutcracker, and is less concerned with who funds
it than whether he has a seat. If the government contributes to a local performing arts troupe,
and the Nutcracker is scheduled, the individual may be less inclined to donate privately to the
troupe.
Human Service nonprofits provide services that may not be as public in nature as
certain types of art. A bed at a homeless shelter, for example, is a rival good. Generally
speaking, donors to Human Service Organizations are also unlikely to be direct beneficiaries,
with Recreation and Sports nonprofits perhaps being the exception to the rule. For these
organizations, we again observe crowding out, but the most interesting finding is the
relationship between earned program service revenues and contributions. It appears that
donors, observing that an organization is collecting more revenues directly from beneficiaries
(or third party payers), are less inclined to financially support the organization through
private contributions. When donating to a Human Service organization, donors may be
motivated by the thought of helping those less fortunate. The more this group can self-
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support, the lower the utility increase of a prospective donor with each dollar donation, hence
aggregate contributions decline.
Health arguably includes the most diverse group of nonprofits with respect to the
nature of services provided. It includes large hospitals, community health clinics, mental
health and substance abuse treatment programs, and medical research. Consider a category
such as medical research, where value is assessed by advances in scientific knowledge.
Increases in financial support by government when no cure is found may not deter private
contributors interested in supporting the organization to find a cure or discover new
treatments. This may differ from a community health clinic serving a particular
neighborhood. If government funds increase and are now sufficient to maintain needed day
to day operations, donors may feel their contributions are no longer needed at this particular
organization. The diversity in this category may explain the lack of significant findings on
crowding out and program service revenue, and hence a further disaggregation of this
category may be most warranted.
Re-division of Nonprofit Organizations
While it is possible that we need further disaggregation of categories to create groups
of nonprofits with greater similarity in mission, the opposite was suggested earlier in this
paper. Perhaps groupings should depend less on mission and more on similarities in revenue
structures. Nonprofit hospitals and universities, for example, may have more in common
than the same hospitals compared with community family planning clinics in lower income
areas. Table 32 presents results for the same model as estimated in Table 30 but groups
organizations based on their dependence on particular revenue streams rather than mission.
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Table 32
Classification by Major Revenue Stream
(1)
(2)
(3)
Contribution Share Program Service Rev.
Government Grant
>.8
Share >.8
Share >.8
-1.634***
-0.340***
1.158
Government
(0.256)
(0.043)
(3.594)
Grants (lag)
-0.574***
-0.012**
0.473
Program Service
(0.051)
(0.005)
(1.555)
Rev (lag)
-1.393
0.206
-2.851
Fundraising
(1.085)
(0.827)
(18.082)
Expenses
0.017***
-1.208
Program Expenses 0.639***
(0.049)
(0.005)
(3.690)
(lag)
0.593
-0.050
-4.159
Price (lag)
(24.702)
(1.610)
(16.966)
70,897.814***
-2,193.220
-17,178.468
Fiscal Year
(18,864.087)
(2,574.045)
(59,022.930)
-1.405e+08***
4526475.245
34501132.306
Constant
(37642469.956)
(5138483.427)
(1.182e+08)
117062
105979
29758
Observations
52482
43462
13723
Number of ein
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

For organizations that depend almost entirely on government grants, the variables
studied thus far explain little of the variation in their contributions from year to year. The
same variables, however, offer the most explanatory power for those organizations that rely
most heavily on contributions. For example, government grants are expected to crowd out
significantly more donations to organizations that depend almost entirely on contributions,
with a one dollar increase in government grants expected to decrease direct support by $1.63.
Crowd-out occurs for those organizations that rely mostly on program service revenues, but
for these organizations, the crowd-out is incomplete. Program service revenues also have a
larger effect on organizations most dependent on contributions. A one dollar increase in this
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revenue stream is expected to decrease contributions by more than 57 cents, again much
larger than the negligible one cent decline in organizations predominantly relying on program
service revenues. Fundraising has no effect on contributions once we separate nonprofits
based on their primary sources of revenue, a surprising finding. What we should take from
the above is that the determinants of contributions may vary based on the level of support an
organization receives from specific revenue streams. Organizations most dependent on
contributions appear most affected by changes in the determinants analyzed in this paper.
Specification
Although panel data offers one of the best means for controlling for time-invariant
unobservables, differences in estimation techniques may have implications for the
consistency and efficiency of the predicted coefficients. For this reason, models were
compared using Hausman‟s specificity test. First, in comparing the fixed effects results with
random effects models, results from the Hausman test suggest that the random effects
estimates are inconsistent, and therefore should be rejected in favor of the fixed effects
estimates. A second round of tests compared the fixed effects results with predictions from
the instrumental variable approach. If the coefficients from the two models are not
systematically different, than the fixed effects results are presumed consistent and more
efficient than those from the instrumental variable fixed effects models. For each of the four
major categories, we cannot reject the null that the differences between the models are not
systematic and therefore, the instrumental approach is determined more consistent (Hausman,
1978).
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Conclusion
Research on the determinants of contributions to nonprofit organizations has largely
been compartmentalized, with researchers focusing on one of two issues. Either researchers
want to assess the effect, if any, that financial proxies for efficiency have on charitable
contributions. Or, they attempt to measure a causal relationship between the receipt of
government grants and private contributions. To date, advances in these two methods have
not been combined. Adding to the contribution of this particular essay is the inclusion of
earned program service revenues. Researchers assumed program service revenues increase
as a result of falling contributions, but this essay instead proposes that potential donors may
respond to changes in an organization‟s ability to collect revenues directly from service
recipients.
Four of the five major NTEE categories are included in this analysis, Arts, Education,
Health, and Human Services. Considerable differences in the types of nonprofits included
vary both within and across these categories. For example, it is suggested that for Arts
organizations, more than the other categories, there is a greater overlap between private
donors and service recipients. These groups are assumed most mutually exclusive for
Human Service nonprofits. The diversity in Education and Health place these categories in
the middle.
It is the two extremes, Arts and Human Services that exhibit the most consistent
patterns of crowding out. Estimates for crowding out in the last instrumental variable fixed
effects approach place crowd-out between 0 (a statistically insignificant level) for Health to
as much as $3.44 for the Arts. The remaining two categories, Education and Human
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Services, each have estimates that are not statistically different from 1, suggesting almost
perfect, one-for-one crowd out for these organizations, on average.
The same two extremes also seem most affected by earned program service revenues,
although the relationship is not as consistent. For Arts organizations, two of the three fixed
effects models suggest that contributions increase by an amount between 0.2 and 4 dollars
per dollar reported as earned program service revenue. The same revenue source negatively
affects donations to Human Service organizations, but this effect is better refined and
expected to fall between 0.36 and 0.56 for each dollar in earned revenue.
Division of nonprofits by dominant revenue stream suggests that the organizations
reliant on contributions are more sensitive to changes in government grants and program
service revenues than other organizations, ceteris paribus. Estimates of government crowdout exceed one, and increases in program service revenues also have significant negative
effects on direct support, reducing estimated direct support by more than fifty cents per
dollar. Further research is needed into how the determinants of contributions might vary by
other characteristics such as organizational size or levels of fundraising, in addition to further
disaggregation.
As in other studies employing fixed effects, the efficiency measure of price is
determined to have no significant effect on contributions. Previous theories that individuals
may not be aware of changes in an organization‟s resource allocation (or simply do not care)
are generally supported. Other reasons for this funding could include the lack of variation in
this measure within an organization. Whether organizations aim for specific targets and
accomplish these or manipulate their accounting reports to reflect consistently hitting these
targets is unclear form this particular study.
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Implications of this research for nonprofits are numerous. First, for many nonprofits,
increasing government grants, even when controlling for fundraising, is likely to reduce
private contributions by an amount equal to or even greater than the change in government
grants, ceteris paribus. This raises the question, why are organizations so eager to increase
their level of support from the government? Perhaps large government grants require less
effort than traditional fundraising for private support. It may also be the case that there is
less volatility in government grants, and organizations are interested in smoothing revenues
and expenditures over time (Harrison & Laincz, 2010). Evidence that organizations prefer
stable but lower revenues may indicate risk-aversion in the sector and demonstrate the move
towards diversification. There is also evidence in the first essay that the most efficient
organizations may not be applying for government grants, suggesting that the most efficient
organizations are those that realize changes in government grants may not be ideal for an
organization trying to maximize total (or net) revenues.
Growing reliance on earned program service revenues, a noticeable trend in the
nonprofit sector (Harrison & Wilsker, 2011; Kerlin & Pollak, 2010), may also prove a
deterrent to private contributions in the future. Especially for Human Service organizations,
increases in earned revenues decrease private contributions (although the opposite is true for
Arts organizations). It should be noted, however, that this effect for Human Service
organizations is consistently less than one, suggesting that growth in the prior year‟s earned
revenues is not completely offset by declining contributions. Even with the negative
relationship, organizations in this category may still look to program service revenues as a
means for improving stability or creating growth.
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Lastly, pressure on nonprofit organizations to provide information on financial
efficiency may largely be unwarranted. Donors may not know what to make of the data or
fail to research organizations. In either case, the most commonly used efficiency proxy,
price, fails to prove significant in any of the models estimated. Organizations moderately
shifting expenses between fundraising and other expense categories during the period 19982003 were unlikely to see any negative repercussions from such changes. To the extent that
watchdog agencies may be more influential now than during the years of this study, it is
possible efficiency proxies could be more influential. Most research suggests that
individuals are not researching organizations (HopeConsulting, 2010; The Center on
Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2007), but further research on this topic is warranted.
There are additional implications for the public sector. When estimates of crowding
out are incomplete, the government can feel fairly confident that their grants are increasing
service provision, although further analysis is necessary to compare trends in government
grants with program expenses. This study suggests significant crowding out, leaving the
public sector to question whether tax dollars are put to the best use. If the public sector is
committed to building relationships between the sectors, a variety of grant types, including
matching or conditional grants, may be needed to reduce the crowding out effect. Another
question has to do with displacement. If public sector funds reduce private contributions to
recipient organizations, to what extent are displaced private funds flowing to direct
competitors with similar missions, nonprofits providing different services, or removed from
the nonprofit sector entirely.
Nonprofit organizations vary considerably in their missions, clients served, and
resource dependence. While attempting to integrate existing theories and add a new
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dimension, more questions arose than were answered. There is evidence of considerable
crowding out, and growing dependence on earned program revenues may decrease
contributions. That being said, contributions to the nonprofit sector continued to rise during
this time period. Our understanding of the nonprofit sector is continuously evolving, and
those working in the sector are similarly making strides in their understandings of their own
organizations. Continued research in the financing of nonprofit organizations coupled with
growing research on competition in the sector (Young, Seaman, et. al 2010) will hopefully
result in a more efficient and effective nonprofit sector.
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When Disaster Strikes: The Effects of 9/11 on the Determinants of Direct
Support
Most Americans can tell you where they were on September 11 th when the World
Trade Center fell. For those in my generation, it was the first event major event that we will
remember for the rest of our lives. We have little recollection of the Reagan administration
and the Iran-Contra scandal, and we were pre-teens during the first Persian Gulf War, a quick
victory for the Coalition forces with relatively few casualties. With the state of technology
and intelligence as they were at the turn of the millennium, we could not fathom the events of
September 11th.
Although concentrated in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Somerset County,
PA (where Flight 93 crashed), 9/11 was different from natural disasters in which
meteorologists are often able to give some warning and damage is limited geographically.
Americans rushed to the aid (including financially) of those in the affected regions but also
recognized the need for preparedness within their own regions. While in the midst of a
recession (March-November 2001), you could sense a shift in Americans‟ priorities.
Despite the effect such events have on nonprofit revenues, we know little about how
these events affect the determinants of contributions at the organizational level. As scholars,
we discuss the effects of fundraising, reputation, and government grants, to name a few
factors of donations, but when people are making more spontaneous decisions or offering
support to new organizations, we do not have a clear theory of what to expect. This paper
intends to begin building such a theory and analyzes data surrounding 9/11 to assess the
merits of this theory.
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How do the affects of organizations‟ behaviors and resources affect contributions
following catastrophic events relative to more normal times? To answer this question, the
remainder of this essay is organized as follows. First, the author discussed literature
pertaining to contributions following 9/11 and other natural disasters. Because the previous
essay provides a review of the literature on the determinants of contributions, discussion of
research on these topics is generally limited. Instead, the author presents reasons why we
might expect the effects of these determinants to differ following disasters. Then, the
methodological approach is presented, followed by a description of the dataset. Results from
a set of first-difference models are presented and discussed, followed by a conclusion that
highlights implications and areas for further research.
Donations following 9/11
Although a tragic event in American history, 9/11 provides an opportunity to study
an exogenous change in contributions (Yurenka, 2009). Like the tsunami in 2004, Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, 9/11 spurred millions of dollars in
private contributions. In one of the few scholarly articles examining organizational level
contributions pre- and post- 9/11, Yurenka (2009) concludes that for select nonprofit
subsectors, fundraising efficiency improved. While fundraising expenses within the studied
subsectors of Public Safety and International Affairs rose, this resulted from new entry as
opposed to increasing fundraising by existing firms.
On the revenue side, it was unclear at the time whether the events of 9/11 would
attract new money into the nonprofit sector or attract money that would have floated to other
nonprofit subsectors. Studying indirect support, the Foundation Center surveyed foundations
to determine the sources of their relief and recovery grants. For the majority of foundations
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in the sample, at least part of their 9/11 grants replaced planned contributions to other
nonprofits (Renz, 2002). One might assume that private donors similarly responded, with a
number of individuals donating to recovery, rescue, and prevention efforts in lieu of their
more regular contribution patterns.
Such an idea is supported by numerous studies conducted shortly after 9/11. K.
Steinberg and Rooney (2005), for example, use a unique sample to compare donations and
volunteering pre- and post-9/11. A survey on household contributions to the nonprofit sector
was already underway when September 11th occurred, and while the same households were
not surveyed before and after, observations were collected using the same survey instrument
immediately before and after. For select demographics, the authors find increased likelihood
of giving and greater amounts donated (K. S. Steinberg & Rooney, 2005). K. Steinberg and
Rooney (2005) also provide a review of other studies tracking donations following the events
of 9/11.
A separate set of research on nonprofit organizations considered the plight of
organizations opening immediately after 9/11. Just over 300 organizations filed for
expedited granting of tax exempt status in 2001, but as of 2006, the vast majority of these
nonprofits could not be located (McNamara & Hrywna, 2006). Many of these organizations
may have satisfied their missions and closed; others may not have been able to handle the
competitiveness of the fundraising market after the initial 9/11 shock.
Competition for donations is a reality that nonprofit organizations face daily
(Feigenbaum, 1987; Thornton, 2006), and pressures are most severe for organizations that
rely heavily on charitable contributions. Nonprofit organizations‟ decisions about
fundraising expenses and the pursuit of other revenue sources undoubtedly affect the level of
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direct support an organization receives ( see (Baber, et al., 2001; Parsons, 2003; Tinkelman,
1999) for a few examples), but the vast majority of this research does not consider whether
their findings would withstand major exogenous events such as 9/11. To be fair, a lot of
research uses data prior to 9/11. Seminal works on financial proxies for efficiency, for
example, were written long before the terrorist attacks (Khanna, et al., 1995; Okten &
Weisbrod, 2000; Tinkelman, 1999; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). The same is true for
research on the crowding out of private contributions by government grants (Khanna &
Sandler, 2000; Payne, 1998; R. Steinberg, 1991). While significant research pre-dates 9/11,
researchers have not lost interest in estimating the relationships between efficiency, resource
allocation, and revenue streams (Brooks, 2004; Harrison & Laincz, 2010; Heutel, 2009;
Marudas & Jacobs, 2009; Tinkelman & Donabedian, 2007).
Previous research on contributions at the organizational level, for example, arrives at
two major conclusions. First, contributions are responsive to changes in nonprofits‟ expense
allocations, although most effects are weak to moderate (Bowman, 2006; Okten & Weisbrod,
2000; Tinkelman & Mankaney, 2007) Second, observed relationships between contributions
and government grants are likely the result of changes in nonprofits‟ behavior (Andreoni &
Payne, 2003; Harrison & Laincz, 2010) as opposed to informed responses by donors (Horne,
et al., 2005), explaining why estimates of crowding-out vary considerably (Tinkelman,
2010). Despite a large body of research on the determinants of contributions, the dynamics
between individual donors, government agencies, and nonprofits may change following an
unexpected disaster such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
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Potential Effects of Catastrophic Events
This essay rests on the notion that donors evaluate nonprofits‟ resources allocation
and revenue streams when making contributions differently following unexpected tragedies
than they would during more peaceful times. This section examines reasons why we might
expect differences.
First, let us distinguish between those industries that might be gainers and losers
following a catastrophe. As Yurenka (2009) notes, there was an increase in the number of
firms classified as Public safety and International Affairs. It is likely that money will flow
into organizations directly serving the population(s) affected, both in terms of geography and
the nature of services provided. To the extent that donors are shifting money from their
original nonprofit destinations to responding agencies, we should see a decline in nonresponding industries. If contributions in response to the event are in addition to other
contributions, then non-responding industries would not see a decline. It is likely that some
contributions are reallocated from other industries, while others are made from money that
would not have otherwise entered the nonprofit sector.
Because some industries likely experience increases in private contributions while
others experience decreases, we might expect that the determinants of contributions to
organizations in each of these groups differ. For example, organizations in those industries
directly responding the tragedies are likely to experience greater returns to their fundraising
efforts immediately following a tragedy. Non-responding organizations, unable to
immediately decrease fundraising, may not receive as great of a return to additional
fundraising expenses.
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In terms of government grants, it is not clear why non-responding agencies would
experience a change in crowding-out or crowding-in. What we may observe, however, is
that the relationship between government grants and contributions for these industries
becomes insignificant, as contributions decline while government funding remains stable.
For responding agencies, however, we might expect a shift towards crowding-in (or at least
less crowding out). Government grants may signal quality or need, in which case donors
respond with increased contributions.
The effect of program service revenues may also vary. Following disasters, relief
organizations are often helping those that cannot pay for services. If an organization is able
to collect revenues, that may deter contributions. For organizations not directly responding
to the event, contributions may also fall for organizations able to collect revenues from
service delivery, as donors see contributions to these organizations as optional for the
organizations‟ survival.
Finally, the issue of organizational efficiency is addressed. Previous research in this
dissertation suggests that private contributions are not responsive to small changes in
efficiency once we control for organizational fixed effects. With donors providing money to
organizations that have no history on which to rely, we would expect the continued
insignificance of efficiency both for responding and non-responding agencies. As was the
case in the previous essay, the author continues to adopt the most common proxy for
efficiency, price. Again, price is assumed equal to the ratio of total expenses to program
expenses. It is based on average expenses allocations rather than marginal values.
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Methodological Approach
To assess the impact of efficiency proxies, government grants, program service
revenues, and fundraising expenses on responding and non-responding organizations before
and after 9/11, the author proposes the following empirical methods. We begin with a simple
approach:

DirSuppi,t = B0 + B1 FRi,t + B2Gi,t-1 + B3PSRevi,t-1 + B4Pricei,t-1 + B5Pexpi,t-1 + ei,t (EQ 14)

Where DirSuppi,t represents the direct support, or contributions, to organization i in time t,
FRi,t is fundraising expenditures during time t, Gi,t-1 is government grants during time t-1,
PSRevi,t-1 is the previous time period‟s program service revenues, and Pexp i,t-1 measures the
organizations program expenses in the previous time period.
Acknowledging the importance of individual fixed effects, we could easily amend our
regression to include a factor, ui, a representation of an organization‟s characteristics that do
not vary with time. Our model becomes:
DirSuppi,t = B0 + B1 FRi,t + B2Gi,t-1 + B3PSRevi,t-1 + B4Pricei,t-1 + B5Pexpi,t-1 + ui + ei,t (EQ 15)
Rather than fixed effects models which remove the fixed factor by subtracting an
organization‟s average values from each of the variables, this essay opts instead for a firstdifferences (FD) approach. In theory, the first differences approach still removes the
unobserved time-invariant factor by subtracting the above equation for time t-1 from time t,
but the restriction is not as severe. Our FD model is:
DirSuppi,t = BFD + B1FRi,t + B2Gi,t-1 + B3PSRevi,t-1 + B4Pricei,t-1 + B5Pexpi,t-1 + ei,t
(EQ 16)
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Although a constant term is not necessary in the FD approach, one is included for the
following reason. Direct support may change even when other revenues and expenses do
not. The term, BFD, will capture these trends. If statistically insignificant, then it is likely
that the constant B0 does not change over time.
Given the likely bias from the OLS models, results displayed through the remainder
of this paper are limited to those from the First Differences approach, as presented in
Equation 16.
Data
To examine the effects of tragedies such as 9/11 on the determinants of private
contributions, the author again uses the Digitized Data assembled by the National Center for
Charitable Statistics and Guidestar. It includes nonprofit tax returns between 1998 and 2003
(National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2003) for all nonprofit organizations with revenues
in excess of $25,000. While the smallest organizations are underrepresented in the sample,
the data are assumed to still represent the vast majority of the formal nonprofit sector.
The same process to clean the data as described in the previous essay is used.
Organizations that do not provide direct services according to their activity codes are
removed from the sample. So, too, are organizations with questionable data.
In this essay, however, a smaller subset of nonprofits is selected. The discussion
above suggests that there are industries that gain and others that lose, responders and nonresponders respectively. To represent both groups, fur industries are created using the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Core Codes. The first industry and the one of most
interest is Disaster Preparedness and Relief (M30s and M40s). This category includes
nonprofits whose primary activities are listed as Search and Rescue, Fire Prevention, and
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First Aid. One might assume that following 9/11, many Americans were interested in
funding public safety organizations. The second category was also thought to be affected by
the events of 9/11, International Development (Q30s). This category includes organizations
involved in economic development, relief, and developing democracy in foreign countries.
Unlike with Disaster relief the direction of the public‟s response to International
Development may be ambiguous. Individuals‟ awareness of political and economic issues in
other regions may have increased, thus encouraging donations, but it is also possible that
9/11 created resentment among other donors.
The other two categories were chosen as comparison groups. The author selected
Performing Arts (A60s) for two reasons. First, New York City is known for the quality of its
performing arts. Second, it could be argued that the beneficiaries of performing arts
nonprofits are largely confined to a specific geographical region. So, too, is the work of
many Disaster Preparedness or Relief organizations. The second industry selected is
Environmental Conservation (C30s). Like International Development, it is feasible that
resources flow to geographical areas far removed from the donors‟ own communities.
Table 33 presents summary statistics for key financial variables. Each category is
separated, but for simplicity, years have been combined to calculate averages within the
category. Following each number in parentheses is the variables‟ ratio relative to total
expenses or revenues. It should also be noted that the summary statistics are presented only
for those observations that are used in this analysis. Trends over time for all organizations
are highlighted later in this paper.
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Table 33
Summary Statistics by Industry
Variable
Direct
Support
Fundraising
Exp.
Government
Gr.
Program Exp.
Program
Service R.
Price
Obs.

Disaster
Preparedness
71191.61 (.28)

International
Development
2389585.00 (.57)

5613.50 (.03)

163558.10 (.04)

50060.42 (.20)

828662.00 (.20)

171727.20 (.77)

3443553.00 (.89)

73835.50 (.29)

307289.30 (.07)

2.36
12866

1.93
8046

Performing
Arts
251910.50
(.35)
29993.88
(.05)
43738.60
(.06)
484260.50
(.76)
326633.70
(.46)
3.12
29574

Environmental
Conservation
529761.10 (.58)
32143.40 (.05)
146271.40 (.16)
542872.90 (.84)
116155.60 (.13)
2.32
8293

International Development organizations are smallest in number but by far the largest
in average contributions (in absolute terms). Of the four categories, Disaster Preparedness
and Relief organizations are the least dependent on direct support as a proportion of program
expenses, but they also spend significantly less on fundraising in absolute terms. Performing
Arts nonprofits are most dependent on program service revenues in absolute terms, but
surprisingly, as a share of program expenses, Disaster Preparedness and Relief organizations
are second. This may result from the first aid organizations which likely charge for training.
Government grants as a percentage of total revenues are equally important to Disaster
Preparedness and International Development organizations, but Environmental Conservation
does not lag far behind as a share of total expenses and receives almost three times as much
government funding as Disaster Preparedness in absolute terms. While differences exist
between the categories, particularly in size, similar allocations across expenses and income
composition make these categories an interesting group for analysis.
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Results
The first part of this analysis is largely descriptive, providing an overview of trends in
the sector and specific industries included in this study. Figure 1 displays the number of
firms filing Form 990 in each fiscal year. Numbers on the nonprofit sector as a whole are
provided on the right axis, whereas the frequency of Performing Arts, Disaster Preparedness,
International Development, and Environmental Conservation are on the left axis.

Figure 1
Number of Nonprofits by Subsector
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For the sector as a whole, the number of nonprofits increased almost 15% between
1998 and 1999, and then grew at a rate between 3.5 and 6.0 percent for the remaining years
except the time between 2001 and 2002, when there was virtually no growth. Performing
Arts organizations followed a similar pattern, with slightly more growth (as a percentage of
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the existing number of firms) when compared to the sector as a whole. Again, growth
between 2001 and 2002 is negligible. Disaster Preparedness, International Development, and
Environmental Conservation nonprofit industries follow similar trajectories except the
increased growth rate of International Development organizations between 2002 and 2003.
Each of these categories grew at more than three percent during 2001 to 2002 when the
sector as a whole was stagnant.
The number of organizations in a particular industry is only part of the picture.
Perhaps more important are the revenues reported within each sector. Figure 2 again
compares the categories across time, with the revenues of the sector as a whole presented on
the right.

Figure 2
Total Revenues by Subsector
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Revenues in the nonprofit sector grew at a more stable pace than the number of
nonprofits. Growth consistently falls between 4.5 and six percent, with the exception of the
2001 to 2002 time span, when the sector‟s revenues fell 1.5 percent. With a stock market
bubble bursting and a recession beginning before 9/11, many donors and foundations found
themselves reducing contributions prior to the terrorist attacks.
Each of the subsectors follows distinct paths. Revenues in the Performing Arts are
generally more cyclical, and thus a decline of 6.5 percent between 2001 and 2002 does not
seem as alarming. Although there are fewer Environmental Conservation nonprofits, they
generate more aggregated revenues than the Disaster Preparedness organizations. For the
Environmental Conservation nonprofits, growth rates ranged from eight percent to more than
25 percent for all years except 2001-2002, when revenues fell almost 15 percent.
International Development nonprofits, while growing only moderately in number, more than
doubled their reported revenues during the six years in this dataset. For all years except
2001-2002, this industry‟s revenues increased between ten and twenty eight percent.
Between 2001 and 2002, revenues increased a modest 3.5 percent.
Disaster Preparedness, however, follows a unique trajectory. Revenues follow a mild
growth path until 2001-2002, when revenues increase by 66 percent. The following time
period, 2002-2003, revenues decline by more than a third, returning to a growth path more
consistent with pre-9/11 revenues. Much of this growth occurred within New York State, but
organizations outside of New York still grew twenty percent between 2001 and 2002.
The above table documents growth in total revenues, but this essay is particularly
interested in private contributions (or direct support). Because some of these organizations
may be receiving a significant proportion of their revenues through program services or
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government grants, the following figure presents information only on direct support. Again,
the nonprofit sector is on the right axis.

Figure 3
Direct Support (Private Contributions) by subsector
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Although at different levels, the trends in direct support largely follow those of total
revenues with a few important exceptions. For example, total revenues for the nonprofit
sector recovered in 2003. The graph above suggests that while total revenues rose, private
contributions continued to fall for the sector. The same is true for organizations classified as
Environmental Conservation. By 2003, aggregate contributions were less than the level
reported in 2000. Between 1998 and 2001, contributions to Performing Arts organizations
were the most volatile, failing to create a smooth path like we find in other categories. :L_
“Following the dip in aggregate contributions in 2002, direct support rose in 2003, but the
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recovery fell short of 2001 levels. International Development organizations‟ growth in
private contributions slows after 2001, but the industry never suffers an actual loss.

Finally,

private contributions to Disaster Preparedness nonprofits spike between 2001 and 2002,
before returning to levels closer to those prior to 9/11.
The final figure graphically represents average contributions for organizations in each
subsector, data that could be extracted from the figures above but is still interesting to see on
its own. Recognizing the differences between organizational and industry trends is
imperative to understanding organizations‟ specific concerns even within growing
subsectors.

Figure 4
Average Direct Support by Subsector
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This is the only figure in which the Nonprofit Sector as a whole is on the left axis
along with most industries while International Development is on the right. Average size of
International Development nonprofits far exceeds the average in the sector and other
industries. Unlike its growth in the aggregate, however, organizations, on average,
experienced declining private contributions between 2001 and 2003. No industry, however,
experienced the declines realized by Environmental Conservation organizations. After
growing rapidly between 1998 and 2001, contributions continuously fall and by 2003,
average contributions equaled those from 1998. Changes in the Performing Arts, like the
sector as a whole, were much less dramatic, but in both cases, there is little difference
between real direct support in 1998 and 2003. Finally, for Disaster Preparedness nonprofits,
we find the expected increase in average contributions between 2001 and 2002 and a decline
in the following year.
The trends provide an overview of what might be occurring in the nonprofit sector,
but they do not answer the questions of what factors affect contributions at the organizational
level and how donors change responses to these factors when major, unexpected events such
as those of 9/11 occur. For the next step, we turn to our empirical strategy and focus
specifically on the four specific industries described earlier.
First Differences Equations
Empirical results in this section are based on Equation 16, described in greater detail
in the methodology section. Results are estimated for each category and time period to
highlight differences pre- and post- 9/11 differences across responding and non-responding
industries. Results should be interpreted as within organization estimates, with parameters
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representing the expected change in direct support between time t and t-1 given a change in
the independent variables during times t and t-1 or times t-1 and t-2 for the lagged variables.
In the case of Performing Arts, we find that changes in fundraising between 1999 and
2000 yielded changes in direct support similar to those expected if an organization were
maximizing net revenues (R. Steinberg, 1986a). The coefficient for fundraising between
2000 and 2001 is most surprising, increasing to an expected return of more than seven dollars
per additional dollar allocated to fundraising, ceteris paribus. Changes in fundraising
between 2001 and 2002 and then between 2002 an 2003 did not significantly affect the level
of direct support. Prior to September 11th, government grants were expected to crowd out
direct support, a finding that differs from the OLS predictions. Between 2001 and 2002,
organizations that received more government grants could expect to receive increased
contributions, whereas there is no statistically significant effect on direct support by
government grants between 2002 and 2003. Growth discouraged contributions in the first
two columns, whereas an increase in program expenses increased contributions between
2001 and 2002. It is also the case that changes in price between 2001 and 2002 are
negatively associated with changes in contributions between 2002 and 2003. Finally, a
$1000 increase in program service revenues increases the expected change in direct support
by $230 and $972 dollars between 1999, 2000, and 2001, but decreases the expected change
in direct support by $1,166 and $133 between 2001, 2002, and 2003.
With the exception of price, a pattern emerges in looking at the signs and significance
of the remaining variables. Signs and significance match in the first two columns, although
there is variation in the magnitude. Between 2001 and 2002, however, significance is either
lost (for fundraising) or the parameters completely change signs. What were negative
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relationships become positive and vice versa. In 2003, many of the variables become
insignificant or decrease in magnitude from the 2001-2002 levels, suggesting a slow return to
pre-9/11 levels.

Table 34
First Differences - Performing Arts
Performing
Arts
Fundraising
Expenses
Government
Grants
(lagged)
Program
Expenses
(lagged)
Program
Service
Revenues
(lagged)
Price (lagged)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1999 - 2000
1.129***
(0.132)
-0.155***
(0.051)

2000 - 2001
7.052***
(0.128)
-0.208**
(0.088)

2001 - 2002
-0.390
(0.242)
0.237*
(0.137)

2002 - 2003
0.195
(0.181)
-0.011
(0.022)

-0.273***
(0.040)

-0.774***
(0.096)

0.150**
(0.067)

0.011
(0.022)

0.230***
(0.044)

0.972***
(0.112)

-1.166***
(0.081)

-0.133***
(0.040)

-159.357
3,045.814
-4,308.598
-17,486.461***
(749.236)
(4,859.918)
(6,087.633)
(3,703.883)
26,716.394*
28,874.466
-37,932.696
-20,155.425
Constant
(14,019.455)
(28,293.998)
(26,235.006)
(14,262.495)
2832
3259
3399
3649
Observations
0.04
0.49
0.33
0.02
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

With the results from Performing Arts organizations creating a clear pattern, we look
to see whether that pattern is replicated in our second comparison category, Environmental
Conservation. Although the results are not as strong, there is one pattern that emerges. For
all determinants (except price which lacks significance), it is always the case that the
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parameters between 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 change sign (or at least lose significance as is
the case with government grants). For example, between 2001 and 2002, an additional dollar
allocated to fundraising was expected to increase direct support by almost $38, ceteris
paribus. An increase in fundraising of the same magnitude between 2002 and 2003 is
expected to decrease the change in direct support by almost $8. Government grants are
expected to crowd-in direct support for all years until 2002, with the greatest expected
change between 2001 and 2002, when an additional $1000 in government grants is expected
to increase direct support by $1481, significantly more than dollar-for-dollar. By 2003,
however, changes in government grants have no effect on direct support. The over-all
crowding in by government grants contradicts the expectations set forth in the OLS models,
when most of the years exhibited crowding out rather than crowding in parameters. By
controlling for organizational fixed effects, we also find differences in the parameters for the
change in program service revenues compared to the earlier specification. In the OLS model,
the coefficient on this variable was negative in most cases. Now, it lacks significance half of
the time, and between 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, increases in program service revenues are
expected to increase and then decrease direct support by almost identical levels – close to
$350 per $1000 change in program service revenue.
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Table 35
First Differences - Environmental Conservation
Environment
Conservation
Fundraising
Expenses
Government
Grants
(lagged)
Program
Expenses
(lagged)
Program
Service
Revenues
(lagged)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1999 - 2000
3.405***

2000 - 2001
2.022

2001 - 2002
37.928***

2002 - 2003
-7.984***

(0.703)
0.847***

(2.103)
1.075***

(2.617)
1.481***

(1.589)
-0.065

(0.090)
-0.019

(0.218)
0.056

(0.324)
-0.180***

(0.105)
0.103**

(0.026)
0.372

(0.063)
-1.066

(0.060)
0.347**

(0.045)
-0.362***

(0.254)
(0.684)
(0.140)
(0.059)
-97.495
-298.853
-1,151.684
858.810
(692.704)
(7,371.088)
(7,307.593)
(14,498.966)
118,555.747*
257,771.002
-163,734.446
57,569.362
Constant
(62,898.233)
(172,270.086)
(144,232.257)
(69,580.532)
739
841
930
1015
Observations
0.20
0.04
0.21
0.08
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
Price (lagged)

In originally conceptualizing this essay, the author expected the categories of
Performing Arts and Environmental Conservation to serve as comparison groups for Disaster
Preparedness and Relief and International Development. Both of these categories of
nonprofits, particularly Performing Arts, demonstrate changes that may have resulted from
9/11. In the case of Disaster Preparedness, 2001-2002 does not serve as the same switch
point. Consider the change in fundraising, for example. The variable is insignificant
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between 1999 and 2000, but following 2000, the returns to an additional dollar spent on
fundraising are fairly consistent between 55 cents and 79 cents. Changes in government
grants increase direct support between 1999 and 2000 and again between 2001 and 2002, but
had no significant effect during the other time spans in this analysis. Size, as measured by
program expenses, is consistently negative and significant but does increase in magnitude
following the events of 9/11. Program service revenues are insignificant before 2000, but in
2000-2001 and 2001-2002, the relationship is positive, reaching a height of a $240 change in
direct support given a $1000 increase in program service revenues.

It is not until 2002-2003

that we observe a change in sign, with a statistically significant but relatively small, negative
effect. Unlike the Performing Arts, no clear pattern emerges.

Table 36
First Differences - Disaster Preparedness and Relief
Disaster Prep

Fundraising Expenses
Government Grants (lagged)
Program Expenses (lagged)
Program Service Revenues
(lagged)

(1)
1999 2000
0.064
(0.070)
0.145***
(0.036)
-0.129***
(0.019)
0.061

(2)
2000 2001
0.793***
(0.195)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.056***
(0.016)
0.080***

(3)
2001 2002
0.550***
(0.083)
0.253***
(0.042)
-0.224***
(0.024)
0.240***

(4)
2002 2003
0.751***
(0.236)
0.119
(0.077)
-0.276***
(0.042)
-0.043***

(0.052)
(0.027)
(0.036)
(0.016)
-1.035
-1.078
-641.346
-35.589
Price (lagged)
(100.095)
(108.466)
(540.641)
(585.869)
1,468.148
3,043.109
2,672.240
3,870.118
Constant
(3,579.435) (3,276.816) (4,092.907) (5,859.285)
1177
1373
1491
1567
Observations
0.06
0.03
0.08
0.04
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
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Results from the first differences model for International Development are presented
in the next table. As was the case with Disaster Preparedness, 2001-2002 does not emerge as
a year in which we find considerable changes for all variables involved. The effect of
fundraising during this time period, for example, is the second lowest in the time span
considered. Changes in government grants are not expected to change direct support
between 1999 and 2000, but after 2000, crowding out occurs and continuously grows in
magnitude. For example, a $1000 increase in government grants between times t-1 and t-2
decreases direct support by $220, $776, and $1,573 in each of the years following 2000.
Increases in size are initially associated with increased direct support but lose significance in
2001 and become negative between 2001 and 2002 before decreasing in magnitude in 2003.
Program service revenue, the last variable of interest in this model, is insignificant in all
years except 2002-2003, when a one dollar increase in program service revenue is expected
to decrease the change in direct support by 82 cents.
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Table 37
First Differences – International Development
International
Development

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1999 - 2000
2000 - 2001
2001 - 2002
2002 - 2003
1.658***
5.770***
3.023***
8.334***
(0.198)
(0.421)
(1.108)
(0.404)
-0.183
-0.220**
-0.776***
-1.573***
Government Grants
(0.118)
(0.088)
(0.187)
(0.132)
(lagged)
0.126***
0.020
-0.769***
-0.183***
Program Expenses
(0.030)
(0.016)
(0.093)
(0.035)
(lagged)
-0.264
-0.047
0.013
-0.820***
Program Service
(0.327)
(0.140)
(0.285)
(0.066)
Revenues (lagged)
-4,194.426
2,644.358
-6,473.215
-3,692.481
Price (lagged)
(19,759.761) (17,050.126) (254,344.740) (45,142.209)
-32,931.473
-50,222.917
617,556.702
190,885.038
Constant
(135,374.379) (105,914.307) (457,285.649) (177,808.416)
708
809
859
925
Observations
0.28
0.20
0.23
0.63
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
Fundraising Expenses

Thus far, the results have demonstrated that 9/11 may have affected the determinants
of contributions more for non-responding organizations than those responding directly to the
tragedy. The results thus far, however, make no distinction between organizations
geographically located in an area directly affected by 9/11 and those in other parts of the
country.
Geographic Distinctions
In this section, we reconsider the case of Disaster Preparedness and Relief
organizations and compare organizations in the tri-state area (New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut) and the D.C. area (DC, Maryland, and Virginia) with those in the rest of the
United States. Numerous nonprofits emerged to address the needs of these two areas
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following the terrorist attacks. It is also the area where most donations flowed. Because
donors were faced with a greater choice of nonprofits in these areas, we might expect to find
more significance in our determinants of contributions. Outside of these areas, there are
fewer disaster preparedness organizations, and with more market power, past performance
may be less significant in determining the level of contributions.
The next table uses the same sample as that in Table 36 but includes interaction terms
to separate the effects of each measure within and outside of the NYC and D.C. areas. The
results suggest significant differences based on the proximity to the terrorist attacks, although
not all differences are in the expected direction.
Consider fundraising expenses. For organizations outside of the tri-state and DC
areas, changes in fundraising between 1999, 2000, and 2001 did not significantly change
private contributions. In the tri-state and DC area states, however, fundraising is associated
with positive changes in direct support during the same years. Following 2001, increases in
fundraising positively increased the direct support of organizations in the other states,
although the return to a dollar increase in fundraising is expected to vary from 57 to 78 cents.
The effect of changes in fundraising for organizations in the tri-state or DC area, calculated
as the sum of the parameters on fundraising and fundraising in the tri-state or DC area, is not
significantly different from zero following 2001.
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Table 38
First Difference Estimation for Disaster Preparedness with Geographic Distinction

Tri State or DC
Fundraising Expenses
Fundraising*Tri State /
DC
Government Grants
(lagged)
Government Grants*Tri
State / DC (lagged)
Program Expenses
(lagged)
Program Expenses*Tri
State / DC (lagged)
Program Service
Revenues (lagged)
Program Service
Rev*Tri State / DC
(lagged)
Price (lagged)

(1)
1999 - 2000
2,511.148
(7,698.809)
0.063
(0.070)
1.655*
(0.892)
0.315***
(0.053)
-0.313***
(0.072)
-0.114***
(0.019)
0.045
(0.111)
0.074
(0.057)
-0.107
(0.138)

(2)
2000 - 2001
9,206.733
(6,765.423)
0.216
(0.206)
2.334***
(0.476)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.829***
(0.130)
-0.032**
(0.016)
-0.288***
(0.105)
0.032
(0.026)
1.270***
(0.141)

(3)
2001 - 2002
1,061.168
(8,521.339)
0.571***
(0.081)
-0.220
(0.582)
0.164***
(0.045)
-0.078
(0.120)
-0.077***
(0.027)
-0.548***
(0.052)
0.081**
(0.038)
0.481**
(0.231)

(4)
2002 - 2003
-21,904.606*
(12,289.730)
0.782***
(0.236)
-2.277*
(1.255)
0.112
(0.091)
0.026
(0.162)
0.006
(0.056)
-0.614***
(0.084)
-0.051***
(0.016)
-0.281
(0.339)

2.992
-24.633
-169.270
116.727
(99.380)
(103.578)
(532.277)
(1,008.101)
-2,681.956
-733.479
327.238
-113.105
Price*Tri State / DC
(3,186.939)
(1,922.721)
(3,165.830)
(1,227.752)
(lagged)
-408.287
-1,524.753
4,036.580
9,578.012
Constant
(4,302.790)
(3,769.297)
(4,768.672)
(7,008.981)
1177
1373
1491
1567
Observations
0.08
0.12
0.15
0.08
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

For organizations outside of DC and the tri-state area, changes in government grants
continue to increase direct support between 1999 and 2000 and again between 2001 and
2002. Within the tri-state area and around DC, however, changes in government grants are
associated with an increase in private contributions between 2000 and 2001.
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Increases in size, as measured by program expenses, are generally associated with an
expected decrease in direct support. For most states, increases in size are expected to
decrease direct support between 1999 and 2002. Organizations in the tri-state area and
surrounding DC, however, are expected to experience declines in contributions with growth,
but only between the years 2000 and 2003. Both this variable and government grants again
fail to fall into a clear pattern around 9/11.
Finally, we consider the effect of program service revenues on direct support. For
organizations outside of the tri-state and DC areas, increases in program service revenue
between 2001 and 2002 are expected to increase direct support, while further increases
between 2002 and 2003 are expected to decrease direct support. Organizations in and around
New York and DC, however, could expect increases in direct support following increases in
previous years‟ program service revenues between 2000 and 2002.
For comparison, the methods of Table 38 are replicated on a sample of Performing
Arts organizations, given the significance of New York to this particular industry. The
distinction remains between organizations within the tri-state and DC areas and the rest of the
country, but the majority of this sample (55%) consists of nonprofits within New York.
Table 39 presents results from this analysis.
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Table 39
First Difference Estimation for Performing Arts with Geographic Distinction

Tri State or DC
Fundraising Expenses
Fundraising*Tri State /
DC
Government Grants
(lagged)
Government
Grants*Tri State / DC
(lagged)
Program Expenses
(lagged)
Program Expenses*Tri
State / DC (lagged)
Program Service
Revenues (lagged)
Program Service
Rev*Tri State / DC
(lagged)
Price (lagged)

1999 - 2000
30,232.342
(32,592.773)
4.024***
(0.260)
-3.958***
(0.303)
-0.371**
(0.165)
0.316*
(0.175)

2000 - 2001
206,965.648***
(57,559.451)
-1.562***
(0.492)
9.760***
(0.505)
-0.484***
(0.086)
1.313***
(0.176)

2001 - 2002
-112,809.128*
(58,979.516)
-0.144
(0.353)
1.104
(1.097)
0.047
(0.143)
-0.711**
(0.348)

2002 - 2003
-20,120.701
(33,778.145)
1.240***
(0.235)
-3.945***
(0.619)
-0.010
(0.023)
0.155*
(0.084)

-0.426***
(0.046)
0.462***
(0.086)
0.409***
(0.057)
-0.386***
(0.089)

0.638***
(0.096)
-5.872***
(0.196)
-0.837***
(0.112)
7.166***
(0.231)

-0.115
(0.078)
0.919***
(0.183)
0.088
(0.100)
-2.771***
(0.184)

0.038
(0.024)
-0.162**
(0.070)
-0.031
(0.044)
-0.523***
(0.116)

5,310.901
-864.623
32.624
3,132.598
(4,718.795)
(4,156.473)
(6,846.109)
(5,227.465)
-5,462.450
-87,423.406
-66,246.91*** -14,850.962
Price*Tri State / DC
(4,775.803)
(92,617.838)
(24,642.571)
(12,389.891)
(lagged)
12,705.255
9,434.291
1,993.331
-12,961.979
Constant
(15,460.990) (27,576.542)
(28,161.891)
(15,875.040)
2832
3259
3399
3649
Observations
0.10
0.63
0.40
0.06
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

Unlike with Disaster Preparedness, the results for the Performing Arts when we allow
for geographic differences do not follow much of a pattern. Perhaps most notable is the lack
of significance for any of the main variables for organizations outside of DC or the tri-state
area between 2001-2002. If we look at variables across time, we find minimal evidence of
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9/11 effects – possibly the result of fiscal years that place September 11 th in the 2001 fiscal
year for some organizations – but we cannot draw such conclusions. For example,
fundraising outside the tri-state and DC areas positively affects private contributions between
1999 and 2000 and again between 2002 and2003. Between 2000 and 2001, we find that
increases in fundraising are associated with decreases in contributions, a possible outcome
from the reallocation of resources to other industries. The opposite effect emerges for
organizations within the tri-state and DC areas. Fundraising has a strong, positive effect
between 2000 and 2001 but a negative effect on contributions between 2002 and 2003.
Crowding out occurs prior to 2001 for organizations outside of the affected regions,
while organizations within the New York and DC regions experience crowding in between
2000 and 2001 and again between 2002 and 2003. For these organizations, we find crowding
out between 2001 and 2002.
Interestingly, we again find one instance in which price is a significant determinant of
contributions, but this time we find that the negative effect of price is significant for
organizations within the tri-state and DC areas, and only between 2001 and 2002.
Further analysis of the Performing Arts might focus on the effects of other changes
such as those in the economy that affected the determinants of contributions along with the
events of 9/11. At this time, however, this is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, this
paper continues the analysis with the geographic distinction in assessing the effects of 9/11
on the determinants of contributions to Disaster Preparedness and Relief organizations.
Robustness Checks
Thus far, analyses have used first difference techniques but are still generated by
ordinary least squares methodology. Parameters describe the expected changes to the
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conditional mean of direct support given a change in the independent variable. The
distribution of direct support for Disaster Preparedness and Relief nonprofits, however, is not
normal. A large proportion of observations (approximately twenty-five percent) do not
report any direct support, and yet very large organizations skew the average such that it is
almost ten times the median.
To check the robustness of the earlier results, the author estimates quantile
regressions for Disaster Preparedness and Relief organizations, where parameters are
calculated using least absolute value methods and estimate changes in the expected medians.
Such estimates are more robust to the presence of large outliers, and are presented in Table
40.
Results from the quantile regression are interesting. Many of the coefficients are
statistically different from zero, but their magnitudes are so small that any effects are
negligible. A few parameters, however, are worth exploring. For example, for organizations
outside of the tri-state and DC areas, changes in fundraising have little effect on the expected
median of direct support in all years except the time between 2001 and 2002, when a $1000
increase in fundraising is expected to increase the median change in direct support by almost
$740. Ironically, changes in fundraising for organizations located around New York or the
DC areas increase the conditional median of direct support in all years except 2001-2002. It
may have been the case that organizations in the tri-state and DC areas received similar
amounts of direct support regardless of fundraising efforts around the time of 9/11, ceteris
paribus.
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Table 40
Quantile Regression Estimates for Disaster Preparedness
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1999-2000
2000-2001 2001-2002
2002-2003
-6.898***
36.236
213.678***
-576.272***
Tri State or DC
(0.492)
(83.085)
(3.756)
(5.784)
0.000***
-0.006*** 0.735***
0.004***
Fundraising Expenses
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
1.094***
-0.693***
0.170***
Fundraising*Tri State / DC 1.312***
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.001)
0.000
-0.018*** 0.000**
-0.000
Government Grants
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(lagged)
0.001***
0.018***
0.004***
-0.004***
Government Grants*Tri
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
State / DC (lagged)
-0.007*** 0.000***
-0.000
Program Expenses (lagged) 0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.013***
0.006***
-0.009***
-0.029***
Program Expenses*Tri
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
State / DC (lagged)
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
Program Service Revenues -0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(lagged)
-0.001***
0.006***
0.018***
-0.003***
Program Service Rev*Tri
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
State / DC (lagged)
4.774***
-0.846
-1.526***
-10.580***
Price (lagged)
(0.000)
(0.558)
(0.229)
(0.428)
-348.132***
31.906
254.164***
-13.932***
Price*Tri State / DC
(0.184)
(23.189)
(1.312)
(0.470)
(lagged)
0.001
-35.413
-0.520
-0.098
Constant
(0.276)
(46.427)
(2.108)
(3.310)
1177
1373
1491
1567
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

For organizations outside of the tri-state and DC areas, changes in government grants
crowded out contributions for the median organization between 2000 and 2001 but crowded
in direct support between 2001 and 2002. This crowd-in, however, amounted to less than
one dollar for a $1000 change in government grants. In the tri-state and DC areas, the
conditional median is expected to increase by $4 per $1000 change in government grants
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between 2001 and 2002, while the exact opposite is true during 2002-2003. Organizations in
the tri-state and DC areas also expect decreases in direct support with increases in size,
although the largest of these effects is a decline of $30 in the conditional median when
program expenses increase by $1000 between 2002 and 2003.
Changes in program service revenue have no affect on the expected median of direct
support for organizations outside of the tri-state or DC areas, but inside these areas is another
story. We find small crowding out between 1999 and 2000, but crowding in occurs and
grows through 2002, before reverting back to a small crowding-out effect.
Lastly, by focusing on the median as opposed to the conditional mean, we find our
strongest support for an independent effect of price, ceteris paribus. The direction, however,
is not always as expected. For organizations outside of the tri-state and DC areas, a one
dollar increase in price increases the expected median of change in direct support by more
than $4 between 1999 and 2000. Price is insignificant the following year, and by 2001, price
has the anticipated negative effect. By 2003, we find that an increase in price decreases the
change in direct support by more than $10. In the tri-state area and DC surroundings, we
find that price negatively affects the median direct support between 1999 and 2000. This
effect turns insignificant between 2000 and 2001, but by 2002, the effect of price has become
significant and positive. Things begin returning to pre-9/11 levels by 2003, although the
negative effect remains significantly smaller in magnitude than that prior to 2001. It should
be noted, however, that a change in price of $1 requires a substantial reallocation of expenses
for most organizations.
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New versus Old organizations
The last comparison in this essay involves comparing those organizations that existed
prior to 9/11 with those that likely started up as a result of these events. Organizations
emerging in direct response to 9/11 such as Widows of Hope Family Relief Fund may be
significantly different from those organizations that operated prior to 9/11. As a result, the
author distinguishes between those organizations that filed From 990 in 2000 from those that
did not file their first returns until 2001 or after. Table 41 presents the following information.
The first two columns compare first difference estimates in 2003 for existing and new
organizations, respectively. Because of the lagged variables in the model and the effects of
first differencing, we will only have results for the time period 2002-2003. The last two
columns are not first-differences models but still include lagged terms, increasing the number
of usable years to two, 2002 and 2003.
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Table 41
Comparison of New and Existing Disaster Preparedness Organizations

Tri State or DC
Fundraising
Expenses
Fundraising*Tri
State / DC
Government
Grants (lagged)
Government
Grants*Tri State /
DC (lagged)
Program Expenses
(lagged)
Program
Expenses*Tri
State / DC (lagged)
Program Service
Revenues (lagged)
Program Service
Rev*Tri State /
DC (lagged)
Price (lagged)

(3)
Existing
2002-2003
-3,306.075
(6,979.677)
1.053***
(0.144)
-2.906***
(0.704)
0.117**
(0.048)
-0.042
(0.088)

(4)
New 20022003
-112,453.180*
(66,973.197)
0.114
(0.978)
1.862
(7.297)
-0.277
(1.204)
0.746
(1.530)

(6)
NEW 2002

(7)
NEW 2003

-178,448.544**
(86,457.064)
0.155
(0.892)
-0.697
(2.645)
-0.393
(0.557)
-0.472
(0.785)

24,920.212
(40,749.268)
-0.091
(0.745)
7.274***
(0.785)
-0.297
(0.227)
0.179
(0.377)

0.031
(0.034)
-0.575***
(0.051)

-0.189
(0.316)
-0.514
(0.418)

0.353
(0.254)
2.226***
(0.261)

0.287**
(0.129)
-0.235*
(0.129)

-0.051***
(0.008)
-0.498**
(0.205)

0.195
(0.491)
-0.083
(1.531)

-0.317
(0.257)
-1.533***
(0.472)

-0.277**
(0.137)
0.121
(0.183)

134.679
-153.228
-996.327
257.530
(724.693)
(3,154.375)
(10,625.476)
(2,284.721)
-116.415
410.490
2,752.631
-425.983
Price*Tri State /
(962.623)
(3,663.854)
(11,047.468)
(2,302.948)
DC (lagged)
5,183.166
30,801.649
43,891.748
49,476.036**
Constant
(3,975.760)
(37,679.469)
(52,878.484)
(24,667.889)
Yes
No
No
First Differencing Yes
1302
265
348
467
Observations
0.22
0.04
0.86
0.77
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

The first-difference models in the first two columns are substantially different.
Existing organizations in the tri-state and DC areas experienced declining direct support with
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increases in fundraising, ceteris paribus. The effect of government grants is insignificant,
suggesting neither crowding-in nor crowding-out, on average, for these organizations.
Increase in size for an organization and an increase in program service revenue are both
expected to decrease the change in direct support expected by an organization.

For

organizations originating after 9/11, changes in our variables of interest yield no significant
changes in direct support, and from the R-squared, we see that very little variation in changes
in direct support are explained. This may be the result of the newness of these
organizations, and different methods are presented in columns three and four to remove the
organizational fixed effects.
In columns three and four, we find that both models explain substantial crossorganization differences in new nonprofits, but the significance of various factors and
magnitudes of the variables vary considerably across years. Increases in fundraising, for
example, are only expected to increase direct support to new organizations in the tri-state and
DC areas, with a one dollar increase expected to increase private contributions by more than
$7. Government funding has no effect on new organizations in either of the years considered
regardless of location. Program expenses has a small effect on organizations outside of the
tri-state and DC areas in 2003 but not in 2002, whereas for organizations within the tri-state
area, program expenses increase direct support in 2002 but not in 2003. A similar pattern
emerges for program service revenues. In 2002, organizations in the tri-state and DC areas
can expect a decline in direct support with an increase in program service revenue, but this
factor loses significance in 2003. Organizations not in the tri-state area or surrounding DC,
however, could not expect a change in direct support with an increase in program service
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revenue in 2002 but could expect a $277 dollar increase for every $1000 increase in program
service revenues in 2003.
Discussion
Scholars have long studied the determinants of contributions at the organizational
level, but to date, little attention was given to how the determinants of private donations
might change following a major tragedy. This paper begins to develop a relevant theory and
provide empirical analysis on this issue, distinguishing between industries that did and did
not directly respond to victims‟ needs following the events to 9/11. To do so, four subsectors
are selected for comparison. Most relevant to 9/11 are the Disaster Preparedness and Relief
organizations. With New York one of the sites most affected by 9/11, Performing Arts is
selected as a comparison group given the importance of this sector to New York City. I was
also interested in how the determinants of contributions to International Aid changed given
the links between the terrorist attacks and specific regions of the world. Given that
Americans are not direct beneficiaries of International Aid, Environmental Conservation is
selected as a comparison given the public-goods nature of its mission.
Descriptively, significant differences in the growth of these four subsectors exist. For
example, direct support of Disaster Preparedness organizations remained relatively low and
stable, with the exception of an expected peak following 9/11. International Development is
the only category that grew across all years in the sample, although growth slowed following
9/11. Both Performing Arts and Environmental Conservation nonprofits suffered a drop in
contributions following 9/11, but while Performing Arts regained some of its lost ground by
2003, the direct support of Environmental Conservation continued to fall.
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The first sets of results presented are Ordinary Least Squares estimates. The results
across years are relatively consistent, although categorical differences exist. These models,
however, do not control for any time-invariant, unobservable fixed effects. Discussion,
therefore, is limited to the second set of first-differences results. Of all the categories
analyzed at this stage, donors to Performing Arts organizations display the most significant
change in behavior in response to 9/11. Government grants and size were both negatively
associated with changes in direct support while the relationship between program service
revenue and direct support was positive prior to 9/11, ceteris paribus. Each of these
relationships, however, changed directions following 9/11. Environmental Conservation
organizations followed a weaker pattern. For example, government grants crowded in
donations through 2002, when the effect peaked at more than a $1.48 return per additional
dollar in government grants. Between 2002 and 2003, however, changes in government
grants were not expected to affect the change in direct support. Program expenses and
program service revenues were both insignificant prior to 2001. Between 2001 and 2002, a
one dollar increase in program expenses decreases the expected change in direct support by
eighteen cents, and the same change in program service revenues increases our expectation
for direct support by almost thirty-five cents. Between 2002 and 2003, however, the
parameters on both of these variables reverse signs such that an increase in size is rewarded,
and organizations that further increase program service revenues are punished. International
Development nonprofits fail to follow any particular pattern related to 9/11, but the results
are still interesting. We find donors increasing their responsiveness to government grants
with crowding out ranging from insignificant between 1999 and 2000 to more than $1.50 per
dollar increase in government grants between 2002 and 2003. It also seems that following
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9/11, growing organizations could expect fewer contributions. Again, growth is lagged and
current fundraising is included in the model, so it should not be the case that organizations
are choosing to pursue other revenue streams than direct support. A summary of the signs
for significant variables is presented in Table 42 .

Table 42
Summary of Significant Findings
Category

Year

1999-„00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
1999-„00
International
2000-01
Development
2001-02
2002-03
1999-„00
Performing
2000-01
Arts
2001-02
2002-03
Environmental 1999-„00
2000-01
Conservation
2001-02
2002-03
Disaster
Preparedness

Fundraising Government
Grants
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+

+
+
+
+
+

Program
Expenses
+
+

+

Program
Service
Rev

Price

+
+
-

+
+
-

-

+
-

Upon beginning this analysis, the author believed Disaster Preparedness might be the
most interesting subsector. In the first differencing results, however, clear patterns around
9/11 did not emerge. Only program service revenues appear moderated by the event, peaking
at a twenty-four cent increase in expected direct support between 2001 and 2002 before
dropping to more than a four cent decrease between 2002 and 2003. Other variables
changed, but not as drastically. For example, a $1000 increase in program expenses between
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1999 and 2001 decreases our expected change in direct support between $56 and $129. After
2001, however, the same $1000 increase in program expenses was expected to decrease
direct support between $224 and $276. Lastly, we find a different pattern in government
grants, where increases in grants are associated with increased direct support between 1999
and 2000 and again between 2001 and 2002, while insignificant in the other years.
Perhaps the unexpected findings for Disaster Preparedness result from the
concentrated attacks in New York and Washington, DC. Testing this possibility, the next
step interacts a dichotomous indicator equal to one if an organization is in the tri-state area or
surrounding DC with each of the variables of interest. Generally speaking, the author finds
that returns to fundraising for organizations in DC and the tri-state area are greater before
9/11, whereas the return for organizations outside of these areas is greatest after 2001.
Interestingly, organizations outside of the tri-state and DC area realize a less than dollar-fordollar change. Government grants crowd in contributions for organizations outside of NY
and DC in only two of the years, whereas organizations located in NY and DC experience
crowd-in during only one of the years analyzed. Overall, increases in size are generally
associated with decreased support for Disaster Preparedness Organizations, although the
effect is much more pronounced for organizations located inside the tri-state or DC areas.
Finally, the author finds a $1000 increase in program service revenue for organizations in
locations other than the tri-state and DC areas increases our expected change in direct support
by $81 between 2001 and 2002 but decreases the expected change in direct support by $51
between 2002 and 2003. Program service revenue increases our expected change in direct
support for those organizations in the tri-state and DC areas by $481 between 2001 and 2002
and more than $1200 between 2000 and 2001 for each $1000 change, ceteris paribus. While
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we still fail to identify a clear pattern, this part of the analysis firmly demonstrates that the
relative weights of factors are affected by location and proximity to the disaster.
To further test results, two more sets of regressions are estimated for Disaster
Preparedness organizations. First, the author removes the effects of outliers by estimating
the conditional median rather than mean. Interestingly, the author finds more evidence of a
9/11 effect now than with the first-difference ordinary least squares estimates. For example,
the return to fundraising spikes between 2001 and 2002 for organizations outside of the tristate and DC areas, although the expected effect on the median is still below the level needed
for service maximization. In the other years studied, the coefficients are so close to zero that
one might think these organizations are maximizing revenues rather than services (Steinberg
1986). For the New York and DC areas, however, the returns to fundraising pre-9/11 were
close to one but drop significantly between 2001 and 2002 when the total effect for these
organizations is not statistically different from zero. Changes in government grants are also
associated with increases in direct support in the tri-state and DC areas for all periods before
2002-2003, although the magnitudes of crowding-in are small. For organizations located in
areas not directly affected by 9/11, the relationship between changes in government grants
and direct support is barely different from zero with the exception of 2000-2001 when it
would require a $100,000 change in government grants to decrease direct support by
approximately $1800. We also find that size has a moderate but significant effect on
organizations in the New York and DC regions.
Program service revenues affect organizations located around New York and DC but
not organizations outside of these areas. Increases in program service revenues decrease the
conditional median of direct support between 1999 and 2000 and again between 2002 and
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2003. Between 2000 and 2002, increases in program service revenue increase the expected
median of direct support, but even the maximum estimated impact is only $18 for each $1000
program service revenue increase.
Most interesting from the quantile (median) regressions is the finding that changes in
price significantly affect the expectation of direct support, just not always in the anticipated
direction. For example, for organizations outside of the tri-state and DC areas, an increase in
price was associated with an increase in direct support before 9/11 and a decrease in direct
support after 2001. The opposite was true for organizations inside of the affected areas.
Experiencing an increase in price decreased the expected median of direct support between
1999 and 2000 but increases our expectation between 2001 and 2002. The relationship again
becomes negative in 2002-2003, but the magnitude in this year is much smaller than the other
two periods with significant effects.
The second robustness test separates organizations into two groups based on their
existence prior to 9/11. When we estimate first difference models, we find that several of our
factors continue to explain changes in direct support in directions already discussed.
Interestingly, our factors do not significantly explain any of the changes in direct support for
organizations that did not file Form 990 prior to 2001. The organizations‟ fixed effects are
removed, thus reducing our ability to produce causal relationships, but we find numerous
differences in the relationships between direct support and our other variables between
estimates for 2002 and 2003.
What may explain these findings, particularly as they relate to Disaster Preparation
and Relief? We might consider whether all nonprofits serving victims are represented in the
sample. The Red Cross, classified as Human Services rather than Disaster Relief, is
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excluded, but we know they collected millions of dollars in donations. Other organizations
may be classified according to the services they provide but responded directly to the events
of 9/11. For example, health clinics assisting patients who were in Manhattan on 9/11 may
have received increased donations but are excluded from this analysis according to the
classification codes. Another possibility is that organizations are classified in Public Safety
(M) but have activity codes that suggest their primary function is the collection and
redistribution of resources as opposed to direct service provision. These organizations are
also excluded from the analysis.
Finally, it is difficult to separate 9/11 effects from those of the economic recession
that occurred around the same time. A longer time period with other events and economic
changes is necessary to detangle the confounding effects.
Conclusion
The events of 9/11 were tragic, but as one reporter wrote, they served as a “catalyst”
to spur an increased sense of patriotism in Americans (Ross, 2005). An attack on “home
soil,” even if hundreds or thousands of miles away, touched the hearts of Americans who in
turn opened their wallets and contributed for relief services. Our reaction is not surprising.
A recent study of Australians‟ giving patterns around disasters concluded that the public‟s
response is positively correlated with the number of people affected and the amount of media
attention a disaster receives, among other factors (Feeny & Clarke, 2007).
While we know contributions flowed to organizations helping those affected by the
terrorist attacks, we also know that aggregate contributions to the nonprofit sector declined
slightly. If people were giving to Disaster Preparedness organizations, it was coming at the
expense of other nonprofits. While scholars tracked growth in giving following 9/11, few
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were interested in those organizations that might have suffered, and no one analyzed
organizational characteristics that affected whether private contributions increased or
decreased.
This paper is the first to assess how the events of 9/11 affected the determinants of
contributions at the organizational level. In other words, are organizational characteristics
that are important for contributors before 9/11 less important immediately after? The
findings from this paper suggest that 9/11 had less of an effect on changing the determinants
of contributions for organizations responding to 9/11, such as Disaster Preparedness, than it
did for industries not directly responding, such as Performing Arts.
It seems as if the determinants to contributions change more significantly for
industries losing funding rather than those receiving an influx of private contributions, an
interesting finding that might counter a priori expectations. In other words, most people
would expect that some sectors gain revenues while others lose revenues following disasters,
but to date, no one has looked at this process and assessed whether the exogenous event such
as 9/11 affects the responding and non-responding sectors differently.
The external validity or generalizability of these results may also be questioned. For
example, are these results unique to 9/11 or would we find similar patterns around other
catastrophes? Unfortunately, the dataset selected limits the analysis to 9/11, but a longer
time span of data would allow future researchers to verify or disconfirm these findings
around other unexpected tragedies such as the tsunami in 2005, Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, for example.
Aside from disasters, there are other instances in which we might study the reduction
of funding, specifically following stories of misallocation of resources by large nonprofit
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organizations. An element of trust between society and the nonprofit sector must remain
intact for individuals to voluntarily give (Fleishman, 1999). Evidence of misuse of funds or
poor leadership damages that trust, and as a result, the sector as a whole or smaller subsectors
may suffer.
This essay explained variation and changes in direct support at the organizational
level, but perhaps another approach is to use time series techniques to analyze trends at the
industry or subsector levels. We talk about the relationship between the nonprofit sector and
government as being adversarial or complementary (Young, 2006), but what if a similar
relationship exists between nonprofits. Nonprofits could collaborate in the traditional sense,
or they could compete with one another for funds and clients, but what if there is another
possibility? Suppose that fundraising by some organizations affects contributions to another.
Humane Society commercials, for example, feature heart wrenching stories that plant a seed,
but what if instead of giving to the Humane Society, someone makes a donation to another
no-kill shelter. Media attention and fundraising requests by some organizations following
9/11 may have encouraged contributions to organizations who essentially free-rode off
others‟ fundraising. If this occurs, it could explain the lack of significance or small
magnitudes of some of our organizational variables. Including controls for industry level
expenses or reconsidering our level of observation could resolve these issues.
There remain a number of issues, both theoretical and empirical, that necessitate
further research. Economists are making strides in researching the nonprofit sector, but at the
organizational level, a considerable amount of work remains. Identifying those factors that
affect private contributions is an important step, but researchers must remain cognizant that
these factors can change over time and for a number of reasons. Regardless of why donors
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give, we hope that their choice of recipient is based on a rational decision-making process.
To prove useful to the nonprofit sector, it is up to researchers to help organizations
understand how and why donors respond and hope that this information improves the
efficiency of the nonprofit sector.
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